Think Again: Middle East Democracy

[Chitah]

Le sujet est: la démocratisation du Moyen-Orient (de la Syrie au Yemen, et de l'Egypte à l'Irak, sazchant que j'incluerai bien l'Afrique du Nord dedans).

Il s'agit là essentiellement de la discussion de quelques idées reçues, que j'ai mis en lettres grasses ci dessous, vous pouvez donc ne pas tout lire, même si j'ai trouvé cet article très intéressant.

J'ai trouvé ça sur le site de Foreign Policy, un site de plutot bonne qualité.

Bonne lecture.

Think Again: Middle East Democracy

By Marina Ottaway, Thomas Carothers

People in the Middle East want political freedom, and their governments acknowledge the need for reform. Yet the region appears to repel democracy. Arab regimes only concede women’s rights and elections to appease their critics at home and abroad. If democracy arrives in the Middle East, it won’t be due to the efforts of liberal activists or their Western supporters but to the very same Islamist parties that many now see as the chief obstacle to change.

“The Middle East Is the Last Holdout Against the Global Democratic Trend”

No. The Middle East is on the wrong side of the global democratic divide, but unfortunately it does not lack company. As Russia slides into authoritarianism, the former Soviet Union is becoming a democratic wasteland with only a few shaky pockets of pluralism, such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. Central Asia is no better off than the Arab world in terms of democracy. A depressingly large swath of East and Southeast Asia—from North Korea and China down through Vietnam, Laos, and Burma to Malaysia and Singapore—is a democracy-free zone that shows few signs of change.

Nor was the Middle East immune to the “Third Wave,” the decisive expansion of democracy that started in southern Europe and Latin America 30 years ago and subsequently spread to other parts of the world. During the 1980s, several Arab countries, including Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan, initiated political reforms to permit multiparty competition. These reforms lost momentum or were undone in the 1990s, however, as Arab leaders proved unwilling to risk their own power through genuine processes of democratization. Tunisia, for example, moved back to rigid authoritarian rule.

Today, political reform is percolating again in the region, amid growing public frustration over chronic corruption, poor socioeconomic performance, and a pervasive sense of stagnation. The Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks also created pressure for reform—from both the United States and some Arabs who began to question why their societies were so widely viewed as dangerous political cesspools. Talk about political reform and democracy is rife even in the Gulf monarchies where such issues had been taboo. The steps taken thus far in most countries, however, are modest. Although the Arab world is not impervious to political change, it has yet to truly begin the process of democratization.

“Democracy in the Middle East Is Impossible Until the Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Resolved”

Wrong. Arab governments curb political participation, manipulate elections, and limit freedom of expression because they do not want their power challenged, not because tension with Israel requires draconian social controls. When the government of Kuwait refuses to give women the right to vote, it does so out of deference to the most conservative elements of its population, not out of fear that voting women will undermine the country’s security. Fear of competition, not of a Zionist plot, leads the Egyptian ruling party to oppose competitive presidential elections. When it comes to democratic reform, the Zionist threat is merely a convenient excuse.

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Yet failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict prevents the United States from gaining credibility as an advocate of democracy in the Middle East. Liberal Arabs perceive claims by the United States that it wants democracy in the Middle East as hypocritical, pointing to what they see as American indifference to the rights of the Palestinians and unconditional support for Israel. For their part, many Arab governments do not take U.S. pressure to democratize their region seriously, believing that the need for oil and fear of upsetting regimes that recognize Israel will trump Washington’s desire for democratic change. U.S. credibility in the Middle East will not be restored—and the unprecedented level of anti-American resentment will not abate—until the United States makes a serious, balanced effort to tackle the conflict. Without such credibility, Washington’s effort to stimulate democratization in the region will be severely constrained.

“The United States Wants Democracy in the Middle East”

Up to a point. The democratic transformation of the Middle East emerged as a central objective of U.S. foreign policy during the Bush administration. This new policy is a sharp reversal of several decades of steadfast support for many autocratic regimes in the region, such as those in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. It reflects the new post-9/11 conventional wisdom that Middle East democracy is the best antidote to Islamist terrorism.

Although this desire for democracy may be heartfelt, the United States has a lengthy laundry list of other priorities in the region: access to oil, cooperation and assistance on counterterrorism, fostering peace between Israel and its neighbors, stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and preventing Islamist radicals from seizing power.

The newfound U.S. enthusiasm for democracy competes for a place in this mix. Fighting Islamist militants and safeguarding oil still compels the United States to cooperate with authoritarian regimes. People in the region watched as the United States took a tough line against Iran and Syria while failing to push Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, or other friendly tyrants very hard. The Bush administration launched new diplomatic endeavors and aid programs to support positive change, such as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative and the Middle East Partnership Initiative. But they consist of mild, gradual measures designed to promote democratic change without unduly challenging the authority of incumbent governments.

Moreover, despite the president’s conviction that democratic change in the Middle East is necessary, a great deal of ambivalence remains within the U.S. policy bureaucracy about the prospect of any rapid political openings in the region. This sentiment is particularly true of the State Department and the intelligence community. Some experts worry that, given the political mood of most Arab citizens—who are angry at the United States and sympathetic to political Islam—free and open elections could result in some distinctly unfriendly regimes.

“The War in Iraq Advanced the Cause of Democracy in the Middle East”

Not yet. The U.S.-led war in Iraq removed from power one of the most heinous, repressive dictators in the region and opened up the possibility that Iraq will one day have a pluralistic political system held together by consensus rather than violence. The actual achievement of democracy in Iraq, however, remains distant and uncertain. The path to that goal will be measured in years rather than months.

The war’s political effects in the rest of the region—especially the way it exposed the hollowness of Saddam Hussein’s regime—has contributed to increased calls for political reform in many Arab countries. Real progress toward democracy, however, is minimal. In addition, the war provoked some Arab governments, such as Egypt, to limit the already constrained political space they allow as a defensive gesture against public protests and as an excuse for prosecuting opponents.

Regrettably, President George W. Bush’s repeated justification of the war as a democratizing mission has discredited some Western-oriented Arab democrats in the eyes of their fellow citizens. Many Arabs have come to view democracy itself as a code word for U.S. regional domination. The unpopularity of the war and the abuses against Iraqis at Abu Ghraib prison have further tarnished the reputation of the United States and fueled Islamist extremism.

Proponents of democratic contagion argue that if Iraq holds successful elections in early 2005, this example will resound loudly in the Arab world. But much of the Arab world will likely view such elections, even if they come off well, as highly flawed. Some parts of the predominantly Sunni areas of Iraq are not expected to participate in the elections, and many Arabs will inevitably accuse the United States of manipulation, because the elections will be held under U.S. occupation. Few Arabs will be dazzled into holding a new view of democracy on the basis of one election. Many countries in the region already hold elections of varying degrees of seriousness and importance, including one in Algeria earlier this year, which a Western observer described as “one of the best conducted elections, not just in Algeria, but in Africa and much of the Arab world.”

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Promoting democracy throughout the Middle East will require doing away with fantasies of a sudden U.S.-led transformation of the region and taking seriously the challenge of building credibility with Arab societies. Moreover, if the United States is to play a constructive supporting role, it must seriously revise its cozy relations with autocratic regimes, show a sustained ability to apply nuanced diplomatic pressure for political change at key junctures, and back up this pressure with well-crafted and well-funded assistance. Washington must prepare to accept emboldened political forces, and eventually new governments, that are uninterested in doing the United States’ bidding. Embracing Middle East democracy in principle is easy; truly supporting it remains an enormous challenge.

“Islamists Are the Main Obstacle to Arab Democracy”

Think again. The standard fear is the “one person, one vote, one time” scenario: Islamists would only participate in elections to win power and put an end to democracy immediately. Hence, the argument goes, they should not be allowed to participate.

True, the commitment to democracy of even moderate Islamists is uncertain and hedged by the caveat that democratic governments must accept Islamic law. However, the chances of an overwhelming electoral victory that would allow Islamists to abrogate all freedoms at once is remote in the Arab world. During the last decade, Islamist parties and candidates have participated in elections in eight Arab countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen), always with modest results. (These elections suffered from various degrees of government interference, but there is no indication that the Islamists would have won in a more open environment.) And Turkey, a country where an Islamist party took power with a large majority, is becoming an encouraging example of democratic success.

Although the prediction that Islamist electoral victories would lead to democracy’s demise in the Middle East have so far proved unfounded, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Fear of such takeovers remains in many Arab countries and the United States. Many Arab regimes use this fear to justify meddling in elections and placing restrictions on political participation. The presence of Islamist parties thus complicates the process of democratization.

But Islamist parties are also integral to democratization because they are the only nongovernmental parties with large constituencies. Without their participation, democracy is impossible in the Middle East. The future of democracy in the region depends on whether a sufficient number of such parties moderate their political views and become actors in a democratic process, rather than spoilers in the present autocratic states, and whether incumbent governments stop hiding behind the Islamist threat and accept that all their citizens have a right to participate.

“Arab Countries Have a Historic Propensity Toward Authoritarianism”

Yes. But so what? Most societies have lived under authoritarian rule for some time, often for a long time. Democracy is a relatively recent historical phenomenon. Even in the United States and Europe it was only consolidated through universal suffrage in the last century.

Arab rulers have been highly authoritarian, but no more so than European or Asian rulers for most of history. Arabs developed a political system based on Islam through the caliph, an individual who served as supreme leader of all Muslims. Europeans clung to the concept of the Holy Roman Empire for centuries after it ceased to exist in practice, fought ferocious religious wars for hundreds of years, and adopted the concept of separation of church and state rather late and incompletely. The Arab world, for most of its history, was quite similar to the rest of the world.

Even in the 1960s and 1970s, much of the Arab world was highly representative of the major political trends of the day. Most Arab countries outside the Gulf displayed the combination of nationalism and socialism that constituted typical Third World ideology at the time. Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, alongside Jawaharlal Nehru in India and Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia, was a major champion of this ideology, which waned in the 1980s with the end of the Cold War and the rise of globally connected economies.

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To ascribe the lingering Arab absence of democracy to some unique historic affinity for authoritarianism, stemming from Arab culture, Islam, or anything else is thus factually incorrect. It is also politically defeatist, attributing a quality of inevitability that belies the experience of political change in other parts of the world.

“Promoting Women’s Rights Is Crucial for Democratic Change”

False. This myth, a favorite of women’s organizations and Western governments, reflects the combination of correct observation and false logic. No country can be considered fully democratic if a part of its population (in some cases, the majority) is discriminated against and denied equal rights. But efforts to change the status quo by promoting women’s rights are premature. The main problem at present is that Arab presidents and kings have too much power, which they refuse to share with citizens and outside institutions. This stranglehold on power must be broken to make progress toward democracy. Greater equality for women does nothing to diminish the power of overly strong, authoritarian governments.

Arab leaders know this truth all too well. Many autocrats implement policies to improve women’s rights precisely to give themselves reformist credentials and score points with Western governments, media outlets, and nongovernmental organizations. These efforts, however, often amount to a trick of smoke and mirrors designed to disguise the governments’ refusal to cede any real power. In the last few years, several Arab states have appointed women to high positions and hurriedly implemented or proposed reforms concerning marriage, divorce, inheritance, and other personal status issues. These are welcome steps, but they do not address the core issue of promoting democracy: breaking the authoritarian pattern of Arab politics.

“Arab Democrats Are the Key to Reform”

Paradoxically, no. All Arab countries boast a small number of Westernized liberals who advocate respect for human rights, freedom of thought and speech, and democratic change. But democratic transformation requires more than the ideological commitment of a few individuals. In Western societies, a small democratic cadre sufficed in the distant past, when political participation was the preserve of public-minded intellectual elites and wealthy property owners. But the Arab world of today is not the United States or Europe of the 18th century. The political elite faces a growing challenge by Islamist movements, which are developing a popular support base. As a result, democratic transformation also requires broad-based political parties and movements capable of transforming abstract democratic ideals into concrete programs that resonate with a public whose main concern is survival.

Arab democrats have so far shown little capacity—and less inclination—to translate abstract ideas into programs with mass appeal. Because they talk to Western organizations and each other more than to their fellow citizens, opposition political parties with a liberal agenda find themselves unable to build broad constituencies. This failure leaves the field open to government parties, which can build a following on the basis of patronage, and to Islamist parties, which build their following in the best tradition of mass parties, with a mixture of ideological fervor and grassroots social services.

Government repression and, at times, co-optation have also undermined Arab democrats’ effectiveness. Some regimes—notably Saudi Arabia’s—move quickly to clamp down on any nascent liberal debate. Others are more tolerant, giving liberals some intellectual space to write and discuss issues openly, as long as their talk is not followed by action. Arab democrats in countries such as Egypt are not a persecuted group. Rather, they tend to be professionals comfortably ensconced in the upper-middle class. Therefore, they are hesitant to demand genuine reforms that might lead to a hard-line takeover and content to advocate democratization from the top.

Under such conditions, it would be a serious mistake for U.S. and European democracy advocates to focus on Arab democrats as the key to political change. These individuals will play a role if democracy becomes a reality. But during this period of transition, they have neither the inclination to push for reform nor the political clout to do so successfully.

“Middle East Democracy Is the Cure for Islamist Terrorism”

No. This view is rooted in a simplistic assumption: Stagnant, repressive Arab regimes create positive conditions for the growth of radical Islamist groups, which turn their sights on the United States because it embodies the liberal sociopolitical values that radical Islamists oppose. More democracy, therefore, equals less extremism.

History tells a different story. Modern militant Islam developed with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s, during the most democratic period in that country’s history. Radical political Islam gains followers not only among repressed Saudis but also among some Muslims in Western democracies, especially in Europe. The emergence of radical Islamist groups determined to wreak violence on the United States is thus not only the consequence of Arab autocracy. It is a complex phenomenon with diverse roots, which include U.S. sponsorship of the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s (which only empowered Islamist militants); the Saudi government’s promotion of radical Islamic educational programs worldwide; and anger at various U.S. policies, such as the country’s stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the basing of military forces in the region.

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Moreover, democracy is not a cure-all for terrorism. Like it or not, the most successful efforts to control radical Islamist political groups have been antidemocratic, repressive campaigns, such as those waged in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria in the 1990s. The notion that Arab governments would necessarily be more effective in fighting extremists is wishful thinking, no matter how valuable democratization might be for other reasons.

The experience of countries in different regions makes clear that terrorist groups can operate for sustained periods even in successful democracies, whether it is the Irish Republican Army in Britain or the ETA (Basque separatists) in Spain. The ETA gained strength during the first two decades of Spain’s democratization process, flourishing more than it had under the dictatorship of Gen. Francisco Franco. In fragile democratic states—as new Arab democracies would likely be for years—radical groups committed to violence can do even more harm, often for long periods, as evidenced by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, or the Maoist rebels in Nepal.

Marina Ottawayis a senior associate at the Democracy and Rule of Law Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Thomas Carothers is the author of Aiding Democracy Abroad (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1999) and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment.

Want to Know More?

A forthcoming book coedited by Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, Uncharted Journey: Democracy Promotion in the Middle East (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), examines the challenges to promoting democracy in the Middle East for the United States and Europe. Joshua Muravchik argues for a bold U.S. approach to democracy promotion in “Bringing Democracy to the Arab World” (Current History, January 2004). Eric J. Hobsbawm is skeptical of the merits of “Spreading Democracy” in FP’s special report on “The World’s Most Dangerous Ideas” (FOREIGN POLICY, September/October 2004).

Tamara Cofman Wittes and Jon B. Alterman offer opposing views on whether Arab democrats are the key to positive political change in the Middle East in their respective essays “The Promise of Arab Liberalism” and “The False Promise of Arab Liberals” (Policy Review, June/July 2004). For a probing examination of the Islamists’ role in Middle East politics, see Graham E. Fuller’s The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave, 2003). The Carnegie Arab Reform Bulletin, a monthly e-newsletter, provides timely analysis of political reform developments throughout the region.

[ULYSSE]

“Arab Democrats Are the Key to Reform”

Paradoxically, no. All Arab countries boast a small number of Westernized liberals who advocate respect for human rights, freedom of thought and speech, and democratic change. But democratic transformation requires more than the ideological commitment of a few individuals. In Western societies, a small democratic cadre sufficed in the distant past, when political participation was the preserve of public-minded intellectual elites and wealthy property owners. But the Arab world of today is not the United States or Europe of the 18th century. The political elite faces a growing challenge by Islamist movements, which are developing a popular support base. As a result, democratic transformation also requires broad-based political parties and movements capable of transforming abstract democratic ideals into concrete programs that resonate with a public whose main concern is survival.

Arab democrats have so far shown little capacity—and less inclination—to translate abstract ideas into programs with mass appeal. Because they talk to Western organizations and each other more than to their fellow citizens, opposition political parties with a liberal agenda find themselves unable to build broad constituencies. This failure leaves the field open to government parties, which can build a following on the basis of patronage, and to Islamist parties, which build their following in the best tradition of mass parties, with a mixture of ideological fervor and grassroots social services.

Government repression and, at times, co-optation have also undermined Arab democrats’ effectiveness. Some regimes—notably Saudi Arabia’s—move quickly to clamp down on any nascent liberal debate. Others are more tolerant, giving liberals some intellectual space to write and discuss issues openly, as long as their talk is not followed by action. Arab democrats in countries such as Egypt are not a persecuted group. Rather, they tend to be professionals comfortably ensconced in the upper-middle class. Therefore, they are hesitant to demand genuine reforms that might lead to a hard-line takeover and content to advocate democratization from the top.

Under such conditions, it would be a serious mistake for U.S. and European democracy advocates to focus on Arab democrats as the key to political change. These individuals will play a role if democracy becomes a reality. But during this period of transition, they have neither the inclination to push for reform nor the political clout to do so successfully.

Arab democrats have so far shown little capacity—and less inclination—to translate abstract ideas into programs with mass appeal.

Je vais demander l'opinion de Neila Charchour à ce sujet.

C'est intéressant en tout cas, ce texte.

[Chitah]

Tiens, c'est vrai qu'en fait ce passage parle directement de gens comme elle! Son avis m'intéresse.

[Sous-Commandant Marco]

A lire par ceux qui croient que l'on peut faire pousser la démocratie en jouant aux dominos depuis Washington ou Bagdad, sans passer d'abord par la case droits et libertés.

Les habitants du Moyen-Orient ne veulent pas la démocratie à l'américaine ou à l'occidentale. Ils veulent être libres. Le discours de l'administration américaine "democracy and freedom" est auto-contradictoire. L'instauration de la loi de la majorité se traduirait par l'arrivée au pouvoir des islamistes dans certains pays et de régimes anti-occidentaux et en tout cas autoritaires dans toute la région. Cf l'Algérie ou l'Irak récemment.

Le Liban, avec ses 35% de chiites et la montée de l'islamisme qu'il connaît, est le parfait exemple de cette situation. Des "élections libres", même organisées sous l'égide de l'ONU (ou, pour rire un peu, de la France ou des Etats-Unis) pourraient bien ne pas servir à grand-chose, voire avoir un effet contraire au but recherché.

Les Etats-Unis ont mis la charrue avant les boeufs en Irak et en ont fait un fort mauvais exemple: le respect des droits et des libertés aurait dû passer bien avant le scrutin. A quoi sert-il de voter quand l'électricité ne fonctionne que deux heures par jour et que l'on risque de se faire tuer au coin de la rue?

[ULYSSE]

A quoi sert-il de voter quand l'électricité ne fonctionne que deux heures par jour et que l'on risque de se faire tuer au coin de la rue?

Peut-être que voter leur donnera justement un sentiment de liberté et d'indépendance qui leur permettra de résister aux radicaux qui bloquent la reconstruction du pays.

Au final, les arguments des "résistants" pour maintenir la lutte armée s'effondrent. Surtout quand ces arguments s'expriment avec le sang des civils irakiens.

[Chitah]

A lire par ceux qui croient que l'on peut faire pousser la démocratie en jouant aux dominos depuis Washington ou Bagdad, sans passer d'abord par la case droits et libertés.

A mon avis, Martin Luther King plus l'US Air Force c'est mieux que MLK tout seul, non?

Les habitants du Moyen-Orient ne veulent pas la démocratie à l'américaine ou à l'occidentale. Ils veulent être libres. Le discours de l'administration américaine "democracy and freedom" est auto-contradictoire. L'instauration de la loi de la majorité se traduirait par l'arrivée au pouvoir des islamistes dans certains pays et de régimes anti-occidentaux et en tout cas autoritaires dans toute la région. Cf l'Algérie ou l'Irak récemment.

Si j'étais en mode provoc', je répondrai "du Maroc à l'Egypte, en passant par la Syrie et la Libye, tous les dirigeants arabes te remercient pour ton aide à la diffusion de leur propagande". Tu vois ce que je veux dire, j'iamgine.

Les islamistes au pouvoir, est-ce si sûr? Et si oui, so what? Le problème, c'est le terme "islamiste", qui peut inclure tout le monde entre Oussama Ben Laden et un authentique démocrate, simplement inspiré au niveau personnel par l'islam!

Les Etats-Unis ont mis la charrue avant les boeufs en Irak et en ont fait un fort mauvais exemple: le respect des droits et des libertés aurait dû passer bien avant le scrutin. A quoi sert-il de voter quand l'électricité ne fonctionne que deux heures par jour et que l'on risque de se faire tuer au coin de la rue?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Tu es sûr de ce constat?

[Ronnie Hayek]

A mon avis, Martin Luther King plus l'US Air Force c'est mieux que MLK tout seul, non?

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Il revenait aux Irakiens de se libérer réellement. Je doute que l'US Army ait agi en ce sens.

[ULYSSE]

C'est le même Chitah que le Chitah d'avant?

A le lire ici et dans le sujet Chine, il semble avoir reçu une valise de Porter Goss. (Ou une charmante agente l'a convaincu).

En tout cas, positive évolution vers la positive attitude.

Un effet de la dynamique amenée par Negroponte?

[Sous-Commandant Marco]

[…]Les islamistes au pouvoir, est-ce si sûr? Et si oui, so what? Le problème, c'est le terme "islamiste", qui peut inclure tout le monde entre Oussama Ben Laden et un authentique démocrate, simplement inspiré au niveau personnel par l'islam!

[…]

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

On ne va pas, je l'espère, revenir sur la polémique irakienne. Je doute néanmoins que le parti vainqueur des élections libres, que l'on peut effectivement qualifier d'islamiste modéré, soit seulement inspiré "au niveau personnel". N'a-t-il pas indiqué que la source de la loi devrait être l'Islam?

Ma préoccupation, c'est que des élections faites à-la-va-vite pour présenter le plus rapidement possible des résultats politiques n'aient aucun effet positif pour les populations. On accrédite même l'idée que la majorité issue de ces élections peut priver les minorités de ses droits.

Et les attentats ne diminueront pas pour autant, car les terroristes se fichent de l'opinion publique comme de leur premier pain de plastic. En Irak, ils sont détestés par la population depuis bien avant les élections et cela ne les empêche pas de continuer. Au passage, merci de ne pas me ranger dans le camp des terroristes (moi aussi je déplore leurs actions) ou de soutien des régimes autoritaires comme ceux de l'Egypte ou de l'Arabie Saoudite. Ce n'est pas moi qui leur verse des milliards de $ et qui les aide à se maintenir au pouvoir en échange de concessions démocratiques bien minces.

[Chitah]

C'est le même Chitah que le Chitah d'avant?

Mais oui, bien sûr!

Un effet de la dynamique amenée par Negroponte?

Ca par contre c'est pas impossible.

J'aimais beaucoup de M.Negroponte avant qu'il ne se fasse nommer à son poste actuel par Georges Bush.

Pour memoire, c'est le fondateur du MediaLab du MIT, autant dire que lorsque l'on prononce le mot "innovation", le nom de Negroponte suit immédiatement dans la conversation.

[Chitah]

On ne va pas, je l'espère, revenir sur la polémique irakienne. Je doute néanmoins que le parti vainqueur des élections libres, que l'on peut effectivement qualifier d'islamiste modéré, soit seulement inspiré "au niveau personnel". N'a-t-il pas indiqué que la source de la loi devrait être l'Islam?

OK, pas de polémiques sur l'Irak, ni sur l'islam, on est entre gens de bonne compagnie.

Si la source du Droit est l'islam, cela ne posera problème que si c'est le corpus juridique islamique qui est repris (le fiqh, jurisprudence religieuse qui a eu le plus grand mal à changer dans les 500 dernièers années). Par contre, si c'est simplement la shari'a qui est la source du Droit, il n'y aura à mon avis pas de problème. C'est simplement une source philosophique comparable à toute autre source.

Certains sont inspirés par le matérialisme athée, d'autres par des éléments de religion, il n'y a pas de problème, je pense;

Ma préoccupation, c'est que des élections faites à-la-va-vite pour présenter le plus rapidement possible des résultats politiques n'aient aucun effet positif pour les populations. On accrédite même l'idée que la majorité issue de ces élections peut priver les minorités de ses droits.

Ce qui est également le cas pour n'importe quelle autre démocratie, je crois, non?

Penses-tu que l'Irak devrait simplement être mis sous tutelle provisoire (je parle là de ne pas organiser d'elections, les membres du gouvernement interimaires peuvent etre irakiens, je ne parle pas d'un americain chef de l'Etat irakien) par:

- l'ONU

- la Ligue Arabe (si ça existe vraiment ce truc)

- l'UE

- les USA

[Invité jabial]

Le dernier coin qui résiste à la mode démocratique? Voire… Et l'Asie, donc?

[ULYSSE]

Voici la réponse de Neila Charchour Hachicha

(Fondatrice du Parti Libéral Méditerranéen)

http://forum.gouverner.com/index.php?showtopic=609

Excusez mon retard, et merci de vous interésser à mon point de vue.

Think Again: Middle East Democracy

By Marina Ottaway, Thomas Carothers

People in the Middle East want political freedom, and their governments acknowledge the need for reform. Yet the region appears to repel democracy. Arab regimes only concede women’s rights and elections to appease their critics at home and abroad. If democracy arrives in the Middle East, it won’t be due to the efforts of liberal activists or their Western supporters but to the very same Islamist parties that many now see as the chief obstacle to change.

Ceci est vrai pour pas mal de pays Arabo-Musulman, mais pas pour tous les pays. En effet chaque pays Arabo-Musulman a eu une évolution propre qui fait que la maturité politique de ses citoyens qui est liée à leur degré de développement humain, et donc d’éducation, diffère d’un pays à l’autre.

A priori essayer d’analyser le monde Arabo-Musulman en tant qu’entité est une erreur d’autant que celui-ci existe uniquement en tant que terme qui ne se traduit par rien de concret dans la réalité. Chaque pays est une entité à part. Il serait déjà plus utile de nuancer beaucoup plus entre le Maghreb et le Moyen Orient.

Le seul point commun de toute la région reste en effet l’absence de démocratie partout. Cette situation se justifie systématiquement par la peur d’un Islamisme violent qui n’est en réalité que le résultat direct des dictatures. Les uns ont besoin des autres pour exister et surtout durer.

Nous nous trouvons donc dans un cercle vicieux puisque nous ne savons pas au juste qu’elle est l’ampleur du mouvement Islamiste et quel serait son vrai impact si nous avions des régimes démocratiques.

Le 11 septembre a par contre démontré que le choix de réprimer les Islamistes était encore plus dangereux puisqu’en les réprimant ils se radicalisaient bien plus au point de se transformer carrément en terroristes et de provoquer des guerres de religions.

“The Middle East Is the Last Holdout Against the Global Democratic Trend”

No. The Middle East is on the wrong side of the global democratic divide, but unfortunately it does not lack company. As Russia slides into authoritarianism, the former Soviet Union is becoming a democratic wasteland with only a few shaky pockets of pluralism, such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. Central Asia is no better off than the Arab world in terms of democracy. A depressingly large swath of East and Southeast Asia—from North Korea and China down through Vietnam, Laos, and Burma to Malaysia and Singapore—is a democracy-free zone that shows few signs of change.

Oui, en effet le monde Arabo-Musulman n’est pas le seul, mais sa position stratégique et ses ressources pétrolières font qu’on s’y intéresse plus pour le moment. Ce ne sont jamais les Droits de l’Homme qui mobilisent le monde, ce sont toujours les Intérêts de l’Homme qui provoquent une mobilisation. Maintenant si cette mobilisation va dans le sens de l’intérêt des Droits de l’Homme, eh bien tant mieux. Et cela le Président Bush l’a très bien compris.

Nor was the Middle East immune to the “Third Wave,” the decisive expansion of democracy that started in southern Europe and Latin America 30 years ago and subsequently spread to other parts of the world. During the 1980s, several Arab countries, including Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan, initiated political reforms to permit multiparty competition. These reforms lost momentum or were undone in the 1990s, however, as Arab leaders proved unwilling to risk their own power through genuine processes of democratization. Tunisia, for example, moved back to rigid authoritarian rule.

Exact. Mais dans les trois cas, il ne s’agissait de toute façon que d’une démocratie de façade, juste pour calmer les esprits qui commençaient à s’éveiller.

Today, political reform is percolating again in the region, amid growing public frustration over chronic corruption, poor socioeconomic performance, and a pervasive sense of stagnation. The Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks also created pressure for reform—from both the United States and some Arabs who began to question why their societies were so widely viewed as dangerous political cesspools. Talk about political reform and democracy is rife even in the Gulf monarchies where such issues had been taboo. The steps taken thus far in most countries, however, are modest. Although the Arab world is not impervious to political change, it has yet to truly begin the process of democratization.

Absolument, mais ce n’est pas seulement la stagnation ou le 11 Septembre qui a provoqué cet éveil, le 11 Septembre a été un catalyseur mondial, mais c’est surtout l’information à travers une grande variété de Médias et essentiellement la multitude de chaînes de télévision qui ont pénétré les foyers et ont fait que le monopole de l’information qui était un privilège des Etats a été totalement dépassé.

“Democracy in the Middle East Is Impossible Until the Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Resolved”

Wrong. Arab governments curb political participation, manipulate elections, and limit freedom of expression because they do not want their power challenged, not because tension with Israel requires draconian social controls. When the government of Kuwait refuses to give women the right to vote, it does so out of deference to the most conservative elements of its population, not out of fear that voting women will undermine the country’s security. Fear of competition, not of a Zionist plot, leads the Egyptian ruling party to oppose competitive presidential elections. When it comes to democratic reform, the Zionist threat is merely a convenient excuse.

Absolument. La cause Palestinienne a toujours été une excellente excuse pour éviter toute réforme démocratique. C’est le seul point qui a toujours uni tous les dirigeants Arabes. Aujourd’hui avec un processus de paix qui a toutes les chances de réussir, ils sont tous au pied du mur en quelque sorte et il ne faudrait donc pas exclure le fait qu’ils tenteront tous de faire échouer ce processus de paix. Il faut rester vigilant.

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Yet failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict prevents the United States from gaining credibility as an advocate of democracy in the Middle East. Liberal Arabs perceive claims by the United States that it wants democracy in the Middle East as hypocritical, pointing to what they see as American indifference to the rights of the Palestinians and unconditional support for Israel. For their part, many Arab governments do not take U.S. pressure to democratize their region seriously, believing that the need for oil and fear of upsetting regimes that recognize Israel will trump Washington’s desire for democratic change. U.S. credibility in the Middle East will not be restored—and the unprecedented level of anti-American resentment will not abate—until the United States makes a serious, balanced effort to tackle the conflict. Without such credibility, Washington’s effort to stimulate democratization in the region will be severely constrained.

Ce n’est pas uniquement le fait de considérer les efforts américains peut suffisants. Le simple citoyen n’est pas capable de faire cette évaluation. Par contre, il est convaincu que l’Occident complote contre lui à cause du pétrole arabe. Ce genre d’idées est repris sciemment et volontairement dans tous les médias au quotidien pour maintenir vivante une haine des Etats-Unis, toute fois que les régimes auraient besoin de la laisser exploser et leur sert en même temps pour justifier leurs méthodes dictatoriales contre ceux qu’ils pourront aisément taxer de terroristes.

Essayer de publier un article pro-américain, non seulement aucun journal n’accepterait de le faire mais si tel était le cas, vous vous faites lyncher par une opinion publique qui n’a d’opinion politique que lorsqu’il s’agit de l’Occident dans son ensemble et des Etats-Unis en particulier.

Pour citer un seul exemple, le cas des dérives qui ont eut lieu dans la prison d’Abou Ghraib, ont choqué le monde Arabe. Alors que ça se passe exactement de la même manière dans les prisons de leurs pays, et ce n’est pas pour autant qu’ils sont choqués. Le degré de manipulation des esprits est vraiment effroyable.

“The United States Wants Democracy in the Middle East”

Up to a point. The democratic transformation of the Middle East emerged as a central objective of U.S. foreign policy during the Bush administration. This new policy is a sharp reversal of several decades of steadfast support for many autocratic regimes in the region, such as those in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. It reflects the new post-9/11 conventional wisdom that Middle East democracy is the best antidote to Islamist terrorism.

Although this desire for democracy may be heartfelt, the United States has a lengthy laundry list of other priorities in the region: access to oil, cooperation and assistance on counterterrorism, fostering peace between Israel and its neighbors, stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and preventing Islamist radicals from seizing power. The newfound U.S. enthusiasm for democracy competes for a place in this mix.

C’est très vrai. Mais de toute façon toute instauration de démocratie ne peut se faire du jour au lendemain. Ca nécessite du temps et de la formation car avant d’être un système politique, la démocratie est une mentalité. Les USA sont très conscients de cela. Par conséquent selon les pays et l’importance de leur évolution démocratique en fonction des intérêts américains, les pressions ne seront pas les mêmes d’un pays à l’autre.

Une chose est sûre c’est que le Président Bush fait de son mieux pour que toutes les mesures soient prises dans tous les pays Arabes, de sorte que l’évolution démocratique soit irréversible même après son départ. Et cela est énorme en soi.

Fighting Islamist militants and safeguarding oil still compels the United States to cooperate with authoritarian regimes. People in the region watched as the United States took a tough line against Iran and Syria while failing to push Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, or other friendly tyrants very hard. The Bush administration launched new diplomatic endeavors and aid programs to support positive change, such as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative and the Middle East Partnership Initiative. But they consist of mild, gradual measures designed to promote democratic change without unduly challenging the authority of incumbent governments.

C’est vrai. Les USA ne peuvent ouvrir des fronts partout en même temps. Les problèmes doivent se régler selon un ordre de priorité bien précis pour les USA. Après tout le Président Bush se soucie en premier lieu de la sécurité de son pays, et c’est normal.

Néanmoins il a offert à tous les militants de la démocratie dans le monde Arabe un nouveau contexte international assez favorable pour leurs actions. A eux de mieux s’organiser et de prouver leur capacités, car on ne change pas de régime juste pour le plaisir d’en changer. Ou bien il y a une vrai alternative crédible et capable comme nous le voyons aujourd’hui au Liban ou alors il faut travailler plus et mieux pour être en mesure d’acquérir de la crédibilité et du soutien de la part des peuples et de l’Occident.

Moreover, despite the president’s conviction that democratic change in the Middle East is necessary, a great deal of ambivalence remains within the U.S. policy bureaucracy about the prospect of any rapid political openings in the region. This sentiment is particularly true of the State Department and the intelligence community. Some experts worry that, given the political mood of most Arab citizens—who are angry at the United States and sympathetic to political Islam—free and open elections could result in some distinctly unfriendly regimes.

Il y a de cela c’est clair, mais il a y aussi tout le travail de fond que font les démocrates Américains. Malheureusement toute situation a un revers de médaille. Moins Bush réussira et plus les démocrates auront de chances aux prochaines élections américaines.

Lorsque j’ai rencontré Monsieur Wolfowitz en Novembre dernier, il disait que seulement 20% de l’administration américaine coopérait à fond avec le Président Bush lors de son premier mandat et il espérait que sous ce second mandat les choses iraient mieux.

Gouverner en démocratie n’est pas un jeu d’enfant comme c’est le cas en dictature. Or le Président Bush a non seulement à faire à des dictatures mais aussi à des terroristes anonymes. Une chose est sûre, c’est que les répercussions de sa politique actuelle se traduiront longtemps après son départ.

“The War in Iraq Advanced the Cause of Democracy in the Middle East”

Not yet. The U.S.-led war in Iraq removed from power one of the most heinous, repressive dictators in the region and opened up the possibility that Iraq will one day have a pluralistic political system held together by consensus rather than violence. The actual achievement of democracy in Iraq, however, remains distant and uncertain. The path to that goal will be measured in years rather than months.

Absolument.

The war’s political effects in the rest of the region—especially the way it exposed the hollowness of Saddam Hussein’s regime—has contributed to increased calls for political reform in many Arab countries. Real progress toward democracy, however, is minimal. In addition, the war provoked some Arab governments, such as Egypt, to limit the already constrained political space they allow as a defensive gesture against public protests and as an excuse for prosecuting opponents.

Pas vraiment, nous venons de voir la volte face de Mubarak en autorisant une élection présidentielle pluraliste. Il est vrai que ça va seulement mener l’Egypte au point où se trouve déjà la Tunisie actuellement. C’est beaucoup pour un pays aussi complexe que l’Egypte, mais pas grand-chose par rapport à une vraie définition de la démocratie.

Regrettably, President George W. Bush’s repeated justification of the war as a democratizing mission has discredited some Western-oriented Arab democrats in the eyes of their fellow citizens. Many Arabs have come to view democracy itself as a code word for U.S. regional domination. The unpopularity of the war and the abuses against Iraqis at Abu Ghraib prison have further tarnished the reputation of the United States and fueled Islamist extremism.

Non, je ne pense pas que cela soit un manquement américain. C’est plutôt les activistes politiques qui évitent d’afficher des choix constructifs de peur de perdre la sympathie de la rue au cas où ils n’arriveraient pas à convaincre, et ce, au vu du lavage de cerveaux effectué par les médias arabes.

Proponents of democratic contagion argue that if Iraq holds successful elections in early 2005, this example will resound loudly in the Arab world. But much of the Arab world will likely view such elections, even if they come off well, as highly flawed. Some parts of the predominantly Sunni areas of Iraq are not expected to participate in the elections, and many Arabs will inevitably accuse the United States of manipulation, because the elections will be held under U.S. occupation. Few Arabs will be dazzled into holding a new view of democracy on the basis of one election. Many countries in the region already hold elections of varying degrees of seriousness and importance, including one in Algeria earlier this year, which a Western observer described as “one of the best conducted elections, not just in Algeria, but in Africa and much of the Arab world.”

Eh bien comme nous le savons tous aujourd’hui, les élections ont été une réussite déjà par le taux de participation. Puis le fait que la liste de l’actuel premier ministre n’a pas gagné prouve bien qu’il n’y a pas eu de manipulation américaine en tout cas. Par ailleurs moi personnellement qui vit en pays Arabe, je peux dire qu’au niveau du peuple on sentait bien l’envie même si elle ne s’exprimait pas ouvertement à cause de la peur.

Ceci dit, je pense en effet que les élections algériennes ont été très bien conduites, mais il ne faut pas oublier les 10 années de terreur par lesquelles sont passés les Algériens avant d’aboutir à ce résultat. Grâce aux différentes actions américaines aujourd’hui, ce genre de débâcle ne se produira plus.

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Promoting democracy throughout the Middle East will require doing away with fantasies of a sudden U.S.-led transformation of the region and taking seriously the challenge of building credibility with Arab societies. Moreover, if the United States is to play a constructive supporting role, it must seriously revise its cozy relations with autocratic regimes, show a sustained ability to apply nuanced diplomatic pressure for political change at key junctures, and back up this pressure with well-crafted and well-funded assistance. Washington must prepare to accept emboldened political forces, and eventually new governments, that are uninterested in doing the United States’ bidding. Embracing Middle East democracy in principle is easy; truly supporting it remains an enormous challenge.

C’est exact.

“Islamists Are the Main Obstacle to Arab Democracy”

Think again. The standard fear is the “one person, one vote, one time” scenario: Islamists would only participate in elections to win power and put an end to democracy immediately. Hence, the argument goes, they should not be allowed to participate.

Absolument faux. D’abord ce n’est pas valable pour tous les pays, ensuite je ne vois aucune raison d’interdire ces gens dans la vie politique. C’est par le dialogue, la négociation d’une bonne Constitution et le respect de l’Etat de Droit qu’ils peuvent être le mieux cerné plutôt que par l’interdiction qui les radicalise. Les exclure est anti démocratique et ça fini par rejaillir à un moment ou à un autre. Le 11 Septembre en a été la meilleure preuve.

True, the commitment to democracy of even moderate Islamists is uncertain and hedged by the caveat that democratic governments must accept Islamic law. However, the chances of an overwhelming electoral victory that would allow Islamists to abrogate all freedoms at once is remote in the Arab world. During the last decade, Islamist parties and candidates have participated in elections in eight Arab countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen), always with modest results. (These elections suffered from various degrees of government interference, but there is no indication that the Islamists would have won in a more open environment.) And Turkey, a country where an Islamist party took power with a large majority, is becoming an encouraging example of democratic success.

Exact. Le citoyen Arabo-Musulman d’aujourd’hui est bien plus mature politiquement qu’il y a une dizaine d’années d’autant que les Islamistes ont fait toutes sortes de bêtises et plus particulièrement les attentats suicide qui leur ont fait perdre beaucoup de crédibilité.

Although the prediction that Islamist electoral victories would lead to democracy’s demise in the Middle East have so far proved unfounded, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Fear of such takeovers remains in many Arab countries and the United States. Many Arab regimes use this fear to justify meddling in elections and placing restrictions on political participation. The presence of Islamist parties thus complicates the process of democratization.

Oui, mais cette excuse ne se justifie plus d’autant que toutes ces dictatures n’ont rien fait de concluant pour empêcher ses mouvements de se propager. Bien au contraire, elles sont à l’origine de leur existence.

But Islamist parties are also integral to democratization because they are the only nongovernmental parties with large constituencies. Without their participation, democracy is impossible in the Middle East. The future of democracy in the region depends on whether a sufficient number of such parties moderate their political views and become actors in a democratic process, rather than spoilers in the present autocratic states, and whether incumbent governments stop hiding behind the Islamist threat and accept that all their citizens have a right to participate.

Je pense que tout dépendra de l’évolution de l’Irak. C’est pour cela qu’il est nécessaire que l’armée américaine y reste le temps nécessaire. D’une part pour assurer la bonne évolution du processus démocratique Irakien mais surtout pour assurer que des forces extérieures à l’Irak ne viennent miner son développement.

“Arab Countries Have a Historic Propensity Toward Authoritarianism”

Yes. But so what? Most societies have lived under authoritarian rule for some time, often for a long time. Democracy is a relatively recent historical phenomenon. Even in the United States and Europe it was only consolidated through universal suffrage in the last century.

Arab rulers have been highly authoritarian, but no more so than European or Asian rulers for most of history. Arabs developed a political system based on Islam through the caliph, an individual who served as supreme leader of all Muslims. Europeans clung to the concept of the Holy Roman Empire for centuries after it ceased to exist in practice, fought ferocious religious wars for hundreds of years, and adopted the concept of separation of church and state rather late and incompletely. The Arab world, for most of its history, was quite similar to the rest of the world.

Even in the 1960s and 1970s, much of the Arab world was highly representative of the major political trends of the day. Most Arab countries outside the Gulf displayed the combination of nationalism and socialism that constituted typical Third World ideology at the time. Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, alongside Jawaharlal Nehru in India and Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia, was a major champion of this ideology, which waned in the 1980s with the end of the Cold War and the rise of globally connected economies.

To ascribe the lingering Arab absence of democracy to some unique historic affinity for authoritarianism, stemming from Arab culture, Islam, or anything else is thus factually incorrect. It is also politically defeatist, attributing a quality of inevitability that belies the experience of political change in other parts of the world.

Absolument. Et nous avons la chance de pouvoir bénéficier de l’expérience des autres pour gagner du temps. Ce n’est pas l’Islam en soit qui est la cause, c’est le sous développement humain dû au manque ou carrément à l’absence d’éducation en plus des mauvais systèmes de gouvernance.

“Promoting Women’s Rights Is Crucial for Democratic Change”

False. This myth, a favorite of women’s organizations and Western governments, reflects the combination of correct observation and false logic. No country can be considered fully democratic if a part of its population (in some cases, the majority) is discriminated against and denied equal rights. But efforts to change the status quo by promoting women’s rights are premature. The main problem at present is that Arab presidents and kings have too much power, which they refuse to share with citizens and outside institutions. This stranglehold on power must be broken to make progress toward democracy. Greater equality for women does nothing to diminish the power of overly strong, authoritarian governments.

Arab leaders know this truth all too well. Many autocrats implement policies to improve women’s rights precisely to give themselves reformist credentials and score points with Western governments, media outlets, and nongovernmental organizations. These efforts, however, often amount to a trick of smoke and mirrors designed to disguise the governments’ refusal to cede any real power. In the last few years, several Arab states have appointed women to high positions and hurriedly implemented or proposed reforms concerning marriage, divorce, inheritance, and other personal status issues. These are welcome steps, but they do not address the core issue of promoting democracy: breaking the authoritarian pattern of Arab politics.

En théorie, si la promotion des droits de la femme est nécessaire voire même obligatoire, il est vrai qu’elle ne change pas grand-chose au fait dictatorial.

Seulement il faut savoir comment ça se passe en pratique. Pour prendre l’exemple de la Tunisie que je connais le mieux, Feu Bourguiba avait imposé à l’aube de l’indépendance un code du statut personnel qui a donné à la femme tunisienne des droits et des protections comme nulle femme dans le monde Arabe n’en a encore à ce jour.

Aujourd’hui avec du recul, on se rend compte que la femme tunisienne est le premier rempart contre l’Islamisme. Pour rien au monde elle ne voudra perdre ses acquis. Tout régime Islamiste en Tunisie devra composer avec ces acquis. Or la Femme représente la moitié de l’électorat et elle est donc en avant de la scène politique pour défendre la notion de République.

C’est vrai que ce n’est pas le cas ailleurs et c’est pour cela que les USA insistent pour que la Tunisie joue un rôle de locomotive dans le processus de démocratisation du monde Arabe. Le Président Ben Ali hésite encore….

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“Arab Democrats Are the Key to Reform”

Paradoxically, no. All Arab countries boast a small number of Westernized liberals who advocate respect for human rights, freedom of thought and speech, and democratic change. But democratic transformation requires more than the ideological commitment of a few individuals. In Western societies, a small democratic cadre sufficed in the distant past, when political participation was the preserve of public-minded intellectual elites and wealthy property owners. But the Arab world of today is not the United States or Europe of the 18th century. The political elite faces a growing challenge by Islamist movements, which are developing a popular support base. As a result, democratic transformation also requires broad-based political parties and movements capable of transforming abstract democratic ideals into concrete programs that resonate with a public whose main concern is survival.

Arab democrats have so far shown little capacity—and less inclination—to translate abstract ideas into programs with mass appeal. Because they talk to Western organizations and each other more than to their fellow citizens, opposition political parties with a liberal agenda find themselves unable to build broad constituencies. This failure leaves the field open to government parties, which can build a following on the basis of patronage, and to Islamist parties, which build their following in the best tradition of mass parties, with a mixture of ideological fervor and grassroots social services.

Government repression and, at times, co-optation have also undermined Arab democrats’ effectiveness. Some regimes—notably Saudi Arabia’s—move quickly to clamp down on any nascent liberal debate. Others are more tolerant, giving liberals some intellectual space to write and discuss issues openly, as long as their talk is not followed by action. Arab democrats in countries such as Egypt are not a persecuted group. Rather, they tend to be professionals comfortably ensconced in the upper-middle class. Therefore, they are hesitant to demand genuine reforms that might lead to a hard-line takeover and content to advocate democratization from the top.

Under such conditions, it would be a serious mistake for U.S. and European democracy advocates to focus on Arab democrats as the key to political change. These individuals will play a role if democracy becomes a reality. But during this period of transition, they have neither the inclination to push for reform nor the political clout to do so successfully.

Ce n’est tout à fait comme cela que ça se passe. Les auteurs de l’article jugent avec leur propre vision émanant d’un contexte démocratique. De nouveau, je reprends le cas de la Tunisie que je connais le mieux.

Il faut savoir que nous n’avons aucune liberté d’association puisque tout association est soumise à une autorisation de l’Etat, ni aucune liberté de presse, mais surtout de grande restriction au niveau des financements ce qui empêche de faire du bon travail. De plus, les textes de loi et malgré toutes les restrictions, ne sont pas respectés.

L’Etat étant le premier à ne pas respecter les lois, les militants font autant, et bien entendu ils tombent dans le piège d’une machine étatique autrement plus puissante. Au lieu de se concentrer à établir de bons programmes porteur pour tous, ils perdent une énergie folle à vouloir exiger leurs droits et récupèrent l’opinion de la rue pour se construire une légitimité et un semblant de protection. Du populisme quoi ! C’est tout à fait normal qu’ils ne soient pas consistants dans ces conditions.

Au même moment, les Islamistes travaillent en quelque sorte dans le noir. A travers les rassemblements dans les mosquées, ils n’ont besoin ni de liberté de presse, ni de liberté d’association et encore moins d’un programme politique. Ils se contentent de surfer sur les croyances des gens et de les assister financièrement. Etant légalement inexistants, ils ne subissent pas non plus les restrictions financières, ainsi beaucoup d’argent impossible à identifier arrive dans leur caisses noires.

C’est pour cela que le Président Bush n’arrête pas d’insister sur la liberté de la presse et la liberté d’association. Ceux sont les deux premiers obstacles majeurs à surmonter pour pouvoir envahir le terrain des Islamistes.

“Middle East Democracy Is the Cure for Islamist Terrorism”

No. This view is rooted in a simplistic assumption: Stagnant, repressive Arab regimes create positive conditions for the growth of radical Islamist groups, which turn their sights on the United States because it embodies the liberal sociopolitical values that radical Islamists oppose. More democracy, therefore, equals less extremism.

History tells a different story. Modern militant Islam developed with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s, during the most democratic period in that country’s history. Radical political Islam gains followers not only among repressed Saudis but also among some Muslims in Western democracies, especially in Europe. The emergence of radical Islamist groups determined to wreak violence on the United States is thus not only the consequence of Arab autocracy. It is a complex phenomenon with diverse roots, which include U.S. sponsorship of the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s (which only empowered Islamist militants); the Saudi government’s promotion of radical Islamic educational programs worldwide; and anger at various U.S. policies, such as the country’s stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the basing of military forces in the region.

Moreover, democracy is not a cure-all for terrorism. Like it or not, the most successful efforts to control radical Islamist political groups have been antidemocratic, repressive campaigns, such as those waged in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria in the 1990s. The notion that Arab governments would necessarily be more effective in fighting extremists is wishful thinking, no matter how valuable democratization might be for other reasons.

The experience of countries in different regions makes clear that terrorist groups can operate for sustained periods even in successful democracies, whether it is the Irish Republican Army in Britain or the ETA (Basque separatists) in Spain. The ETA gained strength during the first two decades of Spain’s democratization process, flourishing more than it had under the dictatorship of Gen. Francisco Franco. In fragile democratic states—as new Arab democracies would likely be for years—radical groups committed to violence can do even more harm, often for long periods, as evidenced by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, or the Maoist rebels in Nepal.

Ce passage me dérange beaucoup car il est totalement anti démocratique. Si les USA ont mal géré ou mal compris le monde Arabo-Musulman pendant plusieurs décennies, ils feraient mieux de corriger leurs erreurs à la base plutôt que de corriger une erreur par une autre qui rendra, à l’arrivée, le coût des deux erreurs encore plus élevé.

De plus ce n’est pas parce que le mur de Berlin est tombé et que l’URSS et son système communiste ont échoués que les mentalités ont définitivement évolués vers le libéralisme. Il faut du temps c’est clair et malheureusement pendant ce temps beaucoup profiteront de cette base populaire islamiste qui s’est développée à travers le monde pour amplifier le mouvement alter-mondialiste.

Maintenant, au vu des conditions dans lesquelles il faut travailler dans le monde arabe, il est clair que ce n’est pas les plus favorisé qui s’engagent dans la lutte démocratique. D’une part ils ont bien trop à perdre et d’autre part ils ne veulent pas essuyer un échec quasiment certain. Ce qui fait que les militants sont surtout des gens qui n’ont pas de grands moyens (comme Feu Mr Harriri par exemple) et qui ne sont pas forcément mathématiciens pour être capables de traduire des idées abstraites en actions concrètes. La plus part du temps ce sont des littéraires et des juristes bien plus théoriciens que praticiens ou qu’entrepreneurs.

[Sous-Commandant Marco]

[…]Ce qui est également le cas pour n'importe quelle autre démocratie, je crois, non?

Oui et c'est d'ailleurs la raison pour laquelle les démocraties occidentales ne sont pas forcément des bons exemples. La constitution américaine et sa liste de limitations du pouvoir de l'état est ce qui fait de mieux en matière de démocratie (à condition de la respecter, cela va de soi). Mais justement: le message que l'on passe aux Irakiens est que la démocratie se limite au scrutin et à la loi de la majorité.

Penses-tu que l'Irak devrait simplement être mis sous tutelle provisoire (je parle là de ne pas organiser d'elections, les membres du gouvernement interimaires peuvent etre irakiens, je ne parle pas d'un americain chef de l'Etat irakien) par:

- l'ONU

- la Ligue Arabe (si ça existe vraiment ce truc)

- l'UE

- les USA

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

De mon point de vue, il manque à ta liste l'OUA, l'OTAN et la police montée canadienne.

Plus sérieusement, je n'ai pas de solution pour réparer l'Irak et je me contente lâchement de critiquer l'administration Bush. Les seules propositions que j'aurais pu faire sont rétroactives: ne pas soutenir Saddam dans les années 80, instaurer la démocratie (puisque c'est la mode) au Koweit en 1991, ne pas décréter d'embargo contre la population irakienne, ne pas soutenir le régime d'Arabie Saoudite depuis 1945, ne pas avoir renversé Mossadegh en Iran en 1953, etc…

[Chitah]

Un document très très intéressant, qui parle d'études et sondages effectuées dans plusieurs pays arabes. Alors bien sûr, les résultats doivent être pris avec des pincettes, comme pour tout sondage de ce type, mais quand même, certaines infos étaient intéressantes.

http://www.css-jordan.org/new/REVISITINGTT…TREETReport.pdf

OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS

The study draws seven main conclusions:

1) Arabs hold coherent notions of what constitutes the values of Western and Arab societies. They associate the West with values of individual liberty and accumulation of wealth, while they view their own societal values as placing emphasis upon religion and family.

2) Arab perceptions of Western values do not determine their attitudes toward Western foreign policies. They hold negative attitudes toward foreign policies of the US and Britain and positive attitudes toward those of France, but these attitudes are not related to any significant differences in the perceived societal values of the three countries.

3) Religion is not the basis of tensions between Arabs and the West. Contrary to widespread media representations, most Arabs do not view the West or the US, in particular, as following a policy driven by religious forces. The notion of a “Crusader War” is largely dismissed. At the same time, Arab attitudes toward a role for Shari’a in legislation and support for or against openness in Ijtihad, are not the driving force behind the formulation of their attitudes toward the West. In short, there is little empirical evidence for the portrayal of Arab-Western hostilities as a religious conflict.

4) The Arab world does not reject the professed goals of the West’s foreign policies toward the Arab World. Indeed, there is great support for liberal democratic principles expressed by Western leaders. However, Arabs object to Western actions because the ‘situation on the ground’ is in contrast to the professed principles.

5) Arabs disagree fundamentally with US positions on issues such as the definition of

terrorism, policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Iraqi war. They have little

confidence in US-led efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict and they largely see the USled war in Iraq as unjustified. In addition, many fundamentally disagree with the US definition of terrorism, often viewing the actions of groups the US identifies as "terrorist" to be legitimate responses to aggression or occupation.

6) Despite these disagreements and disillusionments, particularly with regard to the US, many Arabs desire stronger relations between their countries and the West. This is particularly true of cultural and economic relations, which are viewed as less potentially problematic than political relations. The study also finds that business and media elites are most likely to seek stronger bilateral ties between their countries and the West, even though they are most likely to openly express disagreement with US policies.

7) Arab dissatisfaction with US policies is unlikely to diminish in the absence of significant foreign policy changes. Foreign policy, as exemplified most significantly by the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iraq War, is at the basis of fundamental tensions with the West and with the US in particular. This finding is consistent across all countries studied and in all demographic groups. Negative sentiments are particularly strong among youth and nonelites, who disapprove of US policies, are skeptical of American intentions in the region, and are most likely to reject strengthened bilateral ties. Given the demographic trends in the region, whereby 50% of the population is less than 25 years of age, there is little reason to believe that these attitudes will dissipate without changes in US foreign policy.