Physique, cosmologie & trou noir divin

[José]

[FabriceM]

 

 

Contrairement à ce que tu insinues, j'ai essayer de comprendre ta vision, je suis allé consulter tes liens. Notamment https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puissance_et_acte#Dans_le_platonisme_et_chez_Aristote

 

Mais ça n'a fait que rajouter des problèmes. Il n'y a rien la dedans qui prouve que ces concepts de puissance et d'acte ont une validité objective, universelle. Les explications et les métaphores, c'est bien beau, on comprend vaguement le sens que ces concepts essaient de transporter, mais on n'a aucune idée de la pertinence de ces concepts une fois sorti de ce corpus d'exemples.

 

Bref, tu es en train de donner raison à NoName. La science bouge. Accrochons nous donc  à des concepts philosphiques qui ne bougent pas, des descriptions de la nature qui n'ont aucun fondement dans la nature, et nous voilà dans une dimension parallèle où on explique la nature des choses avec des concepts dont la nature n'est rien d'autre que celle d'artefacts du langage.

 

Pourtant, à la base, je suis tout à fait près à reconnaitre les limites de la science, des équations et tout ce bordel. Je ne crois pas qu'il y ait des équations inscrites dans le tissu de l'univers. L'univers est, il fonctionne, et nous faisons ce que nous pouvons pour le comprendre. Aucun calcul ne régit le fonctionnement des atomes. Mais nous ne pouvons pas comprendre comment ils agissent sans faire de calculs.

 

Les vrais principe de la physique moderne, comme le principe de superposition ou  le principe d'exclusion de pauli, l'esprit voudrait les rejeter tant leur arbitraire apparent et leur conséquences sont grands. Pourtant, on a toutes les raison de penser que ces principes ont un fondement objectif dans la nature de l'univers. Voilà ce à quoi peuvent ressembler, pour moi, des interrogations de nature philosophiques, compte tenu des progrès du savoir humain depuis Aristote.

[Troy89]

 

 

Quand tu dis "il n'y a rien là dedans qui prouve...", je suppose que "là dedans" renvoie à l'article du wiki. Ben oui, cet article je l'ai mis en lien par commodité, pas pour y lire un cours exhaustif sur les notions d'acte et de puissance. Je n'espérais pas que tu comprennes sérieusement ces notions et leur portée avec ce lien. Sauf qu'au lieu de te dire "je n'ai pas la matière pour comprendre de quoi il s'agit", tu réponds orgueilleusement qu'il ne s'agit au mieux que de métaphores ou d'artefacts du langage. C'est une attitude grossière. 

 

Mais qu'il y ait des êtres mobiles, c'est-à-dire des choses qui changent, c'est donné par les sens ("aucun fondement dans la nature"...ah...ce que tu es prêt à nier pour sauver tes préjugés positivistes quand même...). Or un être qui change devient quelque chose, sinon il ne changerait pas et serait parfaitement le même. Donc ce qu'il est au moment où il l'est, on l'appelle être en acte. Ce qu'il devient et ce qu'il peut devenir, on appelle ça une puissance. Le changement, c'est donc l'actualisation de la puissance. Or une puissance ne peut pas s'actualiser elle-même, précisément parce qu'elle est puissance. Il faut un acte pour actualiser la puissance (exemple typique : il faut un objet sensible pour actualiser les facultés sensitives), et c'est pourquoi un être ne peut pas être en acte et en puissance sous le même rapport. Je ne vois pas où est la métaphore ou l'artefact du langage. C'est juste que tu n'y comprends rien, pas même ce qui est en question, et que tu te rattaches à ce que tu peux pour te voiler la face.

 

La science s'intéresse à ces lois qui régissent les objets et à la description des phénomènes. C'est une analyse d'ordre phénoménale. La philosophie de la nature s'intéresse à un autre fait, qui n'intéresse pas la science, c'est que les choses puissent devenir quelque chose. Elle implique une analyse d'ordre ontologique, parce que sa fonction est de rendre raison, pas de décrire.

 

Tu écris "L'univers est". Très bien. Le scientifique veut savoir comment il est. Il le décrit, il donne ses lois, etc. Le philosophe, à partir du même fait, s'intéresse non pas à sa part phénoménale, mais à sa part intelligible. Si l'univers est, qu'est-il du point de vue de l'être ? Un être nécessaire en soi, ou bien un être contingent ? Pouvait-il ne pas être ou est-il de toute nécessité, en soi ? Mais puisqu'il change, c'est à dire que l'univers n'est pas fixe, n'est pas au repos, c'est qu'il n'est pas nécessaire en soi, il a en lui de la puissance. Or comment rendre raison de l'univers alors ? Retour au 5 voies. S'agit-il de jeux de mots ? Absolument pas. Le scientifique peut-il railler le philosophe ? Encore moins, parce que son point de départ, c'est que l'univers est, ce qui est un fait proprement philosophique et ontologique. Il n'a absolument pas besoin de la philosophie dans son activité, mais sa dépendance intellectuelle à l'égard de la philosophie est évidente, et pas seulement sur le plan épistémologique.

 

Bref, tout ça mériterait de bien plus longs développements. Et ce n'est pas le lieu (ni le topic, ni le forum). Je renvoie encore à Jacques Maritain et aux Degrés du savoir, et à Philosophie de la nature, qui sont excellents sur ces questions. Il y aurait bien aussi quelques œuvres de Charles de Koninck. Si tu n'as pas compris que la faculté intellective de l'homme ne se rapportait pas qu'aux phénomènes, et qu'à ce titre, il y a une attitude rationnelle en dehors des seules sciences (ce qui est de toute façon déjà admis par les mathématiques et la logique qui touchent à des êtres de raison), tant pis, je passe à autre chose.

[Soda]

Je me suis tapé les cours introductif de philosophie des sciences de Etienne Klein et plus j'en apprend plus je me dit que je sais peu de chose, c'est passionnant mais tellement vaste.

[Tortue joviale]

[Adrian]

Les physiciens de l’observatoire américain Ligo viennent d’annoncer la détection d’une seconde onde gravitationnelle

[h16]

Ah maintenant qu'ils ont vu que ça déclenchait le buzz, ils vont en trouver tous les 4 matins. Vraiment, pfff, ces scientifiques, tous des attention whores.

[Alchimi]

Tiens, j'ai dû rater les news de l'époque mais hier til que les photos directes d'exoplanètes ont commencés -en petit nombre pour l'instant.

 

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/2M1207_b

et http://www.space.com/8680-direct-photo-alien-planet-finally-confirmed.htmlainsi que http://www.space.com/33160-alien-planet-photo-cvso-30c-vlt.html?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=facebook&utm_campaign=socialfbspc&cmpid=social_spc_514630

 

Bon ok ce ne sont pour l'instant que des tas de pixels sur un fond noir... mais quand même!

[Reykjavik]

Question: si l'univers est en expansion, dans quoi s'étend t il?

 

Dans "l'espace" qu'il crée en se "dilatant"!

[Reykjavik]

 Bon, n'empêche que je comprends pas trop la théorie de Hawking. Grosso modo, il dirait que le trou noir réémet ce qu'il absorbe sous une forme suffisamment destructurée pour qu'on ne sache pas trop de quoi il retourne ?

 

 

 

 

D'autres théories démontrent au contraire qu'il n'y a pas de perte d'information!

Sans avoir les compétences pour les expliquer je vais quand même rechercher le nom du physicien qui s'oppose à Hawking sur ce sujet (ils sont potes d'ailleurs me semble-t-il).

Plutôt rassurant cette alternative si l'on suppose que l'on finira tous dans un trou noir!

[h16]

D'autres théories démontrent au contraire qu'il n'y a pas de perte d'information!

Sans avoir les compétences pour les expliquer je vais quand même rechercher le nom du physicien qui s'oppose à Hawking sur ce sujet (ils sont potes d'ailleurs me semble-t-il).

Plutôt rassurant cette alternative si l'on suppose que l'on finira tous dans un trou noir!

Kip Thorne, je crois.

[Sloonz]

Sans avoir les compétences pour les expliquer je vais quand même rechercher le nom du physicien qui s'oppose à Hawking sur ce sujet (ils sont potes d'ailleurs me semble-t-il).

C’est Susskind qui a développé l’idée qu’il n’y avait pas de perte d’information lorsque de la matière passait l’horizon d’un trou noir. Et Hawking s’est rangé à ses arguments. Dans les physiciens « célèbres » qui croient encore à la perte d’information, il y a Penrose.

[Jesrad]

Le trou noir étant une bulle de stase temporelle, son entropie doit rester constante. C'est juste mon avis.

[Argon]

Il l'a vu ? Il est allé se pencher au-dessus de son cadavre et a planté son doigt dans la plaie ? A posé sa main sur son coeur pour entendre les battements ?

Ce qu'il a vu, c'est des mots sur une page. Des mots sur une page, y'en a plein; y'en a des vrais et des faux, et Thomas le sait. C'est bien de la croyance donc, et non du savoir.

 

Vous avez besoin de preuves de la bataille d'Austerlitz en 4K pour savoir que Napoléon existe ?

 

Distinguer "croyance" et "savoir" est une ineptie faramineuse, tous les historiens sont des "croyants" par défaut. Quant au fait de reprocher à Saint Thomas d'être dans le domaine de la "croyance" alors que les preuves de l'existence de Jésus-Christ, de sa crucifixion et de sa résurrection sont aussi nombreuses à son époque que celle de l'existence de Jules César ou d'Alexandre le Grand, c'est tomber dans l'anachronisme et l'arrogance positiviste dénoncé plus haut par Troy89.

[Argon]

d'ailleurs tu parles d'observation et réfutation, concrètement Dieu, observé combien de fois ?

 

La main invisible du marché a été observée combien de fois ?  Pourtant vous y croyez sans réclamer des monceaux de preuves.

 

En réfléchissant un peu, l'existence de Dieu relève du même bon sens philosophique, la cause efficiente étant aussi intuitivement bonne que le système des prix libres.

 

S'il n'y avait rien après la mort, l'homme l'aurait ressenti depuis des millénaires. Il est quelque peu attristant que les modernes se croient plus malin que toutes les générations de "croyants" qui les ont précédé.

[Lancelot]

[h16]

La main invisible du marché a été observée combien de fois ?  Pourtant vous y croyez sans réclamer des monceaux de preuves.

Ah non. Tu te trompes de forum.

[Neomatix]

Quant au fait de reprocher à Saint Thomas d'être dans le domaine de la "croyance" alors que les preuves de l'existence de Jésus-Christ, de sa crucifixion et de sa résurrection sont aussi nombreuses à son époque que celle de l'existence de Jules César ou d'Alexandre le Grand, c'est tomber dans l'anachronisme et l'arrogance positiviste dénoncé plus haut par Troy89.

qu'est-ce qu'il faut pas lire comme conneries...

La main invisible du marché a été observée combien de fois ?

J'en sais rien, des milliards de fois par jour, à chaque fois que quelqu'un fait une transaction.

En réfléchissant un peu, l'existence de Dieu relève du même bon sens philosophique, la cause efficiente étant aussi intuitivement bonne que le système des prix libres.

Toutes les pseudo-preuves ontologiques de l'existence de Dieu sont du foutage de gueule à la rigueur inexistante.

Le système des prix libres démontre son efficacité tous les jours.

S'il n'y avait rien après la mort, l'homme l'aurait ressenti depuis des millénaires.

"Si le voyage supraluminique était impossible les figues seraient fécondées par des ratons-laveurs" <-- Raisonnement tout aussi rigoureux.

Il est quelque peu attristant que les modernes se croient plus malin que toutes les générations de "croyants" qui les ont précédé.

C'est vrai, soyons humbles. Après tout le monde a sûrement été créé en 6 jours il y a 6000 ans, et la pomme tombe de l'arbre pour rejoindre le sol parce que "là est sa place".

[Argon]

Ah non. Tu te trompes de forum.

 

 

En réfléchissant un peu, l'existence de Dieu relève du même bon sens philosophique

[h16]

Ah non. Tu te trompes de forum.

En réfléchissant un peu, l'existence de Dieu relève du même bon sens philosophique

Tu te trompes de forum.

[Argon]

Toutes les pseudo-preuves ontologiques de l'existence de Dieu sont du foutage de gueule à la rigueur inexistante.

 

La preuve ontologique de Dieu est tellement peu rigoureuse que le chanoine George Lemaître, le découvreur du Big Bang, y accordait non seulement du crédit mais dût se confronter aux scientifiques incrédules de son époque qui soutenaient par arrogance anti-religieuse un modèle d'univers stationnaire, désormais réfuté.

 

Vous pensez être plus rigoureux que cet esprit immense ? La preuve ontologique lui aura au moins permis d'accoucher de notre modèle cosmologique standard

[Argon]

Ah non. Tu te trompes de forum.

Prouvez-moi dans ce cas qu'il n'existe aucune métaphysique dans le libéralisme

 

[Neomatix]

La preuve ontologique de Dieu est tellement peu rigoureuse que le chanoine George Lemaître, le découvreur du Big Bang, y accordait non seulement du crédit mais dût se confronter aux scientifiques incrédules de son époque qui soutenaient par arrogance anti-religieuse un modèle d'univers stationnaire, désormais réfuté.

Georges Lemaitre a su, contrairement à vous, séparer très clairement la science et la foi. La Bible n'a pas vocation, selon lui, à expliquer ce qu'est le cosmos, mais seulement à guider l'Homme sur le chemin de la foi. Donc de deux choses l'une :

- Soit on parle d'un point de vue scientifique et vous n'avez rien compris a la science ni à la pensée de Lemaitre

- Soit on parle exclusivement d'un point de vue philosophique, sans prétention de prévoir le réel, et on peut s'adonner à toutes les spéculations, furent-elles sur l'existence de Dieu. Auquel cas ce n'est pas le bon forum.

[Lancelot]

http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html

 

If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if belief is of the nature of a habit, why should we not attain the desired end, by taking as answer to a question any we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything that might disturb it? This simple and direct method is really pursued by many men. I remember once being entreated not to read a certain newspaper lest it might change my opinion upon free-trade. "Lest I might be entrapped by its fallacies and misstatements," was the form of expression. "You are not," my friend said, "a special student of political economy. You might, therefore, easily be deceived by fallacious arguments upon the subject. You might, then, if you read this paper, be led to believe in protection. But you admit that free-trade is the true doctrine; and you do not wish to believe what is not true." I have often known this system to be deliberately adopted. Still oftener, the instinctive dislike of an undecided state of mind, exaggerated into a vague dread of doubt, makes men cling spasmodically to the views they already take. The man feels that, if he only holds to his belief without wavering, it will be entirely satisfactory. Nor can it be denied that a steady and immovable faith yields great peace of mind. It may, indeed, give rise to inconveniences, as if a man should resolutely continue to believe that fire would not burn him, or that he would be eternally damned if he received his ingesta otherwise than through a stomach-pump. But then the man who adopts this method will not allow that its inconveniences are greater than its advantages. He will say, "I hold steadfastly to the truth, and the truth is always wholesome." And in many cases it may very well be that the pleasure he derives from his calm faith overbalances any inconveniences resulting from its deceptive character. Thus, if it be true that death is annihilation, then the man who believes that he will certainly go straight to heaven when he dies, provided he have fulfilled certain simple observances in this life, has a cheap pleasure which will not be followed by the least disappointment. A similar consideration seems to have weight with many persons in religious topics, for we frequently hear it said, "Oh, I could not believe so-and-so, because I should be wretched if I did." When an ostrich buries its head in the sand as danger approaches, it very likely takes the happiest course. It hides the danger, and then calmly says there is no danger; and, if it feels perfectly sure there is none, why should it raise its head to see? A man may go through life, systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change in his opinions, and if he only succeeds -- basing his method, as he does, on two fundamental psychological laws -- I do not see what can be said against his doing so. It would be an egotistical impertinence to object that his procedure is irrational, for that only amounts to saying that his method of settling belief is not ours. He does not propose to himself to be rational, and, indeed, will often talk with scorn of man's weak and illusive reason. So let him think as he pleases.

But this method of fixing belief, which may be called the method of tenacity, will be unable to hold its ground in practice. The social impulse is against it. The man who adopts it will find that other men think differently from him, and it will be apt to occur to him, in some saner moment, that their opinions are quite as good as his own, and this will shake his confidence in his belief. This conception, that another man's thought or sentiment may be equivalent to one's own, is a distinctly new step, and a highly important one. It arises from an impulse too strong in man to be suppressed, without danger of destroying the human species. Unless we make ourselves hermits, we shall necessarily influence each other's opinions; so that the problem becomes how to fix belief, not in the individual merely, but in the community.

Let the will of the state act, then, instead of that of the individual. Let an institution be created which shall have for its object to keep correct doctrines before the attention of the people, to reiterate them perpetually, and to teach them to the young; having at the same time power to prevent contrary doctrines from being taught, advocated, or expressed. Let all possible causes of a change of mind be removed from men's apprehensions. Let them be kept ignorant, lest they should learn of some reason to think otherwise than they do. Let their passions be enlisted, so that they may regard private and unusual opinions with hatred and horror. Then, let all men who reject the established belief be terrified into silence. Let the people turn out and tar-and-feather such men, or let inquisitions be made into the manner of thinking of suspected persons, and when they are found guilty of forbidden beliefs, let them be subjected to some signal punishment. When complete agreement could not otherwise be reached, a general massacre of all who have not thought in a certain way has proved a very effective means of settling opinion in a country. If the power to do this be wanting, let a list of opinions be drawn up, to which no man of the least independence of thought can assent, and let the faithful be required to accept all these propositions, in order to segregate them as radically as possible from the influence of the rest of the world.

This method has, from the earliest times, been one of the chief means of upholding correct theological and political doctrines, and of preserving their universal or catholic character. In Rome, especially, it has been practised from the days of Numa Pompilius to those of Pius Nonus. This is the most perfect example in history; but wherever there is a priesthood -- and no religion has been without one -- this method has been more or less made use of. Wherever there is an aristocracy, or a guild, or any association of a class of men whose interests depend, or are supposed to depend, on certain propositions, there will be inevitably found some traces of this natural product of social feeling. Cruelties always accompany this system; and when it is consistently carried out, they become atrocities of the most horrible kind in the eyes of any rational man. Nor should this occasion surprise, for the officer of a society does not feel justified in surrendering the interests of that society for the sake of mercy, as he might his own private interests. It is natural, therefore, that sympathy and fellowship should thus produce a most ruthless power.

In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called the method of authority, we must, in the first place, allow its immeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity. Its success is proportionately greater; and, in fact, it has over and over again worked the most majestic results. The mere structures of stone which it has caused to be put together -- in Siam, for example, in Egypt, and in Europe -- have many of them a sublimity hardly more than rivaled by the greatest works of Nature. And, except the geological epochs, there are no periods of time so vast as those which are measured by some of these organized faiths. If we scrutinize the matter closely, we shall find that there has not been one of their creeds which has remained always the same; yet the change is so slow as to be imperceptible during one person's life, so that individual belief remains sensibly fixed. For the mass of mankind, then, there is perhaps no better method than this. If it is their highest impulse to be intellectual slaves, then slaves they ought to remain.

But no institution can undertake to regulate opinions upon every subject. Only the most important ones can be attended to, and on the rest men's minds must be left to the action of natural causes. This imperfection will be no source of weakness so long as men are in such a state of culture that one opinion does not influence another -- that is, so long as they cannot put two and two together. But in the most priest-ridden states some individuals will be found who are raised above that condition. These men possess a wider sort of social feeling; they see that men in other countries and in other ages have held to very different doctrines from those which they themselves have been brought up to believe; and they cannot help seeing that it is the mere accident of their having been taught as they have, and of their having been surrounded with the manners and associations they have, that has caused them to believe as they do and not far differently. Nor can their candour resist the reflection that there is no reason to rate their own views at a higher value than those of other nations and other centuries; thus giving rise to doubts in their minds.

They will further perceive that such doubts as these must exist in their minds with reference to every belief which seems to be determined by the caprice either of themselves or of those who originated the popular opinions. The willful adherence to a belief, and the arbitrary forcing of it upon others, must, therefore, both be given up. A different new method of settling opinions must be adopted, that shall not only produce an impulse to believe, but shall also decide what proposition it is which is to be believed. Let the action of natural preferences be unimpeded, then, and under their influence let men, conversing together and regarding matters in different lights, gradually develop beliefs in harmony with natural causes. This method resembles that by which conceptions of art have been brought to maturity. The most perfect example of it is to be found in the history of metaphysical philosophy. Systems of this sort have not usually rested upon any observed facts, at least not in any great degree. They have been chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seemed "agreeable to reason." This is an apt expression; it does not mean that which agrees with experience, but that which we find ourselves inclined to believe. Plato, for example, finds it agreeable to reason that the distances of the celestial spheres from one another should be proportional to the different lengths of strings which produce harmonious chords. Many philosophers have been led to their main conclusions by considerations like this; but this is the lowest and least developed form which the method takes, for it is clear that another man might find Kepler's theory, that the celestial spheres are proportional to the inscribed and circumscribed spheres of the different regular solids, more agreeable to his reason. But the shock of opinions will soon lead men to rest on preferences of a far more universal nature. Take, for example, the doctrine that man only acts selfishly -- that is, from the consideration that acting in one way will afford him more pleasure than acting in another. This rests on no fact in the world, but it has had a wide acceptance as being the only reasonable theory.

This method is far more intellectual and respectable from the point of view of reason than either of the others which we have noticed. But its failure has been the most manifest. It makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste; but taste, unfortunately, is always more or less a matter of fashion, and accordingly metaphysicians have never come to any fixed agreement, but the pendulum has swung backward and forward between a more material and a more spiritual philosophy, from the earliest times to the latest. And so from this, which has been called the a priori method, we are driven, in Lord Bacon's phrase, to a true induction. We have examined into this a priori method as something which promised to deliver our opinions from their accidental and capricious element. But development, while it is a process which eliminates the effect of some casual circumstances, only magnifies that of others. This method, therefore, does not differ in a very essential way from that of authority. The government may not have lifted its finger to influence my convictions; I may have been left outwardly quite free to choose, we will say, between monogamy and polygamy, and, appealing to my conscience only, I may have concluded that the latter practice is in itself licentious. But when I come to see that the chief obstacle to the spread of Christianity among a people of as high culture as the Hindoos has been a conviction of the immorality of our way of treating women, I cannot help seeing that, though governments do not interfere, sentiments in their development will be very greatly determined by accidental causes. Now, there are some people, among whom I must suppose that my reader is to be found, who, when they see that any belief of theirs is determined by any circumstance extraneous to the facts, will from that moment not merely admit in words that that belief is doubtful, but will experience a real doubt of it, so that it ceases to be a belief.

To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency -- by something upon which our thinking has no effect. Some mystics imagine that they have such a method in a private inspiration from on high. But that is only a form of the method of tenacity, in which the conception of truth as something public is not yet developed. Our external permanency would not be external, in our sense, if it was restricted in its influence to one individual. It must be something which affects, or might affect, every man. And, though these affections are necessarily as various as are individual conditions, yet the method must be such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same. Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as are our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion. The new conception here involved is that of Reality. It may be asked how I know that there are any Reals. If this hypothesis is the sole support of my method of inquiry, my method of inquiry must not be used to support my hypothesis. The reply is this: 1. If investigation cannot be regarded as proving that there are Real things, it at least does not lead to a contrary conclusion; but the method and the conception on which it is based remain ever in harmony. No doubts of the method, therefore, necessarily arise from its practice, as is the case with all the others. 2. The feeling which gives rise to any method of fixing belief is a dissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions. But here already is a vague concession that there is some one thing which a proposition should represent. Nobody, therefore, can really doubt that there are Reals, for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. The hypothesis, therefore, is one which every mind admits. So that the social impulse does not cause men to doubt it. 3. Everybody uses the scientific method about a great many things, and only ceases to use it when he does not know how to apply it. 4. Experience of the method has not led us to doubt it, but, on the contrary, scientific investigation has had the most wonderful triumphs in the way of settling opinion. These afford the explanation of my not doubting the method or the hypothesis which it supposes; and not having any doubt, nor believing that anybody else whom I could influence has, it would be the merest babble for me to say more about it. If there be anybody with a living doubt upon the subject, let him consider it.

To describe the method of scientific investigation is the object of this series of papers. At present I have only room to notice some points of contrast between it and other methods of fixing belief.

This is the only one of the four methods which presents any distinction of a right and a wrong way. If I adopt the method of tenacity, and shut myself out from all influences, whatever I think necessary to doing this, is necessary according to that method. So with the method of authority: the state may try to put down heresy by means which, from a scientific point of view, seem very ill-calculated to accomplish its purposes; but the only test on that method is what the state thinks; so that it cannot pursue the method wrongly. So with the a priori method. The very essence of it is to think as one is inclined to think. All metaphysicians will be sure to do that, however they may be inclined to judge each other to be perversely wrong. The Hegelian system recognizes every natural tendency of thought as logical, although it be certain to be abolished by counter-tendencies. Hegel thinks there is a regular system in the succession of these tendencies, in consequence of which, after drifting one way and the other for a long time, opinion will at last go right. And it is true that metaphysicians do get the right ideas at last; Hegel's system of Nature represents tolerably the science of his day; and one may be sure that whatever scientific investigation shall have put out of doubt will presently receive a priori demonstration on the part of the metaphysicians. But with the scientific method the case is different. I may start with known and observed facts to proceed to the unknown; and yet the rules which I follow in doing so may not be such as investigation would approve. The test of whether I am truly following the method is not an immediate appeal to my feelings and purposes, but, on the contrary, itself involves the application of the method. Hence it is that bad reasoning as well as good reasoning is possible; and this fact is the foundation of the practical side of logic.

It is not to be supposed that the first three methods of settling opinion present no advantage whatever over the scientific method. On the contrary, each has some peculiar convenience of its own. The a priori method is distinguished for its comfortable conclusions. It is the nature of the process to adopt whatever belief we are inclined to, and there are certain flatteries to the vanity of man which we all believe by nature, until we are awakened from our pleasing dream by rough facts. The method of authority will always govern the mass of mankind; and those who wield the various forms of organized force in the state will never be convinced that dangerous reasoning ought not to be suppressed in some way. If liberty of speech is to be untrammeled from the grosser forms of constraint, then uniformity of opinion will be secured by a moral terrorism to which the respectability of society will give its thorough approval. Following the method of authority is the path of peace. Certain non-conformities are permitted; certain others (considered unsafe) are forbidden. These are different in different countries and in different ages; but, wherever you are, let it be known that you seriously hold a tabooed belief, and you may be perfectly sure of being treated with a cruelty less brutal but more refined than hunting you like a wolf. Thus, the greatest intellectual benefactors of mankind have never dared, and dare not now, to utter the whole of their thought; and thus a shade of prima facie doubt is cast upon every proposition which is considered essential to the security of society. Singularly enough, the persecution does not all come from without; but a man torments himself and is oftentimes most distressed at finding himself believing propositions which he has been brought up to regard with aversion. The peaceful and sympathetic man will, therefore, find it hard to resist the temptation to submit his opinions to authority. But most of all I admire the method of tenacity for its strength, simplicity, and directness. Men who pursue it are distinguished for their decision of character, which becomes very easy with such a mental rule. They do not waste time in trying to make up their minds what they want, but, fastening like lightning upon whatever alternative comes first, they hold to it to the end, whatever happens, without an instant's irresolution. This is one of the splendid qualities which generally accompany brilliant, unlasting success. It is impossible not to envy the man who can dismiss reason, although we know how it must turn out at last.

Such are the advantages which the other methods of settling opinion have over scientific investigation. A man should consider well of them; and then he should consider that, after all, he wishes his opinions to coincide with the fact, and that there is no reason why the results of those three first methods should do so. To bring about this effect is the prerogative of the method of science. Upon such considerations he has to make his choice -- a choice which is far more than the adoption of any intellectual opinion, which is one of the ruling decisions of his life, to which, when once made, he is bound to adhere. The force of habit will sometimes cause a man to hold on to old beliefs, after he is in a condition to see that they have no sound basis. But reflection upon the state of the case will overcome these habits, and he ought to allow reflection its full weight. People sometimes shrink from doing this, having an idea that beliefs are wholesome which they cannot help feeling rest on nothing. But let such persons suppose an analogous though different case from their own. Let them ask themselves what they would say to a reformed Mussulman who should hesitate to give up his old notions in regard to the relations of the sexes; or to a reformed Catholic who should still shrink from reading the Bible. Would they not say that these persons ought to consider the matter fully, and clearly understand the new doctrine, and then ought to embrace it, in its entirety? But, above all, let it be considered that what is more wholesome than any particular belief is integrity of belief, and that to avoid looking into the support of any belief from a fear that it may turn out rotten is quite as immoral as it is disadvantageous. The person who confesses that there is such a thing as truth, which is distinguished from falsehood simply by this, that if acted on it should, on full consideration, carry us to the point we aim at and not astray, and then, though convinced of this, dares not know the truth and seeks to avoid it, is in a sorry state of mind indeed.

Yes, the other methods do have their merits: a clear logical conscience does cost something -- just as any virtue, just as all that we cherish, costs us dear. But we should not desire it to be otherwise. The genuis of a man's logical method should be loved and reverenced as his bride, whom he has chosen from all the world. He need not contemn the others; on the contrary, he may honor them deeply, and in doing so he only honors her the more. But she is the one that he has chosen, and he knows that he was right in making that choice. And having made it, he will work and fight for her, and will not complain that there are blows to take, hoping that there may be as many and as hard to give, and will strive to be the the worthy knight and champion of her from the blaze of whose splendors he draws his inspiration and his courage.

[NoName]

les preuves de sa résurrection

ridicule

 

En réfléchissant un peu, l'existence de Dieu relève du même bon sens philosophique

S'il n'y avait rien après la mort, l'homme l'aurait ressenti depuis des millénaires.

ridicule²

 

je t'annonce quand même que t'es plonké

[Rincevent]

Lancelot : Tl;dr.

[Lancelot]

C'est ma modeste réponse à "lis d'abord toute l'école thomiste avant de me causer n00b".

Et encore moi je balance un lien qui représente 15 pages, pas une référence à un bouquin entier introuvable.

[Anton_K]

Confusion, confusion, confusion.

[Lancelot]

[Jesrad]

Moi au moins ma position est simple, courte et limpide. La Déesse me parle. Des fois Elle a même presque l'air de m'écouter. C'est cool, ça me va maintenant que j'ai eu tout le temps de m'y faire.