Les expériences anarchistes

[h16]

ça se déroule comment ce type de réunion?

Un orateur présente un sujet. Il a exactement 1h03 pour parler. S'il dépasse, il est mangé. S'il se racle la gorge pendant sa présentation, il est mangé. S'il est trop court, même d'une minute, il est mangé. S'il bégaye, s'il tousse, s'il chuchote ou s'il braille, il est mangé. Tout cru.

En général, les convives font un bon repas.

Viens !

[Bob]

Et oui une ville privée qui a le monopole (au sens courant) de la justice sur son territoire est un État. Que cela ne te plaises pas n'y change rien, tu dois apprendre à vivre avec l'idée que le français n'a pas été inventé par des anarcaps.

A propos, est-ce que la copropriété qui gérerait les parties communes, les services collectifs (entretien des routes, ramassage des ordures,…) et ferait respecter le règlement interne d'une entité géographique regroupant plusieurs propriétaires privés ce n'est pas un peu la réinvention de la commune?

[Rincevent]

A propos, est-ce que la copropriété qui gérerait les parties communes, les services collectifs (entretien des routes, ramassage des ordures,…) et ferait respecter le règlement interne d'une entité géographique regroupant plusieurs propriétaires privés ce n'est pas un peu la réinvention de la commune?

Selon Simonnot, la copropriété est un Etat. Minuscule, rudimentaire et très loin de la forme que l'Etat moderne a prise, mais un début d'Etat quand même.

[Bob]

Selon Simonnot, la copropriété est un Etat. Minuscule, rudimentaire et très loin de la forme que l'Etat moderne a prise, mais un début d'Etat quand même.

Tout individu est lié par un réseau de contrats. Je crois que Simonnot établi une rupture à partir du moment où la seule solution permettant d'échapper à une obligation contractuelle (comme le respect d'un réglement de copropriété) est de déménager physiquement et de se trouver un logement en dehors de la "juridiction" précédente. De là à parler "d'Etat"… Pourtant lorsqu'un jour j'ai fait remarquer - en plus de l'argument de Simonnot - qu'une copropriété de propriétaires fonciers privés "ressemblait" beaucoup à une commune, au sens ou elle rend des services similaires et implique un minimum de processus politique (comme le vote lors des assemblées du syndic), je me suis attiré les foudres de Pascal S. et Bertrand L. (qui par charité n'ont pas trop insisté mais j'ai bien senti que j'avais dit une connerie). En fait je crois que ce qui n'est pas passé c'était de suggérer que les anarcaps "réinventaient" peu ou prou la commune.

[melodius]

Pour ma part je définirais l'anarchie comme un système politique qui ne reconnait aucun monopole légal.

Selon Simonnot, la copropriété est un Etat. Minuscule, rudimentaire et très loin de la forme que l'Etat moderne a prise, mais un début d'Etat quand même.

Simonnot a un petit côté libertaire, voire anomiste, qui m'effraie un peu. Je m'étonne d'ailleurs que ses écrits te plaisent tant.

A part ça c'est un type charmantissime.

[Rincevent]

Simonnot a un petit côté libertaire, voire anomiste, qui m'effraie un peu. Je m'étonne d'ailleurs que ses écrits te plaisent tant.

Ses écrits ont un côté subversif qui me plait beaucoup.

A part ça c'est un type charmantissime.

De fait. Mais ses dents m'effraient davantage que ses écrits.

[Apollon]

Pour ma part je définirais l'anarchie comme un système politique qui ne reconnait aucun monopole légal.

Ce qui me rappelle que l article wikipedia sur le sujet risque de basculer vers la conception collectiviste.

[Stranger]

Il est facile de déterminer si une ville privé est un monopole. Si la ville t'expulse et ton contrat stipule que tu as droit de rester, et que la seule autorité à qui porter plainte est la ville, c'est un état.

Si la ville doit te poursuivre dans un tribunal tiers pour t'expulser, ce n'est pas un état.

[Guest Arn0]

Il est facile de déterminer si une ville privé est un monopole. Si la ville t'expulse et ton contrat stipule que tu as droit de rester, et que la seule autorité à qui porter plainte est la ville, c'est un état.

Si la ville doit te poursuivre dans un tribunal tiers pour t'expulser, ce n'est pas un état.

Je suis assez d'accord pour le coup.

[Guest jabial]

Selon Simonnot, la copropriété est un Etat. Minuscule, rudimentaire et très loin de la forme que l'Etat moderne a prise, mais un début d'Etat quand même.

D'un autre côté, poru Simonnot, il n'y a pas de rupture entre esclavage et salariat. Ici comme là, il confond tout.

[Ronnie Hayek]

D'un autre côté, poru Simonnot, il n'y a pas de rupture entre esclavage et salariat. Ici comme là, il confond tout.

Oui, il aime bien dire : "il n'y a pas de solution de continuité entre ceci et cela". Finalement, avec ce genre de raisonnement, tout est dans tout, et inversement.

[Mike]

Viens !

Bon, on verra!

[Roniberal]

Alors, tu t'es décidé sur le sujet? Qui serait ton éventuel directeur de mémoire au fait?

[Mike]

Alors, tu t'es décidé sur le sujet? Qui serait ton éventuel directeur de mémoire au fait?

Je voulais soumettre la chose à M Gasparini et M Quastana, malheureusement le premier était au Vietnam et le second ne prend pas d'étudiants cette année. Dommage, le cours qu'on a eu avec Quastana était fort intéressant et pas trop juridique (et a pour objet la liberté dans les idées politiques, on pouvait pas trouver plus à propos). Si je trouve personne d'ici la fin de la semaine qui vient, je changerai de sujet et je prendrai un des trucs proposés. Tant pis.

Au fait Ronni, quels sont tes liens avec la fac? (ancien étudiant, enseignant…?)

[Roniberal]

Au fait Ronni, quels sont tes liens avec la fac? (ancien étudiant, enseignant…?)

Un peu les 2 en fait…: ancien étudiant et prof assistant (chargé de TD) à la Faculté d'Economie Appliquée.

[xara]

Et oui une ville privée qui a le monopole (au sens courant) de la justice sur son territoire est un État. Que cela ne te plaises pas n'y change rien, tu dois apprendre à vivre avec l'idée que le français n'a pas été inventé par des anarcaps.

Pas d'accord, d'abord les deux sens du mot monopole sont et ont été couramment utilisés depuis longtemps. Ce qui compte, c'est de savoir de quel sens on parle quand on utilise le mot. Ensuite, la définition traditionnelle de l'Etat en tant que monopole de la production de sécurité fait référence au monopole au sens où AB l'a donné, de toute évidence, puisqu'il s'agit du monopole de l'usage de la force dans un territoire donné. Celui-ci n'est généralement pas compris comme un monopole au sens d'un producteur unique qu'aucun concurrent ne saurait contester parce qu'il a convaincu ses clients de ne pas changer de fournisseur. Et ce pour d'excellentes raisons. Ce monopole (au sens 2 du producteur unique) n'est pas contestable parce qu'il est législativement établi et que les concurrents potentiels sont éliminés par la menace de l'usage de la force (monopole au sens 1 de privilège exclusif). Autrement dit, nos Etats relèvent du monopole au sens 1 et ne le sont au sens 2 que grâce au privilèges qu'ils s'octroient. Par conséquent, un monopole (au sens de producteur unique d'un bien) obtenu sans privilège n'est pas un Etat et une ville privée, pourvu qu'on désigne bien par là des relations contractuelles n'est pas un Etat.

"Le français n'a pas été inventé par des anarcaps" Très bien. D'abord, où est le rapport avec l'anarchisme dans cette histoire de vocabulaire ? Ensuite, puisque tu affirmes que l'usage originel du terme concerne le critère du producteur unique (et non du privilège), on aimerait quelques explications ou illustrations pour cette thèse étonnante.

[xara]

Tu as la Somalie, avec des tonnes de documentation…

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarchy_in_Somalia

liste quelques articles à ce sujet… apparemment la tradition kritarchique est assez ancienne pour la Somalie.

A propos de la Somalie, il faudrait certainement en parler puisque ce serait à ma connaissance le seul exemple actuel ou récent. Ce livre devrait être des plus intéressants: The Law of the Somalis de Michael van Hotten. Cf. aussi tous les liens indiqués en bas de la page.

Voir aussi la présentation faite à la dernière conf de l'ISIL par Spencer MacCallum, qui a fini cet ouvrage inachevé à la mort de van Hotten et qui l'édite:

The Somali Way

Authentic Rule of Law

Without the State

by Spencer H. MacCallum

Spencer MacCallum addresses ISIL world conference in Williamsburg, Virginia (Aug 11-15, 2007).

Were there such a category, Somalia would hold a place in the Guinness Book of Records as the country with the longest absence of a functioning central government. When the Somalis dismantled their government in 1991 and returned to their pre-colonial political status, the expectation was that chaos would result – and that, of course, would be the politically correct thing to expect. Imagine if it were otherwise. Imagine any part of the globe not being dominated by a central government and the people living there surviving, even prospering. If such were to happen and the idea spread to other parts of Africa or other parts of the world, the mystique of the necessity of the state might be irreparably damaged, and many politicians and bureaucrats might find themselves walking about looking for work.

If the expectation was that Somalia would plunge into an abyss of chaos, what is the reality? A number of recent studies address this question, among them one by economist Peter Leeson drawing on statistical data from the United Nations Development Project, World Bank, CIA, and World Health Organization. Comparing the last five years under the central government, 1985-1990, with the most recent five years of anarchy, 2000-2005, Leeson finds these welfare changes:

Life expectancy increased from 46 to 48.5 years. This is a poor expectancy as compared with developed countries. But in any measurement of welfare, what is important to observe is not where a population stands at a given point in time, but what is the trend. Is the trend positive, or is it the reverse?

Number of one-year-olds fully immunized against measles rose from 30 to 40 percent.

Number of physicians per 100,000 population rose from 3.4 to 4.

Number of infants with low birth weight fell from 16 per thousand to 0.3 – almost none.

Infant mortality per 1,000 births fell from 152 to 114.9.

Maternal mortality per 100,000 births fell from 1,600 to 1,100.

Percent of population with access to sanitation rose from 18 to 26.

Percent of population with access to at least one health facility rose from 28 to 54.8.

Percent of population in extreme poverty (i.e. less than $1 per day) fell from 60 to 43.2.

Radios per thousand population rose from 4 to 98.5.

Telephones per thousand population rose from 1.9 to 14.9.

TVs per 1,000 population rose from 1.2 to 3.7.

Fatalities due to measles fell from 8,000 to 5,600.

Another even more comprehensive study published last year by Benjamin Powell of the Independent Institute, concludes: "We find that Somalia's living standards have improved generally . . . not just in absolute terms, but also relative to other African countries since the collapse of the Somali central government."

Somalia's pastoral economy is now stronger than that of either neighboring Kenya or Ethiopia. It is the largest exporter of livestock of any East African country. Telecommunications have burgeoned in Somalia; a call from a mobile phone is cheaper in Somalia than anywhere else in Africa. A small number of international investors are finding that the level of security of property and contract in Somalia warrants doing business there. Among these companies are Dole. BBC, the courier DHL, British Airways, General Motors, and Coca Cola, which recently opened a large bottling plant in Mogadishu. A 5-star Ambassador Hotel is operating in Hargeisa, and three new universities are fully functional: Amoud University (1997) in Borama , and Mogadishu University (1997) and University of Benadir (2002) in Mogadishu.

The Call to "Establish Democracy"

All of this is terribly politically incorrect for the reason I suggested. Consequently, the United Nations has by now spent well over two billion dollars attempting to re-establish a central government in Somalia. But here is the irony: It is the presence of the United Nations that has caused virtually all of the turbulence we have seen in Somalia. Let me explain why this is the case.

Like most of pre-colonial Africa, Somalia is traditionally a stateless society. When the colonial powers withdrew, in order to better serve their purposes, they hastily trained local people and set up European-style governments in their place. These were supposed to be democratic. But they soon devolved into brutal dictatorships.

Democracy is unworkable in Africa for several reasons. The first thing that voting does is to divide a population into two groups – a group that rules and a group that is ruled. This is completely at variance with Somali tradition. Second, if democracy is to work, it depends in theory, at least, upon a populace that will vote on issues. But in a kinship society such as Somalia, voting takes place not on the merit of issues but along group lines; one votes according to one's clan affiliation. Since the ethic of kinship requires loyalty is to one's fellow clansmen, the winners use the power of government to benefit their own members, which means exploitation of the members of other clans. Consequently when there exists a governmental apparatus with its awesome powers of taxation and police and judicial monopoly, the interests of the clans conflict. Some clan will control that apparatus, and out of self-defense to avoid being exploited by other clans, each must attempt to be that controlling clan.

The turmoil in Somalia consists in the clans maneuvering to position themselves to control the government whenever it might come into being, and this has been exacerbated by the governments of the world, especially the United States, keeping alive the expectation that a government will soon be established and supplying arms to whomever in the moment seems most likely to be able to "bring democracy" to Somalia. The "warlord" phenomenon refers to clan and independent militias, often including left-overs of the former central government, who promise to establish a government under the control of their own clan. They often operate outside the control of the traditional elders and sometimes in opposition to them.

Hence the most violent years in Somalia were the years following 1991 when the United Nations was physically present, attempting to impose a central government. When the United Nations withdrew in 1995, the expectation of a future central government began to recede, and things began to stabilize. But the United Nations continued it efforts to re-establish a government through a series of some sixteen failed "peace conferences." In 2000 it set up a straw government, the Transitional National Government (TNG). However, not only did the northern Somali clans not recognize the TNG, it was unable to control its intended capital city of Mogadishu. Today a combined "peace-keeping mission" of United States-backed troops from Ethiopia, Somalia's traditional enemy, and Uganda under the aegis of the African Union are in Mogadishu attempting to prop up the TNG and secure its control over the rest of Somalia. Violence soars.

The situation is curiously like an event in Greek mythology. The gods on Mt. Olympus were enjoying a festive party, to which, understandably, they had not invited Eris, the goddess of discord. Eris, just as understandably, took the matter personally. She had the blacksmith Hephaestus fashion a golden apple bearing the words, "To the fairest." Then she opened the door a crack and rolled the golden apple into the festive hall. In no time at all, the gods were fighting over who should have the apple. The golden apple in Somalia is the expectation that there will soon be a central government. As long as there is that expectation, the clans must fight over who will control it.

Somalia and the Rule of Law

Now, I've gone this far without telling you much about Somalia. It's the Horn of Africa, that part of northeast Africa that juts out into the Indian Ocean just below the Arabian Peninsula. The Somali culture area includes all of the Horn and is home to some 11.5 million people. The Colonial powers arbitrarily fragmented this culture area so that today parts of it fall under the jurisdiction of Kenya in the south, Ethiopia in the west, and some in Djibouti in the north. The remainder along the coast is now without a working government. What these people have in common, even more than similar language, lifestyle, and physical character, is a body of customary law, the Xeer, which differs from clan to clan in non-essential ways such as founding myths but is remarkably uniform with respect to its provision for the protection of persons and property. The Xeer provides a rule of law-customary law, that is: permitting safe travel, trade, marriage, and so forth throughout the region. The Xeer is most intact in the north of Somalia, which was under British rule. In the south, the Italians tried to eradicate it. Nonetheless, it survives to a significant degree everywhere, even in the urban areas, and is virtually unaffected in rural Somalia.

The Xeer is the secret to the whole perplexing question of Somalia's success without a central government, since it provides an authentic rule of law to support trade and economic development. Fortunately, we know something about the Xeer because of Michael van Notten, a Dutch lawyer (and ISIL Advisory Boare member) who in the early 1990s married into the Samaron Clan in the northwest of Somalia, the fifth largest of the Somali clans, and lived with them for the last twelve years of his life. He took full advantage of that opportunity to research the Xeer. The result was his pioneering study, The Law of the Somalis (Red Sea Press, 2005). Van Notten died when his manuscript was half finished. Fortunately, he had largely completed assembling the ethnographic material. In his will, he asked that I edit and complete the manuscript for publication. The task ahead is to see the work translated into Somali.

Highlights of the Xeer

There is time in this short talk to give you only some of the highlights of the Xeer. First, law and, consequently crime, are defined in terms of property rights. The law is compensatory rather than punitive. Because property right requires compensation, rather than punishment, there is no imprisonment, and fines are rare. Such fines as might be imposed seldom exceed the amount of compensation and are not payable to any court or government, but directly to the victim. A fine might be in order when, for example, the killing of a camel was deliberate and premeditated, in which case the victim receives not one but two camels. Fines figure in another interesting way. It is expected that a prominent public figure such as a religious or political dignitary or a policeman or a judge should lead an exemplary life. If he violates the law, he pays double what would be required of an ordinary person. Also, it should be noted, since the law and crime are defined in terms of property rights, the Xeer is unequivocal in its opposition to any form of taxation.

Secondly, in order to assure that compensation will be forthcoming even in cases where the perpetrator is a child, or penniless, or crazy, or has fled abroad, the Xeer requires that every person be fully insured against any liability he might incur under the law. If an individual cannot make the required payment, a designated group of his kin are responsible. Van Notten describes in an interesting way how this happens:

A person who violates someone's rights and is unable to pay the compensation himself notifies his family, who then pays on his behalf. From an emotional point of view, this notification is a painful procedure, since no family member will miss the opportunity to tell the wrongdoer how vicious or stupid he was. Also, they will ask assurances that he will be more careful in the future. Indeed, all those who must pay for the wrongdoings of a family member will thereafter keep an eye on him and try to intervene before he incurs another liability. They will no longer, for example, allow him to keep or bear a weapon. While on other continents the re-education of criminals is typically a task of the government, in Somalia it is the responsibility of the family.

If the family tires of bailing out a repeat offender, they can disown him, in which case he becomes and outlaw. Not being insured, he forfeits all protection under the law and, for his safety, must leave the country. Customary law is similar in this and many other respects throughout the world. An instance is told in the founding legend of my own Clan MacCallum in Scotland. The founder of the Clan supposedly was exiled 1500 years ago from Ireland because he was a hothead whom his family disowned for embroiling them in fights. In the loneliness of his exile on the North Sea, he became a man of peace. He couldn't return to Ireland, as he was no longer under protection of the law and could have been killed with impunity. So he went instead to Scotland and there founded our clan.

A third point about the Xeer is that there is no monopoly of police or judicial services. Anyone is free to serve in those capacities who is not at the same time a religious or political dignitary, since that would compromise the sharp separation of law, politics, and religion. Also, anyone performing in such a role is subject to the same laws as anyone else and more so; if they violate the law, they must pay heavier damages or fines than would apply to anyone else. Public figures are expected to show exemplary conduct.

Fourthly, there are no victimless crimes. Only a victim or his family can initiate a court action. Where there is no victim to call a court into being, no court can form. No court can investigate on its own initiative any evidence of an alleged misconduct.

Lastly, the court procedure is interesting. From birth, every Somali has his own judge who will sit on the court that will judge him should he transgress the law. That judge is his oday, the head of his extended family consisting of all males descended from the same great grandfather, together with their spouses and children. Several extended families make up a jilib, which is the group responsible for paying the blood price in the event a member kills someone of another jilib or clan. The oday, or judge, is chosen carefully following weeks or months or deliberation by elders of the clan. He has no authority over the family but is chosen solely for his knowledge of human affairs and his wisdom, and he can lose his position if his decisions are not highly regarded in the community. When an offense is committed, the offender goes first to his oday, who then forms a court with the oday of the plaintiff. If the odays cannot resolve the matter, they form another court made up of odays representing additional families, jilibs, or clans. A virtue of each person knowing from birth who will be one of his judges, and vice versa, is that an oday knows each person in his extended family intimately and can observe and counsel him before what might seem a small problem escalates into a crime.

Once a court forms and accepts jurisdiction over a case, its first action is to appoint a recorder, who will repeat loudly during the hearing each important point made by the speakers. It then announces when and where it will hear the case. When the court session opens, the court invites the plaintiff to state his case. The plaintiff has the right to appoint a representative to make the presentation on his behalf. During the presentation, the plaintiff has opportunity to confer with his family to make sure that he has not forgotten anything. When the plaintiff has finished, the court asks him to summarize his case and state his demands. Lastly, the court asks the defendant to present his defense and any counter claims.

Then the court adjourns to deliberate whether any witnesses should be heard. A disputed fact is admitted as evidence only when three witnesses have testified to its truth. The parties can also call in experts and character witnesses. If the victim has died or has been wounded, the court will instruct a religious dignitary to assess how the victim died or was wounded. These dignitaries assess injuries usually by applying the standards enumerated in the commentary of the twelfth-century Muslim scholar al-Nawawii's Minhaaj at-Talibiin. When the plaintiff has elaborated his case with witnesses and evidence, the defendant is given a chance to refute the plaintiff's charges, arguments, and evidence. It is not customary to cross-examine witnesses.

Finally, the court adjourns again to evaluate the evidence. If less than three witnesses support a fact, or if the witnesses contradict each other, the court will proceed to oath taking. There are several types of oaths. The simplest starts by the oath giver saying, "I swear by my virility." Alternatively, he can say, "I swear by Allah." A stronger oath is the so-called triple oath, in which he swears the same oath three times. A stronger oath yet is the one that is repeated 50 times. Also, there is the so-called divorce oath, in which the oath giver swears by his marriage(s). If it is later found out that he lied, his marriage(s) become null and void.

It should be noted that even when the plaintiff fails to convince the court of his case, the court will usually not rule in favor of the defendant until the latter has taken an oath of innocence.

In a longer talk, I could discuss the role of police and enforcement of judgments, but this much should give some flavor of the legal system practiced by the Somalis. It provides an effective rule of law entirely without the backing of a government.

The Xeer takes it place among such great legal systems of the world as the Roman law, the English common law, the Law Merchant, and the Jewish traditional law (Halacha). It must be extremely old and is believed to have developed in the Horn of Africa. There is no evidence that it developed elsewhere or was greatly influenced by any foreign legal system. The fact that Somali legal terminology is practically devoid of loan words from foreign languages suggests that the Xeer is truly indigenous.

Michael van Notten's book describing this system of law deserves to be better known and widely read. It is the first study of any customary law to treat it not as a curiosity of the past, but as potentially instructive for a future free society. Whether or not the intervention of foreign governments, which has intensified with the refusal of Somalis to die or remain poor, will frustrate this potential, only time can tell. I would like to end with a plea to help get this book into wider circulation. If you are connected with any schools or colleges, please contact them. Many of them will find it highly appropriate. A review by a distinguished legal anthropologist on Amazon.com ends on this note:

The readability and relative brevity of the text highly recommend The Law of the Somalis for classroom use. It fits comfortably alongside, and is a refreshing addition to, the scholarly tradition reflected in such classic ethnographic legal-political titles as, Tswana Law (I. Schapera), The Cheyenne Way (K. Llewellyn and E.A. Hoebel), and The Judicial Process among the Barotse (M. Gluckman).

Howard J. De Nike, J.D., Ph.D.

Department of Anthropology

University of New Mexico.

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Bibliography

De Nike, Howard J. 2006. "Customary Law Upholds Natural Law." — Amazon.com Customer-Reviews

Leeson, Peter T. 2005. "Better Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Collapse." West Virginia University. www.peterleeson.com/Better_Off_Stateless.pdf

Powell, Benjamin, Ryan Ford, and Alex Nowrasteh. 2006. "Somalia after State Collapse: Chaos or Improvement?" Independent Institute Working Paper No. 64. www.independent.org/pdf/working_papers/64_somalia.pdf

Van Notten, Michael. 2005. The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic and Social Development in the Horn of Africa. Trenton NJ: Red Sea Press. home.arcor.de/danneskjoeld/X/Som/index.html

Obituary for Michael van Notten www.isil.org/resources/fnn/2002nov/van-notten-obit.html

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Spencer MacCallum (Mexico/USA) is a social anthropologist who played a key role in the economic miracle of the Mata Ortiz, a village of potters in northern Mexico that without government assistance or encouragement became affluent and commanded the attention of the art world. He is also author of The Art of Community.

Et en complément:

Stateless in Somalia, and Loving It

By Yumi Kim

Posted on 2/21/2006

Somalia is in the news again. Rival gangs are shooting each other, and why? The reason is always the same: the prospect that the weak-to-invisible transitional government in Mogadishu will become a real government with actual power.

The media invariably describe this prospect as a "hope." But it's a strange hope that is accompanied by violence and dread throughout the country. Somalia has done very well for itself in the 15 years since its government was eliminated. The future of peace and prosperity there depends in part on keeping one from forming.

As even the CIA factbook admits:

"Despite the seeming anarchy, Somalia's service sector has managed to survive and grow. Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent. In the absence of a formal banking sector, money exchange services have sprouted throughout the country, handling between $500 million and $1 billion in remittances annually. Mogadishu's main market offers a variety of goods from food to the newest electronic gadgets. Hotels continue to operate, and militias provide security."

To understand more about the country without a government, turn to The Law of the Somalis, written by Michael van Notten (1933-2002) and edited by Spencer Heath MacCallum, sheds light on the little known Somali law, culture and economic situation. Somalia is often cited as an example of a stateless society where chaos is the "rule" and warlords are aplenty.

The BBC's country profile of Somalia sums up this view as widely publicized by the mainstream media: "Somalia has been without an effective central government since President Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991. Fighting between rival warlords and an inability to deal with famine and disease led to the deaths of up to one million people."

The first sentence is indeed true: when the president was driven out by opposing clans in 1991, the government disintegrated. The second sentence, however, depicts Somalia as a lawless country in disorder. As for disorder, Van Notten quotes authorities to the effect that Somalia's telecommunications are the best in Africa, its herding economy is stronger than that of either of its neighbors, Kenya or Ethiopia, and that since the demise of the central government, the Somali shilling has become far more stable in world currency markets, while exports have quintupled.

As for Somalia being lawless, Van Notten, a Dutch lawyer who married into the Samaron Clan and lived the last dozen years of his life with them, specifically challenges that portrayal. He explains that Somalia is a country based on customary law. The traditional Somali system of law and politics, he contends, is capable of maintaining a peaceful society and guiding the Somalis to prosperity. Moreover, efforts to re-establish a central government or impose democracy on the people are incompatible with the customary law.

Van Notten distinguishes between the four meanings of the word "law" — statutory, contractual, customary, and natural law. The common misunderstanding is that legitimate rules only come from formally established entities and that therefore a country without a legislature is lawless. Refuting that misunderstanding, van Notten explains that a perfectly orderly and peaceful country can exist when people respect property rights and honor their contracts. While natural laws denote peace, liberty, and friendly relations, statutory laws represent commands. Statutory laws reflect the preferences of legislators, who impose "morality" on those they govern and regulate their ability to voluntarily enter into contracts. This, according to van Notten, is wrong from the standpoint of both morality and law.

Customary laws develop in a country like Somalia in the absence of a central legislating body. Rules "emerge spontaneously as people go about their daily business and try to solve the problems that occasionally arise in it without upsetting the patterns of cooperation on which they so heavily depend" (Van Notten, 15: 2005). Van Notten contends that the Somali customary law closely follows the natural law and therefore should be preserved.

The extended family is the core of Somali society. Families descended from common great grandparent form a jilib, the basic independent jural unit, and a number of jilibs in turn form a clan. Each family, jilib, and clan has its own judge, whose role is to facilitate the handling of disputes by deciding where the liability lies and what compensation should be paid. For example if a man is murdered, the murderer's clan gives the victim's clan one hundred camels (the blood price). Verdicts are widely discussed, and a judge who does not base his decision on norms prevailing in the community is unlikely to be asked to settle further disputes. Thus while a judge may form his own principles, his customers will decide his competence as a judge.

The family of the successful plaintiff can resort to self-help to enforce a payment, or the court can order the men of the community to do so. Every clansman is insured by his jilib. For instance, if A violates B's right and it is held that A should pay compensation to B, A's jilib will provide the compensation. Hence the jilib functions as "a safety net, venture capital, protection, and insurance" (Van Notten, 74: 2005).

If a clan member constantly violates others' rights and his jilib repeatedly pays compensation, the jilib can expel him. On the other hand, there is nothing to stop someone from leaving his jilib and joining another, if it will have him, or setting up his own. A person without a jilib is unthinkable, an outlaw, because he is not insured against liabilities he might incur toward others. Hence he loses all protection of the law.

Decisions are enforced and oaths taken in ways that may seem unsophisticated or odd, yet they are the custom and must be respected. If, for instance, the defendant refuses to comply with the verdict without appealing his case to a higher court, he can be tied to a tree covered with black ants until he agrees. When evidence is sketchy or lacking, several types of oaths are available. A strong oath is one that is repeated fifty times. Another type is a divorce oath. If a man testifies under divorce oath and it is later found that his testimony was false, his marriage becomes null and void.

Independent extended families being the basic social and economic unit does have its weaknesses. While clansmen are under no obligation to share their wealth with other clans, they must share it to a significant extent within the clan. Van Notten notes this as a drawback and states that the "law makes clansmen somewhat a prisoner of their clan." Since individuals differ in their productivity, it is inevitable that some family members will benefit from more successful members. In addition, as a way of promoting internal cohesion, extended families may foment animosity against other families. Van Notten also writes that foreigners are not recognized under Somali law unless they marry into a clan or come under the protection of a Somali patron.

This has important economic implications. For example, because land cannot be sold outside the clan, foreigners would generally be prohibited from purchasing it. One way to work with this might be land leasing, which is possible under customary law. Somali elders suggested to Van Notten that a group of foreign investors could form their own 'clan' on a leased territory and develop it, say for a free port, on a land-lease basis.

An important discussion centers around democracy. In 1960, when the British and Italian colonizers withdrew from Somalia, they formed the government of the Republic of Somalia as a democratic entity. Nine years later, the country was under a dictatorship. Through these events, according to van Notten, many Somalis realized that they could return to their traditional form of governance founded on independent clans.

Nevertheless, since 1991, the United Nations has made efforts to promote the establishment of a democratic government in Somalia. Van Notten strongly argues that such government is incompatible with the Somali customary law, which prizes life, liberty, and property. He asserts that democracy is not even a viable option:

"When the electorate is composed of close-knit tribal, religious, linguistic or ethnic communities, the people invariably vote, not on the merits of any issue, but for the party of their own community. The community with the greatest numbers wins the election, and the minority parties then put rebellion and secession at the top of their political agenda. That is nothing but a recipe for chaos." (van Notten, 127; 2005)

Van Notten contends that the argument that a central government is a prerequisite for making treaties with foreign government agencies is flawed because the Somalis have long dealt with foreign governments and their agencies on a clan-by-clan basis. A common ministry of foreign affairs would pose a grave danger because it would undermine the customary law. He suggests that clans sharing a common interest could appoint a private company as their common agent. Van Notten and MacCallum further dispute that a central government is needed to provide "public" services. They propose the establishment of freeports, land-leasing, and commercial insurance companies. Certain sectors such as telecommunications have been thriving in Somalia's free market and government regulation could only hinder their growth.

Questions arise as to rampageous warlords when discussing a country without a central government. Van Notten explains that warlords exist because of the efforts to form a central government, not because of its absence:

"A democratic government has every power to exert dominion over people. To fend off the possibility of being dominated, each clan tries to capture the power of that government before it can become a threat. Those clans that didn't share in the spoils of political power would realize their chances of becoming part of the ruling alliance were nil. Therefore, they would rebel and try to secede. That would prompt the ruling clans to use every means to suppress these centrifugal forces… in the end all clans would fight with one another." (van Notten, 136; 2005)

He thus asserts that efforts by the United Nations are not only futile, but also harmful to the Somalis.

Van Notten calls for documentation of clan law systems to facilitate doing business with foreigners, especially, on a nationwide scale. He argues that by compiling all the major jurisprudence under Somali law, the customary law will more readily evolve into a coherent body of common law. But if each clan is only bound by its own rules and custom, and if the Somalis so far never felt the need for the "merger of clan law systems," why would compiling rules of all different clans be necessary? Moreover, it is unclear how such a task can effectively be undertaken when the customary law evolves constantly, and clans have a nomadic character.

The book does not contain information regarding the Somali presidential election in 2004, which took place in Kenya. Efforts to construct a formal government continue but they appear to be in vain, inspiring hope in UN bureaucrats and the news media, but only fear and loathing in Mogadishu and the rest of the country.

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Yumi Kim studied law in London, where she now works in financial services.

[Guest Arn0]

Pas d'accord, d'abord les deux sens du mot monopole sont et ont été couramment utilisés depuis longtemps.

Je te signale que c'est AB qui conteste ce point, pas moi. C'est lui qui veut rejeter un des sens du mot monopole (en le faisant passer pour une déviation socialiste, ce qui est historiquement faux).

Ce qui compte, c'est de savoir de quel sens on parle quand on utilise le mot. Ensuite, la définition traditionnelle de l'Etat en tant que monopole de la production de sécurité fait référence au monopole au sens où AB l'a donné, de toute évidence, puisqu'il s'agit du monopole de l'usage de la force dans un territoire donné. Celui-ci n'est généralement pas compris comme un monopole au sens d'un producteur unique qu'aucun concurrent ne saurait contester parce qu'il a convaincu ses clients de ne pas changer de fournisseur. Et ce pour d'excellentes raisons. Ce monopole (au sens 2 du producteur unique) n'est pas contestable parce qu'il est législativement établi et que les concurrents potentiels sont éliminés par la menace de l'usage de la force (monopole au sens 1 de privilège exclusif). Autrement dit, nos Etats relèvent du monopole au sens 1 et ne le sont au sens 2 que grâce au privilèges qu'ils s'octroient. Par conséquent, un monopole (au sens de producteur unique d'un bien) obtenu sans privilège n'est pas un Etat et une ville privée, pourvu qu'on désigne bien par là des relations contractuelles n'est pas un Etat.

Si le règlement intérieur d'une ville privée m'interdit d'aller voir ailleurs pour mes besoins en justice c'est bien qu'il s'agit d'un monopole non contestable ! Ce n'est pas un monopole de fait (qui impliquerait que j'ai le droit d'aller voir ailleurs mais que je n'en ai pas la possibilité matérielle) mais bien un monopole de droit (je n'ai pas le droit d'aller voir ailleurs). Les concurrents potentiels sont exclus du marché par la force (par simple application du contrat). La seule "concurrence" est territoriale comme avec les États actuels.

"Le français n'a pas été inventé par des anarcaps" Très bien. D'abord, où est le rapport avec l'anarchisme dans cette histoire de vocabulaire ? Ensuite, puisque tu affirmes que l'usage originel du terme concerne le critère du producteur unique (et non du privilège), on aimerait quelques explications ou illustrations pour cette thèse étonnante.

D'abord j'ai parlé de sens courant et non de sens originel (et encore moins unique), ensuite j'ai déjà donné des illustrations. Je présume donc que tu ne me lis pas.

[Guest jabial]

Si le règlement intérieur d'une ville privée m'interdit d'aller voir ailleurs pour mes besoins en justice c'est bien qu'il s'agit d'un monopole non contestable !

C'est un exemple typique de contrat invalide. Il n'est pas valide de renoncer à ses droits. D'où t'es venue l'idée que les villes privées auraient le monopole de la justice? De la police, oui, probablement, dans la mesure où elles peuvent légitimement interdire l'entrée d'une autre police sur leur territoire tant qu'elles ne sont pas elles-mêmes criminelles - comme n'importe quel propriétaire. De la justice, en aucun cas - ce serait une renonciation au droit inaliénable d'obtenir justice.

[Guest Arn0]

C'est un exemple typique de contrat invalide. Il n'est pas valide de renoncer à ses droits. D'où t'es venue l'idée que les villes privées auraient le monopole de la justice? De la police, oui, probablement, dans la mesure où elles peuvent légitimement interdire l'entrée d'une autre police sur leur territoire tant qu'elles ne sont pas elles-mêmes criminelles - comme n'importe quel propriétaire. De la justice, en aucun cas - ce serait une renonciation au droit inaliénable d'obtenir justice.

Dans ce cas là une ville privée ne serait pas un état, je suis bien d'accord (je l'avais déjà dit en réponse au post de Stranger).

Je suis pas convaincu que ce soit la position de AB.