Taranne Posté 23 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 23 juillet 2008 Jul 22, 2008Turkey in the throes of Islamic revolution? By Spengler Turkey is half pregnant with political Islam, if one believes Western foreign ministries and the mainstream press. Its Islamist government last week arrested 82 alleged coup plotters from Turkey's military and intellectual elite, on the strength of a secret indictment of 2,445 pages. Turkish media have offered fanciful allegations linking the secular leaders of the alleged "Ergenekon" plot to al-Qaeda as well as the violent Kurdish Workers' Party. Among those detailed are pillars of the secular establishment, including the head of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce and the Ankara editor of the country's leading daily newspaper, Cumhuriyet. Before shouting "Reichstag Fire!" in a crowded theater, one should read the indictment, when and if it is made public. A few Western analysts, such as Michael Rubin at the American Enterprise Institute, are warning [1] that an Islamic putsch is possible, after the fashion of ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. The question of the moment, though, is not whether mass arrests of civic leaders on charges that challenge the imagination are compatible with Turkey's image as a democratic nation, but rather why the world's media have printed nary a harsh word about the administration of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. A perfect storm of enmity has come down on the beleaguered Turkish secularists, who find themselves without friends. That is a tragedy whose consequences will spill over Turkey's borders, for the secular model established by Kemal Ataturk after World War I was the Muslim world's best hope of adapting to modernity. Many years of misbehavior by Turkey's army and security services, the core institutions of secular power, have eroded their capacity to resist an Islamist takeover. The United States State Department, meanwhile, has found a dubious use for what it thinks is a moderate strain of political Islam. Washington apparently hopes to steer Turkey into a regional bloc with the short-term aim of calming Iraq, and a longer-term objective of fostering a Sunni alliance against Iran's ambition to foment a Shi'ite revolution in the Middle East. By rejecting Turkey's efforts to join the European Union, France and Germany have destroyed the credibility of the secular parties who seek integration with the West. Perhaps the Europeans already have consigned Turkey to the ward for political incurables, and do not think it worthwhile to try to revive Western-oriented secularism. Turkey's liberal intellectuals, who suffered intermittent but brutal repression at the hands of the secular military, think of the Islamist government as the enemy of their enemy, if not quite their friend. Sadly, the notion that moderate Islam will flourish in the Turkish nation demands that we believe in two myths, namely, moderate Islam and the Turkish nation. Too much effort is wasted parsing the political views of Erdogan, who began his career in the 1990s as an avowed Islamist and anti-secularist, but later espoused a muted form of Islam as leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Whether Erdogan is a born-again moderate or a disguised jihadi is known only to the man himself. Islam in Turkey flourishes in full public view. At the village level, the AKP draws on the same sort of Saudi Arabian patronage that filled Pakistan with madrassas (seminaries) during the past two decades, and incubated the Wahhabi forces that have now all but buried the remnants of Pakistani secularism. If political Islam prevails in Turkey, what will emerge is not the same country in different coloration, but a changeling, an entirely different nation. In a 1997 speech that earned him a prison term, Erdogan warned of two fundamentally different camps, the secularists who followed Kemal, and Muslims who followed sharia. These are not simply different camps, however, but different configurations of Turkish society at the molecular level. Like a hologram, Turkey offers two radically different images when viewed from different angles. Turkish Islam, the ordering of the Anatolian villages and the Istanbul slums, represents a nation radically different than the secularism of the army, the civil service, the universities and the Western-leaning elite of Istanbul. If the Islamic side of Turkey rises, the result will be unrecognizable. Modern Turkey is a construct, not a country in the sense that Westerners understand the term; it is the rump of a multi-ethnic empire that perished in World War I, and the project of a nation advanced by a visionary leader who could not, however, pierce the sedimentary layers of ethnicity, language and history that make modern Turkey less than the sum of its parts. Turkey's army prevailed as the dominant institution of the secular state simply because no other entity could array the poor farmers of the Anatolian highlands according to the secular program. The trouble is that there are not that enough Turks in Turkey. To replace the imperial identity of the Ottoman Empire, Kemal proposed Turkum, or Turkishness, an Anatolian national identity founded on the many civilizations that had ruled the peninsula. Ethnic identity in the sense of European nationalism informed neither the Ottoman Empire nor the Kemalist state. The Orghuz Turks who conquered the hinterlands of the Byzantine Empire during the 12th century never comprised more than a small minority of the population. At the height of their conquests during the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire ruled over more Christians than Muslims. Kemal created modern Turkey by thwarting the attempts of Western powers to partition his country after its defeat in World War I, but at terrible cost. The 20 million population of the Ottoman Empire was reduced to perhaps 7 million (by a French government estimate) in 1924. Up to a million and a half Armenian Christians were murdered in 1914-1918 at the instigation of the Turkish government, to neutralize a population considered sympathetic to wartime adversaries. Most of the killing was done by Kurdish tribesmen. Between 1.5 million and 3 million Greek Orthodox Christians, whose ancestors had settled Asia Minor thousands of years before the Turks arrived, were expelled in 1924 at the conclusion of the Greek-Turkish War. Modern Turkey thus began not only with the rump of an empire, but with the turnover of nearly half its 1924 population. Because Kemal's concept of Turkum requires suspension of disbelief in favor of a nonexistent national identity, Turkey has avoided a census of its minorities since 1965. Perhaps 30% of its population are Kurds, whose integration into the Turkish state is uncertain. Kurds are concentrated in eastern Turkey in an area that before 1918 was known as Western Armenia - because ethnic Kurds replaced the slaughtered Armenians. In addition, there are 3 million Circassians, 2 million Bosniaks, a million and a half Albanians, a million Georgians, and sundry smaller groups. But even within the majority characterized as "ethnic Turks", the sedimentary layers remain of millennia of contending tribes and civilizations. The Kemalists had mixed results in their efforts to pack this ethnic and cultural jumble into a newly-designed national identity. What sometimes is called the "deep state" - the secretive Kemalist hold over military and intelligence services - may turn out to be shallow as it is brittle. One Turkish historian told me, "Like the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid, who fell 100 years ago this week because of an explosion of popular unrest, the Turkish military are the victims of their own success in creating a diversified and modern society which wants to live in a freer system. The hard hand they turned against intellectual dissenters drove sections of the westernized intelligentsia into the arms of the Islamists - and it is that alliance which is now at work to demolish both the military's influence in politics and (perhaps) the entire heritage of Kemal Ataturk." Like its Ottoman predecessors, the Kemalist establishment recognized its danger far too late. This year, the country's Constitutional Court attempted to ban Erdogan's AKP for attempting to undermine the secular state. It seems probable that the suppression of the supposed coup plot constitutes the AKP's response, as well as a pre-emptive action against the last-resort tactic of the secularists, namely military intervention to prevent Turkey from sliding into Islamism. Turkey presently is composed of 70 million people who do not quite know who they are. If the hologram rotates towards Islam, that is, a return to sharia and traditional life in opposition to modernity, Turkey will no more resemble the "moderate Muslim" state of 2008 than Kemal's Turkey resembled the Ottoman Empire of 1908. According to one Turkish analyst, "The Islamic movement in Turkey is a vast and varied coalition of which the AKP is only the nose cone. It was designed to look studiously moderate and allay the suspicions both of the military and of world opinion. Some sections of the AKP are undoubtedly moderates or pragmatists and deserve their moderate reputation. But alongside the party, there is an enormous groundswell of Islamic movements, at work transforming Turkish society and institutions. Successful revolutionaries tend to be those who conceal their intentions until the hour of victory: if anyone in the AKP intends to move towards sharia it is unlikely that they would be shouting this from the rooftops." It should be no surprise that the State Department looks favorably on Turkey's Islamist drift: that is precisely how Foggy Bottom viewed Iran in 1979, when it sped the overthrow of the shah. It appears that the United States and Saudi Arabia, each for its own reasons, are doing their best to propel Turkey on the way to Islamism. Saudi Arabia's support for Islamist organizations at the grassroots level is an open secret in Turkey, and the influence of Erdogan's AKP at the village level stems to a great extent from Saudi patronage. Less subtle is the burgeoning importance of Gulf state contracts for the Turkish economy. Turkey has two main sources of external business: consumer goods exports to Europe, and contracting as well as exports in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Economic conditions are deteriorating in Turkey, and the country's stock market is the worst performer this year among emerging markets. With Europe in recession, and prospects fading for Turkish entry into the European community, Saudi Arabia looms larger in the Turkish economy, strengthening Erdogan's hand among the business elite. Washington's immediate concern is the appearance of stability in Iraq, which will influence the November presidential elections in the US. As a self-styled moderate Sunni, Erdogan seems to be Central Casting's idea of an Iraqi ally. Erdogan received an extraordinary welcome when he visited Iraq last week, with the promise of an economic and political alliance with the country. An Iraqi spokesmen, Ali al-Dabbagh, declared after Erdogan's visit that "Turkey is Iraq's door to Europe", adding that Turkey "can be the best trade partner of Iraq", according to the BBC on July 13. Even more, "The security and political dimensions are also of paramount importance because the two countries are on the road to democracy. Turkey is a democratic country and democracy has started to take roots in Iraq … I think this relationship will be a large nucleus around which other countries will rally so that the region will develop into a common market benefiting its peoples." Less dramatic, but perhaps more important than the mass arrests, was another development in Turkey. The country's Supreme Court dismissed all charges against the exiled Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen, the man Michael Rubin believes will be Turkey's answer to Khomeini. State prosecutors had accused Gulen of founding an illegal organization with the objective of undermining the secular structure of the state. An elderly diabetic, Gulen has lived in exile in the United States since 1998. "We expect Gulen here any day," a Turkish analyst told me. Whether Rubin is correct to view Gulen as the Turkish Khomeini is of secondary interest. Gulen's movement is one of a number of entities that might form the kernel of an Islamic Republic in Turkey. The Sorcerer's Apprentices of the State Department do not understand the sort of objects that they are animating. Political Islam will not merely change coloration of the country, but transform its character from the grassroots upward. For all the crudeness of the Kemalists, American diplomats will regret their failure as much as the fall of the shah. Note 1. Turkey's Turning Point National Online, April 14, 2008.
José Posté 23 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 23 juillet 2008 Enterprise Institute, are warning [1] that an Islamic putsch is possible… Moins probable toutefois qu'un putsch militaro-laïcard.
Blondie Posté 23 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 23 juillet 2008 Moins probable toutefois qu'un putsch militaro-laïcard. Toi alors tu aime vraiment l'islam toujours pret a sortir un truc pour dedouaner les islamistes de tout poil. Quel service !
Ash Posté 23 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 23 juillet 2008 Il s'agit de la Turquie quand même, pas de l'Iran.
Taranne Posté 23 juillet 2008 Auteur Signaler Posté 23 juillet 2008 Toi alors tu aime vraiment l'islam toujours pret a sortir un truc pour dedouaner les islamistes de tout poil. Quel service ! Ce n'est pas une question d'aimer ou non l'Islam, mais une question de probabilité. L'AKP a le pouvoir et le peuple de son côté (les sondages le montrent) et les laïcs sont dans l'opposition et ont l'armée dans leur poche. Alors qui est le plus susceptible de fomenter un coup d'état, mm?
José Posté 23 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 23 juillet 2008 Toi alors tu aime vraiment l'islam toujours pret a sortir un truc pour dedouaner les islamistes de tout poil. Faut-il te rappeler les menaces de coup d'État à peine voilée lancée par la hiérarchie militaire turque quand la présidence turque allait échoir à l'AKP (le premier e-coup d'État de l'Histoire) ou le fait qu'une enquête actuelle incrimine une dizaine de militaires dans un complot laïco-putschiste ?
Legion Posté 23 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 23 juillet 2008 Toi alors tu aime vraiment l'islam toujours pret a sortir un truc pour dedouaner les islamistes de tout poil. Quel service ! On parle de la Turquie. Hors-sujet, 0/20.
Harald Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Toi alors tu aime vraiment l'islam toujours pret a sortir un truc pour dedouaner les islamistes de tout poil. Quel service ! Et puis ? Ainsi donc, islam et islamisme seraient la même chose ? Il va falloir réviser un peu.
José Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Un article autrement plus nuancé que celui de Spengler : Flags, veils and shariaJul 17th 2008 | ANKARA, KARS AND TOKAT From The Economist print edition Behind the court case against Turkey’s ruling party lies an existential question: how Islamist has the country become? A MARBLE fountain held up by bare-breasted maidens in the eastern city of Kars is a source of pride for the city’s mayor, Naif Alibeyoglu. Yet last November the sculpture vanished a few days before a planned visit to Kars by Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Fearful of incurring the wrath of Mr Erdogan and his mildly Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), the mayor (himself an AKP man) reportedly arranged for its removal. In the event, the prime minister never arrived—and the fountain came back. The incident may be testimony to the prudery of Mr Erdogan, and of the AKP more broadly. But could it also be evidence of their desire to steer Turkey towards sharia law? The country’s chief prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, might say so. In March he petitioned the constitutional court to ban the AKP and to bar Mr Erdogan and 70 other named AKP officials, including the president, Abdullah Gul, from politics, on the ground that they are covertly seeking to establish an Islamist theocracy. Turkey has been in upheaval ever since. After hearings earlier this month, a verdict is expected soon, maybe in early August. Most observers expect it to go against the AKP. Turkey has banned no fewer than 24 parties in the past 50 years, including the AKP’s two forerunners. In 23 of these cases, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the bans violated its charter. Yet Mr Yalcinkaya’s indictment lacks hard evidence to show that the AKP is working to reverse secular rule. Much of his case rests on the words, not the actions, of Mr Erdogan and his lieutenants. Among Mr Erdogan’s listed “crimes” is his opinion that “Turkey as a modern Muslim nation can serve as an example for the harmony of civilisations.” That is hardly a call for jihad. The AKP has promoted Islamic values, but it has never attempted to pass laws inspired by the Koran. None of this seems to impress Turkey’s meddlesome generals, who are widely believed to be the driving force behind the “judicial coup” against the AKP. This follows the “e-coup” they threatened last year by issuing a warning on the internet against making Mr Gul president. Some renegade generals are also involved in the so-called Ergenekon group; 86 members were charged this week with plotting a coup. The generals and their allies believe that nothing less than the future of Ataturk’s secular republic is at stake. Similar rumblings were heard when the now defunct pro-Islamic Welfare party first came to power in 1996. It was ejected a year later in a bloodless “velvet coup” and banned on similar charges to those now levelled at the AKP. But with each intervention the Islamists come back stronger. Unlike their pro-secular rivals, Islamists have been able to reinvent themselves to appeal to a growing base of voters. Nobody has done this more successfully than Mr Erdogan with the AKP. An Islamic cleric by training, Mr Erdogan became Istanbul’s mayor when Welfare won a municipal election in 1994. He was booted out in 1997, and jailed briefly a year later for reciting a nationalist poem in public that was deemed to incite “religious hatred”. It was a turning-point. Mr Erdogan defected from Welfare with fellow moderates to found the AKP in 2001. He and his friends said that they no longer believed in mixing religion with politics and that Turkish membership of the European Union was the AKP’s chief goal. And when the AKP won the general election of November 2002, it formed a single-party government that did something unusual for Turkey: it kept its word. The death penalty was abolished; the army’s powers were trimmed; women were given more rights than at any time since Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the secular Turkish state, made both sexes equal before the law. Despite Mr Erdogan’s calls for women to have “at least three children”, abortion remains legal and easy. This silent revolution eventually shamed the EU into opening formal membership talks with Turkey in 2005, an achievement that had eluded all the AKP’s predecessors in government. The government’s economic record was impressive, too. The economy bounced back from its nadir in 2001, growing by a steady average annual rate of 6% or more. Inflation was tamed (though it has crept back up recently). Above all, foreign direct investment, previously paltry, hit record levels. For a while, Turkey seemed to have become a stable and prosperous sort of place. That is surely why 47% of voters backed the AKP in July 2007, a big jump from only 34% in 2002. Many see the campaign to topple the AKP as part of a long battle pitting an old guard, used to monopolising wealth and power, against a rising class of pious Anatolians symbolised by the AKP. Others say it is mostly about an army that believes soldiers, not elected politicians, should have the final say over how the country is run. Yet the real struggle “is between Islam and modernity”, says Ismail Kara, a respected Islamic theologian. Adapting to the modern world without compromising their religious values is a dilemma that has long vexed Muslims. For Turkey the challenge is also to craft an identity that can embrace all its citizens, whether devout Muslims, hard-core secularists, Alevis or Kurds. If the generals had their way, everyone would be happy to call himself a Turk, all would refrain from public displays of piety and nobody would ever challenge their authority. But the Kemalist straitjacket no longer fits the modern country. Opinion polls suggest that most Turks now identify themselves primarily as Muslims, not as Turks. The AKP did not create this mindset: rather, it was born from it. The caliph of Istanbul Islam has been intertwined with Turkishness ever since the Ottoman Sultan adopted the title of “Caliph”, or spiritual leader, of the world’s Muslims almost six centuries ago. When Ataturk abolished the caliphate in 1924 and launched his secular revolution, he did not efface piety; he drove it underground. Turkey’s brand of secularism is not about separating religion from the state, as in France. It is about subordinating religion to the state. This is done through the diyanet, the state-run body that appoints imams to Turkey’s 77,000 mosques and tells them what to preach, even sometimes writing their sermons. In the early days of Ataturk’s republic, the façade of modernity was propped up by zealous Kemalists, who fanned out on civilising missions across Anatolia. They would drink wine and dance the Charleston at officers’ clubs in places like Kars. “My grandmother, she told me about the balls, the beautiful dresses. Kars was such a modern place then,” sighs Arzu Orhankazi, a feminist activist. In truth, life outside the cities continued much as before: deeply traditional and desperately poor. A big reason why Anatolia seemed less Islamist in the old days is because it was home to a large and vibrant community of Christians. But this demographic balance was brutally overturned by the mass killings and expulsions of Armenians and Greeks in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Take Tokat, a leafy northern Anatolian town where Armenians made up nearly a third of the population before 1915. The only trace that remains of a once thriving Armenian community is a derelict cemetery overgrown with weeds and desecrated by treasure-hunting locals. Much of this history is overlooked by the secular elite. Pressed for evidence of creeping Islamisation under the AKP, they point to the growing number of women who wear the headscarf, which is proscribed as a symbol of Islamic militancy in state-run institutions and schools. Mr Erdogan’s attempt to lift the ban for universities, which was later overturned by the constitutional court, is a big part of Mr Yalcinkaya’s case against him and the AKP. Yet surveys suggest that, except for a small group of militant pro-secularists, most Turks do not oppose Islamic headgear, least of all in universities. Its proliferation probably has little to do with Islamist fervour, but is linked to the influx of rural Anatolians into towns and cities. The exodus from the countryside accelerated under Turgut Ozal, a former prime minister who liberalised the economy in the early 1980s. For conservative families, covering their daughters’ heads became a way of protecting them in a new and alien world. Once urbanisation is complete the headscarf will begin to fade, says Faruk Birtek, a sociologist at Istanbul’s Bogazici University. Bogazici was always refreshingly unbothered by students with headscarves. But the rules were tightened in the 1990s. And around the time the constitutional court in June overturned the new AKP law to let women with headscarves attend university, Bogazici’s liberal female director was squeezed out. Like many, Summeye Kavuncu, a sociology student at Bogazici, has been caught in the net. She complains that her stomach “gets all knotty each time I go to university. I no longer know whether to keep my scarf on or to take it off. The secularists look upon us as cockroaches, backward creatures who blot their landscape.” Few would guess that Ms Kavuncu belongs to a band of pious activists who dare to speak up for gays and transvestites. Social and class snobbery may partly drive the secularists’ contempt for their pious peers. But it is ignorance that drives their fear. Bridging these worlds can be tricky, “because Islam is not like other religions, it’s a 24-hour lifestyle,” comments Yilmaz Ensaroglu, an Islamic intellectual. “Devout Muslims pray five times a day.” Wine, women and schools The biggest fault-lines in Turkey’s sharpening secular/religious divide concern alcohol, women and education. When Welfare rose to power in the 1990s, one of its first acts was to ban booze in restaurants run by municipalities under its control. Party officials argued that pious citizens had the right to affordable leisure space that did not offend their values. Some AKP mayors have pushed this line further. They want to exile drinkers to “red zones” outside their cities. A newly prosperous class of devout Muslims is creating its own gated communities, and a growing number of hotels boast segregated beaches and no liquor. A survey shows that the number of such retreats has quadrupled under the AKP. Taha Erdem, a respected pollster, says the number of women wearing the turban, the least revealing headscarf of all, has quadrupled too. All this is feeding secularist paranoia about creeping Islam. Are these fears justified? In the big cities conservative Anatolians are expanding their living space. But this is not at the secularists’ expense. Life for urban middle-class Turks, and certainly for the rich, continues much as before. It is in rural backwaters that freewheeling Turks fall prey to what Serif Mardin, a respected sociologist, calls “neighbourhood pressure”. For instance, Tarsus, a sleepy eastern Mediterranean town (and birthplace of St Paul), made headlines recently when two teenage girls were attacked by syringe-wielding assailants who sprayed their legs with an acid-like substance because their skirts were “too short”. Habits in the workplace are changing too. Female school teachers have been reprimanded for wearing short-sleeved blouses. During the Ramadan fast last year the governor’s office in Kars stopped serving tea for a while. Secular Turks contend that Islam will inevitably wrest more space from their lives and must be reined in now. With no credible opposition in sight, many look to the army as secularism’s last defender. So do many of Turkey’s estimated 15m Alevis, who practise an idiosyncratic form of Islam: they do not pray in mosques, they are not teetotal and their women do not cover their heads. The government has not kept its promise formally to recognise Alevi houses of worship, called cemevler. Nor has it heeded Alevi demands for their children to be exempted from compulsory religious-education classes that are dominated by Sunni Islam. “There is a systematic campaign to brainwash us, to make us Sunnis,” complains Muharrem Erkan, an Alevi activist in Tokat. The battle for Turkey’s soul is being waged most fiercely in the country’s schools. Egitim-Sen, a leftist teachers’ union, charges that Islam has been permeating textbooks under the AKP. Darwin’s theory of evolution is being whittled away and creationism is seeping in. Islamist fraternities, or tarikat, continue to ensnare students by offering free accommodation. The quid pro quo is that they fast and pray, and girls cover their heads. Yet the biggest boost to religious education came from the army itself, after it seized power for the third time in 1980. Communism was the enemy at the time, so the generals encouraged Islam as an antidote. Religious teaching became mandatory. Islamic clerical-training schools, known as imam hatip, mushroomed. Another example of how army meddling goes awry is Hizbullah, Turkey’s deadliest home-grown Islamic terrorist outfit. Hizbullah (no relation to its Lebanese namesake) is alleged to have been encouraged by rogue security forces in the late 1980s to fight separatist PKK rebels in the Kurdish south-east. The group spiralled out of control until police raids in 2001 knocked it out of action. But not entirely. Former Hizbullah militants are said to have regrouped in cells linked to al-Qaeda, and took part in the 2003 bombings of Jewish and British targets in Istanbul. Banning the AKP could strengthen the hand of such extremists, who share the fierce secularists’ belief that Islam and democracy cannot co-exist. If instead the AKP stayed in power, that would bring Islamists closer to the mainstream. “Six years in government has tempered even the most radical AKP members,” comments Mr Ensaroglu. True enough. AKP members of parliament wear Zegna suits and happily shake women’s hands; their wives get nose jobs and watch football matches; their children are more likely to study English than the Koran. Had Mr Erdogan made an effort to reach out to secular Turks, “we might not be where we are today,” concedes a senior AKP official. He missed several chances. The first came last autumn when the AKP was trying to patch together a new constitution to replace the one written by the generals in the 1980s. Mr Erdogan never bothered to consult his secular opponents. He ignored them again when passing his law to let girls wear headscarves at universities. Critics say that his big election win turned his head. “Erdogan accepts no advice and no criticism,” whispers an AKP deputy. “He’s become a tyrant.” Maybe he has. But that does not mean he deserves to be barred from politics, and his party banned. http://www.economist.com/world/europe/disp…ory_id=11745570
Nick de Cusa Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 La classe pourrie qui maintenait l'inflation à 80% pendant des décennies avec des cracks économiques toutes les quelques années, le tout maintenant la population dans la pauvreté, voit que la bonne gestion de l'AKP met en lumière comment eux sont mauvais. Ca ne peut plus durer, il faut que ça cesse. Autre abomination islamiste intolérable: l'IS a été ramené de 30% à 20% et les tranches d'IR vont de 15% à 35%, la tranche maximum ayant été abaissée en 2006 (avant c'était 40%).
Ronnie Hayek Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 En fait, les détracteurs d'Erdogan sont des nostalgiques du soudard à qui les paroles suivantes sont attribuées : "Depuis plus de 500 ans, les règles et les théories d'un vieux sheikh arabe, et les interprétations abusives de générations de prêtres crasseux et ignares ont fixé, en Turquie, tous les détails de la loi civile et criminelle. Elles ont réglé la forme de la constitution, les moindres faits et gestes de la vie de chaque citoyen, sa nourriture, ses heures de veille et de sommeil, la coupe de ses vêtements, ce qu'il apprend à l'école, ses coutumes, ses habitudes et jusqu'à ses pensées les plus intimes. L'islam, cette théologie absurde d'un bédouin immoral, est un cadavre putréfié qui empoisonne nos vies." (Mustapha Kemal Atatürk)
José Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Un grand démocrate. Toutafè, c'est même lui qui a fondé le parti d'opposition à son propre parti (historique).
Ronnie Hayek Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Un grand démocrate. Exemplaire : ainsi, en 1922, ses sbires obligèrent - flingue en pogne - les députés turcs à voter l'abolition du sultanat. Et que dire de sa manie d'accrocher aux gibets ses opposants ! Voilà ce que déclarait le futur tyran alcoolique et hétaïromane peu avant ce vote "franc et massif" : « Voilà bientôt deux heures que j'écoute vos bavardages ! La question est pourtant simple : le droit souverain de disposer d'elle-même réside dans la Nation. Or la maison d'Osman [la dynastie ottomane] s'est arrogée ce privilège par la force, et c'est par la violence que ses représentants ont régné sur la nation turque et ont maintenu sur elle leur domination pendant dix siècles. Maintenant, c'est la Nation qui, se révoltant contre ses usurpateurs, reprend elle-même effectivement l'exercice de sa souveraineté. C'est désormais un fait accompli, auquel rien ne saurait plus s'opposer. Il serait opportun que chacun des membres de cette assemblée se ralliât à ce point de vue, basé sur le droit naturel. Dans le cas contraire, les faits de l'inéluctable réalité n'en seront pas changés, mais alors gare !… on pourrait voir tomber des têtes ! » Si j'étais méchant, je dirais que cela me rappelle certaines choses. Quasiment ubuesque aussi sa loi de 1926 assimilant le port du fez à un attentat contre la sûreté de l'État.
Blondie Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Et puis ? Ainsi donc, islam et islamisme seraient la même chose ? Il va falloir réviser un peu. Je doute fort qu'en Turquie, il y ait une difference notable entre islam et islamisme. Ce pays a des moeurs trop rude pour faire cette difference.
Blondie Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 En fait, les détracteurs d'Erdogan sont des nostalgiques du soudard à qui les paroles suivantes sont attribuées :"Depuis plus de 500 ans, les règles et les théories d'un vieux sheikh arabe, et les interprétations abusives de générations de prêtres crasseux et ignares ont fixé, en Turquie, tous les détails de la loi civile et criminelle. Elles ont réglé la forme de la constitution, les moindres faits et gestes de la vie de chaque citoyen, sa nourriture, ses heures de veille et de sommeil, la coupe de ses vêtements, ce qu'il apprend à l'école, ses coutumes, ses habitudes et jusqu'à ses pensées les plus intimes. L'islam, cette théologie absurde d'un bédouin immoral, est un cadavre putréfié qui empoisonne nos vies." (Mustapha Kemal Atatürk) "Notre démocratie est uniquement le train dans lequel nous montons jusqu'à ce que nous ayons atteint notre objectif. Les mosquées sont nos casernes, les minarets sont nos baïonnettes. Les coupoles nos casques et les croyants nos soldats." Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 1998 J'adore son style new age
Ronnie Hayek Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 "Notre démocratie est uniquement le train dans lequel nous montons jusqu'à ce que nous ayons atteint notre objectif. Les mosquées sont nos casernes, les minarets sont nos baïonnettes. Les coupoles nos casques et les croyants nos soldats." Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 1998 J'adore son style new age Cela faisait longtemps qu'on ne nous l'avait plus sortie celle-là ! L'ami Taisei s'était naguère livré à une brillante analyse de texte, qui en désamorçait la prétendue charge belliqueuse.
Blondie Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Cela faisait longtemps qu'on ne nous l'avait plus sortie celle-là !L'ami Taisei s'était naguère livré à une brillante analyse de texte, qui en désamorçait la prétendue charge belliqueuse. Si on se content d'une analyse textuelle stricte, cet extrait ne veut pas dire grand chose d'autre que "nous n'avons pas besoin de soldats, nous avons des croyants; nous n'avons pas besoin d'armes, nous appelons à la prière; c'est notre foi qui nous protégera", ce qui n'est pas si con dans un pays où l'armée est tellemenbt puissante. Certes la métaphore est guerrière, mais ne servirait-elle pas plutôt a différencier le parti d'Erdogan d'un état plutôt opresseur, et d'une armée plutôt ennemie des libertés? Encore new age la nanalyse ! Dire que lui n'a pas besoin d'armée puisque la force militaire est intégré à l'Islam, c'est ce faire l'avocat de la liberte : la gniole devait etre bonne !
Ash Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Toutafè, c'est même lui qui a fondé le parti d'opposition à son propre parti (historique). Absolument : [dailymotion]x305hn&related=1[/dailymotion] Je doute fort qu'en Turquie, il y ait une difference notable entre islam et islamisme. Ce pays a des moeurs trop rude pour faire cette difference. Et cette votre expérience personnelle qui parle ? Votre abonnement à Del Valle Magazine ?
Blondie Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Et cette votre expérience personnelle qui parle ? Votre abonnement à Del Valle Magazine ? Avez vous fait l'experience de parler a des gens originaire de Turquie ? N'avez vous pas noté leur rudesse d'esprit, leur nationaliste exacerbé, leur desir d'ordre islamique ?
LeSanton Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 N'est-ce pas justement le résultat de la dureté kémaliste (Kemal et le régime qu'il a légué)?
Ash Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Avez vous fait l'experience de parler a des gens originaire de Turquie ? Oui, sauf les jours où je reste chez moi N'avez vous pas noté leur rudesse d'esprit, leur nationaliste exacerbé, leur desir d'ordre islamique ? Et leurs moustaches ? Non mais vous avez vu leurs moustaches horribles ?!
Taisei Yokusankai Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Encore new age la nanalyse ! Dire que lui n'a pas besoin d'armée puisque la force militaire est intégré à l'Islam, c'est ce faire l'avocat de la liberte : la gniole devait etre bonne ! Fameux. Relire attentivement, accompagné d'un dictionnaire si nécessaire, est sans doute une bonne idée. Ce que dit Erdogan, si on ne se lance pas dans des interprétations, des procès d'intentions et des analyses des motivations personelles, bref si on ne regarde que les mots et leur interaction, bref si on sait lire le français, ce que dit Erdogan donc, c'est qu'à la force ques les laïcs lui oppose, il répond par la foi. Ce n'est pas qu'ils vont planifier la reprise en main violente de l'Etat dans les mosquées et que ses fidèles vont se faire exploser. Le plus beau de l'affaire: les dix années passées depuis cette déclaration démontrent à suffisance l'inanité de l'interprétation apocalyptique que tu voudrais en faire.
melodius Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Avez vous fait l'experience de parler a des gens originaire de Turquie ? N'avez vous pas noté leur rudesse d'esprit, leur nationaliste exacerbé, leur desir d'ordre islamique ? Ca me rappelle plutôt la France cette description, hors la queue bien sûr.
Ash Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Il faut l'excuser, je crois, il est encore sous le choc de l'euro 2008. Au passage, tous les Turcs que je rencontre (et surtout ceux de mon jeune âge) me parlent à quels points leurs femmes ressemblent aux occidentales de chez nous… et que c'est très bien ainsi. Alors le coup de l'islamisme ça me fait beaucoup rire. Avec un nord-africain je veux bien, mais pas avec un turc. Ils n'ont pas de complexe d'infériorité et de post-colonisation, eux.
Legion Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Je doute fort qu'en Turquie, il y ait une difference notable entre islam et islamisme. Ce pays a des moeurs trop rude pour faire cette difference. Vous mentez comme vous respirez. Le seul islamisme en Turquie est le fait de certains rebelles kurdes - qui n'ont, au niveau du gouvernement, aucun pouvoir, aucune représentation, aucune reconnaissance, et qui sont shiites dans un pays très majoritairement sunite. Difficile de voir autre chose que de la xénophobie et de l'islamophobie mal assumés derrière vos propos et vos analyses géopolitiques dignes d'un coiffeur aviné et paranoïaque, rayez la mention inutile.
Ash Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Islamisme en parlant des kurdes… la plupart de ceux que je connaissent ils mangent du porc, ne font pas le ramadan… C'est plus un mouvement d'autonomistes que d''islamistes.
Blondie Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Enfin, si vous aimez votre Erdogan … moi je ne sais pas quoi vous lui trouver de plus que Ataturk ou autres. La bonne gestion ? je pense que c'est plutot une oeuvre des USA un peu comme au Chili. Il faut arreter de jouer a la police politique de "sos racisme", Legion. Pour ce qui est de la xenophobie, votre heros Erdogan, il en a mis une belle couche lors de son celebre discours de Cologne.
José Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 …je ne sais pas quoi vous lui trouver de plus que Ataturk… Peut-être simplement le fait que ce n'est pas un dictateur, contrairement à Kemal. La bonne gestion ? je pense que c'est plutot une oeuvre des USA un peu comme au Chili. Nimportenawak.
LeSanton Posté 24 juillet 2008 Signaler Posté 24 juillet 2008 Difficile de voir autre chose que de la xénophobie et de l'islamophobie mal assumés derrière vos propos et vos analyses géopolitiques dignes d'un coiffeur aviné et paranoïaque, rayez la mention inutile. C'est peut-être un peu bcp, non?
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