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Le concept de justice en anarcapie

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Voila je souhaiterai savoir si vous auriez un livre en français à me conseiller qui traite du fonctionnement de la justice dans un modèle anarco-capitaliste. Parce que autant j'arrive à concevoir un monde sans état dans plein de domaines, autant j'ai du mal sur ce point là.

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David Friedman: the machinery of freedom, a radical guide to capitalism.

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Voir ce que m'avait répondu Molinari il y a deux mois: http://www.liberaux.org/index.php?s=&s…st&p=203223 (=> c'est téléchargeable sur le net)

J'allais citer le même. Je l'ai même téléchargé sur mon téléphone portable pour le lire dans les transports.

Il est juste trop gros pour être posté ici, dommage.

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Voila je souhaiterai savoir si vous auriez un livre en français à me conseiller qui traite du fonctionnement de la justice dans un modèle anarco-capitaliste. Parce que autant j'arrive à concevoir un monde sans état dans plein de domaines, autant j'ai du mal sur ce point là.

Un détour par l'article Fallacies of the Public Goods Theory and the Production of Security de Hans Hoppe me semble indispensable.

Le passage clé:

Paradoxical as it may seem establishing a competitive system of security producers implies erecting an institutionalized incentive structure to produce an order of law and law-enforcement that embodies the highest possible degree of consensus regarding the question of conflict resolution. Such a structure will tend to generate less rather than more social unrest and conflict than would occur under monopolistic auspices. In order to understand this paradox, it is necessary to take a closer look at the only typical situation that concerns the skeptic and that allows him to believe in the superior virtue of a monopolistically organized order of security production: when a conflict arises between A and B, both are insured by different companies and the companies cannot come to an immediate agreement regarding the validity of the conflicting claims brought forward by their respective clients. (No problem would exist if such an agreement were reached or if both clients were insured by one and the same company-at least the problem then would not be different in any way from that emerging under a statist monopoly .) Wouldn't such a situation always result in a shoot-out? This is highly unlikely. First, any violent battle between companies would be costly and risky, in particular if these companies had reached a respectable size (which would be important for them to have in order to appear as effective guarantors of security to their prospective clients in the first place). More importantly, under a competitive system with each company dependent on the continuation of voluntary consumer payments, any battle would have to be deliberately supported by each and every client of both companies. If there were only one person who withdrew his payments because he was not convinced a battle was necessary in the particular conflict at hand, there would be immediate economic pressure on the company to look for a peaceful solution to the conflict. Hence any competitive producer of security would be extremely cautious about engaging in violent measures in order to resolve conflicts. Rather, to the extent that it is peaceful conflict resolution that consumers want, each and every security producer would go to great lengths to provide it to its clients and to establish in advance, for everyone to know, to what arbitration process it would be willing to submit itself and its clients in case of a disagreement over the evaluation of conflicting claims. And as such a scheme could appear to the clients of different firms to be working only if there were agreement among them regarding such arbitrational measures, a system of law governing relations between companies that would be universally acceptable to the clients of all of the competing security producers would naturally evolve. Moreover, the economic pressure to generate rules representing a consensus on how conflicts should be handled is even more far-reaching. Under a competitive system, the independent arbitrators who would be entrusted with the task of fmding peaceful solutions to conflicts would be dependent on the continued support of the two disputing companies insofar as the companies could and would select different judges if either one of them were sufficiently dissatisfied with the outcome of the arbitration work. Thus, these judges would be under pressure to find solutions to the problems handed over to them that, this time not with respect to the procedural aspects of law but its content, would be acceptable to all of the clients of the firms involved. Otherwise one or all of the companies might lose customers, thus inducing those firms to turn to different arbitrators the next time they were in need of one.

Et ceci implique, comme Hoppe le suggère en note de bas de page, une tendance à ce que le contenu de la loi corresponde au droit libertarien, ne serait-ce que parce qu'en tant que seule réponse universalisable à la question "qui est légitimement propriétaire de quoi?", il est plus susceptible d'être acceptable et découvert par les juges sous pression de la concurrence que d'autres codes.

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Tout cela n'est pas en français mais j'ajoute quand même qu'une anthologie en anglais vient de paraitre sur le sujet avec de nombreux classiques du genre et aussi avec des articles critiques produits par des minarchistes et leurs réponses: Anarchy and the Law: The Political Economy of Choice, edited by Edward Stringham

Table of Contents

1. Introduction—Edward P. Stringham

Section I: Theory of Private Property Anarchism

2. Police, Law, and the Courts—Murray Rothbard

3. The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism (excerpt)—David Friedman

4. Market for Liberty (excerpt)—Morris and Linda Tannehill

5. Pursuing Justice in a Free Society: Crime Prevention and the Legal Order—Randy Barnett

6. Capitalist Production and the Problem of Public Goods—Hans Hoppe

7. National Defense and the Public-Goods Problem—Jeffrey Rogers Hummel and Don Lavoie

8. Defending a Free Nation—Roderick Long

9. The Myth of the Rule of Law—John Hasnas

Section II: Debate

10. The State—Robert Nozick

11. The Invisible Hand Strikes Back—Roy A. Childs

12. Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State—Murray Rothbard

13. Objectivism and the State: An Open Letter to Ayn Rand—Roy Childs

14. Do We Ever Really Get Out of Anarchy?—Alfred G. Cuzan

15. Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy—Tyler Cowen

16. Law as a Private Good: A Response to Tyler Cowen on the Economics of Anarchy—David Friedman

17. Rejoinder to David Friedman on the Economics of Anarchy—Tyler Cowen

18. Networks, Law and the Paradox of Cooperation—Bryan Caplan and Edward Stringham

19. Conflict, Cooperation and Competition in Anarchy—Tyler Cowen and Daniel Sutter

20. Conventions: Some Thoughts on the Economics of Ordered Anarchy—Anthony De Jasay

21. Can Anarchy Save Us from Leviathan?—Andrew Rutten

22. Government: Unnecessary but Inevitable—Randall Holcombe

23. Is Government Inevitable? Comment on Holcombe’s Analysis—Peter Leeson and Edward Stringham

Section III: History of Anarchist Thought

24. Gustave de Molinari and the Anti-statist Liberal Tradition (excepts)—David Hart

25. Vindication of Natural Society (excerpt)—Edmund Burke

26. The Production of Security—Gustave de Molinari

27. Individualist Anarchism in the United States: The Origins—Murray Rothbard

28. Anarchism and American Traditions—Voltairine de Cleyre

29. On Civil Government—David Lipscomb

30. No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority (excerpt)—Lysander Spooner

31. Trial by Jury—Lysander Spooner

32. Relation of the State to the Individual—Benjamin Tucker

33. Political and Economic Overview—David Osterfeld

Section IV: Historical Case Studies of Non-Government Law Enforcement

34. Are Public Goods Really Common Pools? Considerations of the Evolution of Policing and Highways in England—Bruce Benson

35. Property Rights in Celtic Irish Law—Joseph Peden

36. Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case—David Friedman

37. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs—Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast

38. Legal Evolution in Primitive Societies—Bruce Benson

39. American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not So Wild, Wild West—Terry Anderson and P. J. Hill

40. Order Without Law (excerpt)—Robert Ellickson


Praise for Anarchy and the Law

“Finally, a fit rejoiner to people who begin sentences with ‘There ought to be a law . . .’”

—P. J. O’Rourke, author, Parliament of Whores and On the Wealth of Nations

“Anarchy and the Law is an important and very powerful book, and for the open-minded, will do a great deal to persuade them that non-state political systems based on voluntary association and private contracts deserve to be taken very seriously indeed.”

—Jan Narveson, Professor of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, Canada

“As the marvelous book Anarchy and the Law demonstrates, a rich intellectual tradition on the desirability and workings of private-property, non-state legal systems stretches back to the mid-nineteenth century. Henceforth, ignorance will be no excuse.”

—Robert Higgs, author, Crisis and Leviathan, Against Leviathan and Depression, War and Cold War

“Scholars interested in scrutinizing the links between political and legal institutions will find Anarchy and the Law an invaluable resource.”

—Tom W. Bell, Professor of Law, Chapman University

“The dynamics of government growth has proven that no matter how benign the original intent and no matter how limited their scope, government programs will eventuate in abuse and malignancy. Anarchy and the Law assembles in one superb volume key essays that embrace this view and in doing so has done us all a great service.”

—Ronald Hamowy, Professor Emeritus of History, University of Alberta, Canada

“With meticulous scholarship, Edward Stringham offers a splendid collection. Anarchy and the Law is a skillful blend of the philosophy, political theory, history, and economics which constitute the framework of one of the least understood political traditions. The book is quite simply a tour-de-force.”

—Wendy McElroy, editor, Liberty for Women

“Anarchy and the Law is a breakthrough work, one which anyone interested in politics will find intellectually exciting.”

—Ralph Raico, Professor of History, Buffalo State College

“Anarchy and the Law should become the beginning for any serious examination of our most deeply held beliefs about government—a ‘must read’ for anyone open to ideas and interested in the preservation of liberty.”

—Thomas J. Nechyba, Professor of Economics, Duke University

“Anarchy and the Law assembles the very best research—theoretical and empirical—on markets' surprisingly robust capacity to supply law and other public goods.”

—Donald J. Boudreaux, Professor of Economics, George Mason University

“Edward Stringham has assembled an excellent—and much-needed—book. Anarchy and the Law is a welcome addition to the scholarship, teaching, and investigation of politics.”

—James R. Otteson, Professor of Philosophy, University of Alabama

“Much work in political philosophy is conducted on the basis of an uncritically-held assumption that only the state can supply law and public order. Anarchy and the State should shake such writers from their dogmatic slumbers. This book is a must for any college or university library, and I'd strongly recommend it as a gift for any intelligent young (or old!) person whose ideas could do with a shake-up.”

—Jeremy Shearmur, Reader in Philosophy, Australian National University

“Anarchy and the Law is an essential book on the theory and history of 'non-state' legal systems in which law enforcement is privatized, including essays by both proponents and skeptics.”

—Lawrence H. White, Friedrich A. Hayek Professor of Economic History, University of Missouri, St. Louis

About the Editor

Edward P. Stringham is a Research Fellow at The Independent Institute, Associate Professor of Economics at San Jose State University, and President of the Association of Private Enterprise Education.

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Wow !

Ca a l'air super. Y a-t-il des bruxellois intéressés par une commande groupée ?

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Wow !

Ca a l'air super. Y a-t-il des bruxellois intéressés par une commande groupée ?

Moi, ça m'intéresse. A voir si c'est dans les cordes de notre croco préféré, ou s'il n'a rien à y gagner.

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Wow !

Ca a l'air super. Y a-t-il des bruxellois intéressés par une commande groupée ?

Ca m'intéresse également.

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Au fait, le même Ed Stringham a édité un autre ouvrage l'année dernière sur le même thème, sauf qu'il est plus centré sur la théorie éco stricto sensu et la tradition du "public choice" en particulier: Anarchy, State and Public Choice

La présentation de Stringham se trouve ici: Can the State Improve a Hobbesian World?

Il a aussi été cité sur le site web de Libé : http://www.liberation.fr/actualite/instant…r/204461.FR.php :doigt::icon_up:

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J'ai mis en ligne une traduction en français d'un texte qui explique assez bien le principe de justice libertarienne ici :icon_up:

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