Le Modèle Suédois, Par Johan Norberg

[Punu]

Extrait :

Gunnar and Alva Myrdal were the intellectual parents of the

Swedish welfare state. In the 1930s they came to believe that

Sweden was the ideal candidate for a cradle-to-grave welfare

state. First of all, the Swedish population was small and

homogeneous, with high levels of trust in one another and the

government. Because Sweden never had a feudal period and the

government always allowed some sort of popular representation, the

land-owning farmers got used to seeing authorities and the

government more as part of their own people and society than as

external enemies. Second, the civil service was efficient and free

from corruption. Third, a Protestant work-ethic--and strong social

pressures from family, friends and neighbors to conform to that

ethic--meant that people would work hard, even as taxes rose and

social assistance expanded. Finally, that work would be very

productive, given Sweden's well-educated population and strong

export sector. If the welfare state couldn't work in Sweden, the

Myrdals concluded, it wouldn't work anywhere.

The National Interest | Article | Swedish Models

http://www.nationalinterest.org/ME2/dirmod…3996995DEA0A05B

"Issue Date: Summer 2006, Posted On: 6/5/2006

Swedish Models

Johan Norberg

TO BE A Swede is once again to be admired. Sweden is "the most

successful society the world has ever known", declares the left-wing

British newspaper the Guardian; "Swedes lead Europe in reform", claims

the free-market-oriented Financial Times; only the Nordic model

"combines both equity and efficiency", explains a recent report

initiated by the European Commission.

In a contentious European debate marked by hostility, riots and

unrest, Sweden looks like a safe bet--neutral, uncontroversial and

with no natural opponents. Sweden is a Rorschach test: The Left sees a

generous welfare state, and the Right sees an open economy that pushes

for deregulation in the European Union. The only thing British

reformists and French protectionists could agree on at the EU summit

in Brussels in March was that Europe should learn from the

Scandinavian model's combination of generous social provisions and a

high-growth economy. Sweden is seen as the proverbial "third way",

combining the openness and wealth creation of capitalism with the

redistribution and safety nets of socialism. It is the best of both

worlds.

But things in Sweden are not as good as the advocates would like to

believe. Long the paragon of social democracy, the Swedish model is

rotting from within. Ironically, the unique social and economic

foundation that first allowed Sweden to construct its political

edifice--and which makes it such a difficult model for other countries

to emulate--has been critically weakened by the system it helped

create. Far from a being a solution for the new sick men of Europe,

Sweden must face serious and fundamental challenges at the heart of

its social model.

The Origins of the Welfare State

TO SAY that other countries should emulate the Swedish social model is

about as helpful as telling an average-looking person to look like a

Swedish supermodel. There are special circumstances and a certain

background that limit the ability to imitate. In the case of the

supermodel, it is about genetics. In the context of economical and

political models, it is about the historical and cultural background.

Gunnar and Alva Myrdal were the intellectual parents of the Swedish

welfare state. In the 1930s they came to believe that Sweden was the

ideal candidate for a cradle-to-grave welfare state. First of all, the

Swedish population was small and homogeneous, with high levels of

trust in one another and the government. Because Sweden never had a

feudal period and the government always allowed some sort of popular

representation, the land-owning farmers got used to seeing authorities

and the government more as part of their own people and society than

as external enemies. Second, the civil service was efficient and free

from corruption. Third, a Protestant work-ethic--and strong social

pressures from family, friends and neighbors to conform to that

ethic--meant that people would work hard, even as taxes rose and

social assistance expanded. Finally, that work would be very

productive, given Sweden's well-educated population and strong export

sector. If the welfare state couldn't work in Sweden, the Myrdals

concluded, it wouldn't work anywhere.

Sweden's economic success story began in the late 19th century, after

a fundamental political shift towards free markets and free trade.

Swedish traders could export iron, steel and timber, and entrepreneurs

created innovative industrial companies that became world leaders.

Between 1860 and 1910, real wages for factory workers rose by about 25

percent per decade, and public spending in Sweden didn't surpass 10

percent of GDP.

The Social Democratic Party came to power in 1932 and has governed

Sweden for 65 of the last 74 years. They realized early on that a

party of class struggle wouldn't be able to hold on to power in

Sweden. Instead, they became a party of the middle class by creating

social security systems that gave the most pension, unemployment,

paternal-leave and sick-leave benefits to those with high wages. (Most

benefits were proportional to the amount paid in, so the wealthy

middle class would have an interest in supporting the system.) It was

a policy of socialization from the consumption side: The government

would not take control of the means of production, but would instead

tax workers, in the form of sales and income taxes, to provide

welfare. It was markets and competition for big business, a welfare

state for the people. Still, as late as 1950 the total tax burden was

no more than 21 percent of GDP, lower than in the United States and

Western Europe.

This meant that the Social Democrats were eager to please industry and

not allow the social agenda to interfere with the economy's progress.

Free trade was always the rule. Regulations that were introduced were

adapted to benefit the biggest industries--for example, wages were

equalized, but for the purpose of keeping wages low for the big

companies, while small and less productive companies were forced out

of business. The trade unions, for their part, were relatively

positive to the creative destruction of capitalism, so they allowed

old sectors like farming, shipping and textiles to pass away, as long

as new jobs were created.

These policies, and the fact that Sweden stayed out of two world wars,

meant that the economy yielded amazing results. Sweden was rich: In

1970 it had the fourth-highest per-capita income in the world,

according to OECD statistics. But at this stage the Social Democrats

began to radicalize, with coffers filled by big business and heads

filled with ideas from an international leftist trend. Social

assistance was expanded and the labor market became heavily regulated.

Public spending almost doubled between 1960 and 1980, rising from 31

percent to 60 percent of GDP.

This was also the time when the model began to run into problems. From

1975 to 2000, while per-capita income grew by 72 percent in the United

States and 64 percent in Western Europe, Sweden's grew by no more than

43 percent. By 2000, Sweden had fallen to 14th in the OECD's ranking

of per-capita income. If Sweden were a state in the United States, it

would now be the fifth poorest. As the Social Democratic Finance

Minister Bosse Ringholm explained in 2002, "If Sweden would have had

the same growth rates as the OECD average since 1970, our common

resources would have been so much bigger that it would be the

equivalent of 20,000 SEK [$2,500] more per household per month."

Too Much of a Good Thing

THE SOURCE of the problem was the fatal irony of the Swedish system:

The model eroded the fundamental principles that had made the model

viable in the first place.

The civil service is a powerful example of this phenomenon. The

efficiency of the civil service meant that the government could

expand, but this expansion began to undermine its efficiency.

According to a European Central Bank study of 23 developed countries,

Sweden now gets the least service per dollar spent by the government.

Sweden still reports impressive results on living standards (just as

it did before the introduction of the welfare state in the years

following World War II), but not at all what you would expect from a

country with the world's highest tax rates, currently at about 50

percent of GDP. If the public sector were as efficient as Ireland's or

Britain's, for example, the expenditure could be reduced by a third

for the same service. The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and

Regions reports that Swedish doctors see four patients a day on

average, down from nine in 1975. It is less than in any other OECD

country, and less than half of the average. One reason is that a

Swedish doctor spends between 50 and 80 percent of his time on

administration.

On the economic side, the old Swedish system of encouraging

investments in big industry worked well, as long as there was little

need for innovation. Once that occurred, however, the system ran into

trouble. The competitiveness of industry had to be propped up several

times by depreciating the currency. Globalization and the new

knowledge and service economy made it more important than ever to

invest in human capital and individual creativity. High marginal tax

rates on personal income, however, reduced individuals' incentives to

take risks and to boost earning potential by investing in their

education and skills, and made it extremely difficult to attract

skilled workers from abroad.

Furthermore, the Swedish model was dependent on having a small number

of large industrial companies. As these diminished in importance, or

moved abroad, Sweden needed something to take their place. But the

policies that benefited the biggest firms created a deficit of small-

and medium-sized businesses. Those that did exist didn't grow, partly

because of the risks and costs of highly burdensome employment rules

that prevented the firing of workers. Indeed, the most important

Swedish companies today are those that were born during the laissez

faire period before the First World War; just one of the fifty biggest

Swedish companies was founded after 1970. Meanwhile, services that

could become new private growth sectors, like education and health

care, were monopolized and financed by the government. As they grew in

importance and size, a steadily growing part of the Swedish economy

thus became protected from international market forces and investments

that could have turned them into successful and productive

enterprises.

In the early 1990s a deep recession forced Sweden to abandon a lot of

the excesses from the 1970s and 1980s. Marginal tax rates were cut,

the central bank was made independent, public pensions were cut and

partially privatized, school vouchers were introduced, and private

providers were welcomed in health care. Several markets were

deregulated, like energy, the post office, transportation, television

and, most importantly, telecom, which opened the way for the success

of companies like Ericsson.

But Sweden retained the world's highest taxes, generous social

security systems and a heavily regulated labor market, which split the

economy: Sweden is very good at producing goods, but not at producing

jobs. According to a recent study of 35 developed countries, only two

had jobless growth: Sweden and Finland. Economic growth in Sweden in

the last 25 years has had no correlation at all with labor-market

participation. (In contrast, 1 percent of growth increases the number

of jobs by 0.25 percent in Denmark, 0.5 percent in the United States

and 0.6 percent in Spain.) Amazingly, not a single net job has been

created in the private sector in Sweden since 1950.

During the recession in the early 1990s, Sweden had an unemployment

rate of about 12 percent. The official rate has been halved since, but

the difference has been offset by a dramatic increase in other forms

of absenteeism. For example, there are 244,000 openly unemployed

workers in a total population of 9 million. But this does not include

126,000 working in labor-market projects (the largely unsuccessful

programs geared towards helping people acquire the skills to find

employment) or the 89,000 job-seekers who are receiving some form of

education. And there are another 111,000 in "latent unemployment",

people who are not defined as part of the work force, but who can and

would like to work. If all of these workers are included in the

calculation, Sweden's true unemployment rate is still 12 percent.

(Although other countries' unemployment figures, including those for

the United States, also fail to reflect the real rate joblessness,

Sweden's array of government-funded projects for work and education

particularly distort the data. In addition, Sweden does not include in

its figures students that are seeking employment, breaking with

international norms.)

Moreover, the unemployment rate says nothing about another hidden

labor problem: rampant absenteeism. Swedes are healthier than almost

any other people in the world, but they are also out sick more often

than any other people, according to available data. In 2004, sickness

benefits absorbed 16 percent of the government budget, while health

absenteeism has doubled since 1998. With a sickness benefit of up to

80 percent of a recipient's income (depending on his or her wage

level), it is not surprising that there is an epidemic of absenteeism.

Moreover, about 10 percent of the working-age population has retired

with disability benefits. A researcher at the main trade union, LO,

recently left his job when he was not allowed to publish his estimate

that close to 20 percent of Swedes are unemployed, either openly or

hidden in labor-market projects, long-term sick-leave and early

retirement.

Immigration and Politics

SWEDEN HAS no official minimum wage, but trade unions with political

power set de facto minimum wages through collective bargaining. That

de facto minimum wage for workers in Sweden is equal to about 66

percent of the median wage in the manufacturing sector, compared to 32

percent in the United States. In economic terms, this means that if

you are less than 66 percent as productive as the median Swedish

manufacturing worker--perhaps because you are unskilled, have no

experience or live in a remote area--you will probably not find a job.

Any company that would hire you would be forced to pay you more than

what you are able to produce. And if you are never successful in

gaining employment, you will not gain the skills and experience to

raise your abilities and productivity.

Immigrants are the hardest hit. Since the early 1980s, Sweden has

received a large number of refugees from the Balkans, the Middle East,

Africa and Latin America, which has ended the country's homogeneity.

Today, about one-seventh of the working-age population is foreign

born, but no where near that proportion is actually employed. Sweden

has one of the developed world's biggest differences between the

labor-market participation of natives and immigrants. Many immigrant

families are discouraged by the lack of job prospects and end up in

welfare dependency.

Unemployment problems in turn result in de facto segregation. Despite

little history of racial conflict, the labor market is more segregated

than in America, Britain, Germany, France or Denmark--countries with

far more troublesome racial histories than Sweden. A report from the

free-market Liberal Party ahead of the election 2002 showed that more

than 5 percent of all precincts in Sweden had employment levels lower

than 60 percent, with much higher crime rates and inferior school

results than in other places. Most of these precincts are suburban, so

outsiders rarely see them. The number of segregated precincts has

continued to grow. In some neighborhoods, children grow up without

ever seeing someone who goes to work in the morning. Pockets of

unemployment and social exclusion form, especially in areas with many

non-European immigrants. When Swedes see that so many immigrants live

off the government, their interest in contributing to the system

fades.

Like in other parts of western Europe, the segregation of immigrant

areas leads to insularity, crime and, in some cases, radicalism. Last

year, Nalin Pekgul, the Kurdish chairman of the National Federation of

Social Democratic Women, explained that she was forced to move out of

a suburb of Stockholm because of crime and the rise of Islamic

radicalism. The announcement sent shock waves through the entire

political system. "A bomb waiting to explode" is one of the most

common metaphors used when social exclusion in Sweden is discussed.

Those immigrants who do keep their entrepreneurial spirit intact often

take it elsewhere. Hundreds of unemployed Somalis and Iranians leave

Sweden every year and move to Britain, where they are often successful

in finding work. The contrast in experience can be staggering. The

Swedish economic historian Benny Carlson recently compared the

experiences of Somali immigrants in Sweden with those of Somali

immigrants in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Only 30 percent had a job in

Sweden, about half as many as in Minneapolis. And there are about 800

businesses run by Somalis in Minneapolis, compared to only 38 in

Sweden. Carlson quoted two immigrants who together summed up the

disparity. "There are opportunities here", said Jamal Hashi, who runs

an African restaurant in Minneapolis. His friend, who migrated to

Sweden instead, told a different story: "You feel like a fly trapped

under a glass. Your dreams are shattered."

A Model No More

SO IF THE Myrdals were right when they said that if the welfare state

couldn't work in Sweden, it wouldn't work anywhere, what will it mean

if Sweden's system fails? The answer seems obvious.

The Swedish model has survived for decades, but the truth is that its

success was built on the legacy of an earlier model: the period of

economic growth and development preceding the adoption of the

socialist system. It is difficult to see how other

countries--especially the troubled systems of Western Europe so keen

to adopt the Swedish approach, but which lack the unique components

for a welfare state first noted by Gunnar and Alva Myrdal--could cope

with a similar welfare state. Bigger and more diverse countries with a

weaker faith in government and more suspicion towards other groups

would likely see an even stronger tendency to exploit the system, work

less and abuse social assistance. The United States and much of

Western Europe face immigration challenges at least as daunting as

Sweden.

The economy has rebounded since the recession of the 1990s and the

reforms that followed--in contrast to the stagnant continental

economies--mostly because of a small number of successful global

companies. But the problem is that a growing part of the population is

left out and old attitudes about work and entrepreneurship are fading.

Since 1995 the number of entrepreneurs in the European Union has

increased by 9 percent; in Sweden it has declined by 9 percent. Almost

a quarter of the population of working age does not have a job to go

to in the morning, and polls show a dramatic lack of trust in the

welfare system and its rules.

The system of high taxes and generous welfare benefits worked for so

long because the tradition of self-reliance was so strong. But

mentalities have a tendency of changing when incentives change. The

growth of taxes and benefits punished hard work and encouraged

absenteeism. Immigrants and younger generations of Swedes have faced

distorted incentives and have not developed the work ethic that was

nurtured before the effects of the welfare state began to erode them.

When others cheat the system and get away with it, suddenly you are

considered a fool if you get up early every morning and work late.

According to polls, about half of all Swedes now think it is

acceptable to call in sick for reasons other than sickness. Almost

half think that they can do it when someone in the family is not

feeling well, and almost as many think that they can do it if there is

too much to do at work. Our ancestors worked even when they were sick.

Today, we are "off sick" even when we feel fine.

The real worry is that Sweden and other welfare states have reached a

point where it is impossible to convince majorities to change the

system, despite the dismal results. Obviously, if you are dependent on

the government, you are hesitant to reduce its size and cost. A middle

class with small economic margins is dependent on social security.

This was Bismarck's plan when he introduced a system that would make

those dependent on it "far more content and far easier to handle."

Sooner or later, politicians begin to identify a new, influential bloc

of voters--those who live at others' expense. A former Social

Democratic minister of industry recently explained what his party

meetings in northern Sweden looked like: "A quarter of the

participants were on sick-leave, a quarter was on disability benefits,

a quarter was unemployed."

This creates a damaging cycle. With high taxes, markets and voluntary

communities are crowded out, which means that every new problem has to

find a government solution. If change seems too far off, a large part

of the electorate becomes more interested in defending good terms for

unemployment and sick-leave than in creating opportunities for growth

and jobs. And that goes even if you have a job. If regulations make it

difficult to find a new job, you worry more about losing the one you

have and will see suggestions of labor market deregulation as a

threat. OECD interviews show that well-protected workers in Sweden,

France and Germany are much more afraid of losing their jobs than

workers in the less regulated United States, Canada and Denmark.

In that case, sclerosis creates a public demand for policies that

create even more stagnation. This might help explain the lack of

reform in Europe, despite all the political ambitions. The more

problems there are, the more dangerous radical reforms seem to the

electorate: If things are this bad now, the logic goes, think how bad

they'll be without state protection. For example, it seems like the

Swedish voters are now willing to oust the Social Democratic

government in September. But that is only after the center-right

opposition abandoned the more radical suggestions--such as

labor-market reform and reduction in social security benefits--that it

used to champion.

Radical reform seems far off. On the other hand, just like the

step-by-step construction of the welfare state that slowly but

steadily reduced the willingness to work and the sense self-reliance,

incremental reforms to expand freedom of choice and reduce the

incentives to live off fellow-citizens might rejuvenate these

fundamental values and increase the appetite for reform.

Johan Norberg is a Swedish writer and a senior fellow at the Centre

for the New Europe, a Brussels-based think-tank. He is the author of

several books, including In Defense of Global Capitalism (2003)."

http://www.nationalinterest.org/ME2/dirmod…05B

[Antoninov]

Sooner or later, politicians begin to identify a new, influential bloc of voters--those who live at others' expense. A former Social Democratic minister of industry recently explained what his party meetings in northern Sweden looked like: "A quarter of the participants were on sick-leave, a quarter was on disability benefits, a quarter was unemployed."

[Legion]

Wow, culte ! Du grand Norberg !

[Roniberal]

Article paru dans www.libres.org

QUE RESTE-T-IL DU « MODELE SOCIALISTE SUEDOIS » ?

Les socialistes français auraient pu se poser la question quand ils ont conçu un programme de gouvernement qui est dans la plus pure tradition collectiviste et jacobine. En effet, il y a trente ans, on nous a rebattus les oreilles du « modèle suédois », salué comme la victoire de l’Etat Providence, de la redistribution et du keynésianisme.

Après la faillite du socialisme, les Suédois se sont par étapes successives rapprochés du « modèle anglo-saxon » : place au marché, réduction des dépenses publiques et de la taille des administrations. Les sociaux-démocrates sont devenus peu à peu des libéraux bon teint.

Ce sont ces socialistes convertis qui ont mis en œuvre certaines réformes, en particulier du marché du travail. Le gouvernement s’est attaqué au déficit public : celui-ci atteignait 13% du produit intérieur brut en 1994 ; désormais, c’est un excédent de 2% que dégagent les finances publiques. Les résultats ont été probants. Grâce à la flexibilité, le taux de chômage est tombé de 9,5% de la population active à 5% seulement et la croissance est l’une des plus fortes d’Europe : elle tourne autour de 4% depuis trois ans.

La campagne électorale qui s’ouvre, en vue des élections législatives du 12 septembre, prend acte de cette évolution positive. Mais le débat va désormais tourner sur ce qu’il reste de l’Etat providence. C’est le parti conservateur, que préside Fredrik REINFELDT, qui mène l’attaque. Il faut dire qu’en dépit des réformes, les prélèvements obligatoires sont les plus élevés du monde, avec 50% du PIB (plus encore qu’en France) – l’impôt direct est toujours progressif et aussi écrasant- et les dépenses publiques représentent 54,5% du PIB. Les seules dépenses de protection sociale représentent 32,5% du PIB, contre 30,6% en France et 26,7 en moyenne dans l’Europe des quinze !

Les conservateurs font par exemple observer ce que Le Figaro appelle « le nombre extravagant de congés maladie : 4,5% de la population en âge de travailler en bénéficie ». De même, les conservateurs s’interrogent « sur la générosité des allocations versées aux vrais chômeurs et aux faux malades ». Les conservateurs appuient donc là où ça fait mal et posent carrément la question de l’avenir du « modèle » suédois . Ils ne cessent de monter dans les sondages.

Bien entendu, les sociaux-démocrates se défendent et font valoir qu’avec ce modèle de flex-sécurité, ils ont trouvé un équilibre entre les considérations économiques et sociales. On aide fortement les chômeurs, mais on fait tout pour qu’ils retrouvent un travail au plus vite. Et les dépenses publiques ont été réorientées vers l’éducation supérieure, la formation professionnelle et même la création d’entreprises. En outre, les sociaux-démocrates n’ont jamais été protectionnistes dans la période récente et l’économie suédoise est très ouverte sur les marchés internationaux et bénéficie à plein de la mondialisation.

La Suède échappera-t-elle à cette réforme de l’Etat providence ? La question des retraites en particulier est explosive, avec l’une des populations les plus âgées du monde (17,2% de personnes de 65 ans et plus). Pour l’instant, on s’est contenté de mesures incitatives : plus le salarié restera en activité, meilleure sera sa retraite. Mais à terme cela ne suffira pas et il faudra envisager des réformes plus radicales.

Car à terme il y a une contradiction évidente entre la volonté d’ouverture internationale et de souplesse interne et les rigidités imposées par l’Etat providence. Comment rester compétitif, lorsque plus de 50% des revenus passent par l’Etat ? Comment assurer le dynamisme des entreprises quand les prélèvements écrasent celles-ci aussi bien que les particuliers ? Et comment avoir une vraie flexibilité, avec un Etat omniprésent, même modernisé et dynamisé : la réforme de l’Etat a ses limites. Il faudra bien envisager un jour le recul de l’Etat.

C’est tout l’enjeu de la campagne qui s’ouvre. Une victoire des conservateurs, s’ils appliquent leurs promesses de remise en cause de l’Etat providence, pourrait enfin ouvrir une brèche dans les modèles nordiques et entamer un déclin de la social-démocratie. C’est la mondialisation qui sonne le glas de l’Etat omniprésent. Il n’y a plus que la France à ne pas reconnaître cette évidence : la mondialisation condamne à terme l’Etat providence.

[Serge]

Le modèle suédois se met au libéralisme

Après les promesses, les actes. Fin septembre, la Suède a changé de gouvernement. Lundi, les conservateurs qui ont repris le pouvoir ont dévoilé leur premier budget. Une annonce quelque peu brouillée par la démission d'un nouveau ministre, mais qui ne doit pas en limiter la portée.

Qu'y lit-on? Surtout des allégements fiscaux: moins de charges pour les entreprises recrutant des chômeurs; idem pour l'embauche de jeunes; baisse de l'impôt sur le revenu et sur la fortune… Autant de recettes en moins qui compensera une diminution des allocations chômage. Bref, le gouvernement réalise ce qu'il a promis pendant la campagne électorale.

Avec plus de 8% de chômeurs, le pays d'Ikea, Ericsson et Volvo a mal à son système si souvent montré en exemple. On attend impatiemment le résultat de ces réformes pour savoir si cette dose de libéralisme lui profite.

La croissance, révisée à la hausse ce même jour (4% en 2006 et 3,3% en 2007), va faciliter la tâche du nouveau gouvernement. Sans oublier que le pays ne va pas si mal: il se place au 3erang mondial de la compétitivité (derrière la Suisse), selon le World Economic Forum.

© Le Temps, 2006 .

[Nick de Cusa]

Wow, culte ! Du grand Norberg !

Oh, Légion! On mollit? Le dernier paragraphe suggère que la démocratie (boouuuh) permettra de sortir de cette crise. Pas de grand soir. La catastrophe.

Extrait :

Merci Gadrel pour cet excellent post.

[Legion]

Oh, Légion! On mollit? Le dernier paragraphe suggère que la démocratie (boouuuh) permettra de sortir de cette crise. Pas de grand soir. La catastrophe.

J'ai dit ça il y a 4 mois, ça ne compte plus.

[Copeau]

Tiens truc a écrit ce machin :

e nouveau gouvernement suédois, le premier de droite depuis douze ans, n'aura connu aucun état de grâce. Après la démission de deux ministres en délicatesse avec la morale fiscale du royaume, le front social vient de s'enflammer. Les syndicats, très puissants en Suède, se braquent contre le projet de réforme de l'assurance-chômage que le gouvernement souhaite faire entrer en vigueur dès le 1er janvier 2007.

"Grâce à cette réforme, nous allons récupérer dix milliards de couronnes (1,08 milliard d'euros)", explique Eva Udden Sonnegard, secrétaire d'Etat chargée du marché du travail. Cette somme doit permettre de financer les premières baisses d'impôts promises et de répondre en même temps au mot d'ordre affiché durant la campagne électorale : la différence entre ceux qui travaillent et les autres doit être plus marquée qu'aujourd'hui.

La réforme prévoit d'abord d'augmenter la cotisation des Suédois aux caisses de chômage. Elle s'élève aujourd'hui en moyenne à une douzaine d'euros par mois et devrait plus que tripler. La part de ces cotisations représente environ 10 % du budget de l'assurance-chômage (chômeurs en formation et allocations chômage).

"SALAIRES VERS LE BAS"

"Nous voulons faire passer cette part d'autofinancement à 35 % au 1er janvier", annonce Eva Udden Sonnegard. Parallèlement, les indemnités vont baisser. Elles s'élèvent aujourd'hui à 80 % du salaire durant une période de 300 jours (généralement plafonné à 74 euros par jour), éventuellement prolongé d'une seconde période équivalente.

Dans la réforme, les 80 % ne seraient plus acquis que durant les 200 premiers jours. Le taux passerait ensuite à 70 % pendant les 100 jours suivants, puis à 65 %.

"Tout cela va en fait contribuer à presser les salaires vers le bas", prévient Anders Bergström, troisième vice-président de Kommunal, le plus gros syndicat du pays, qui rassemble les employés des administrations territoriales ou des services de soins.

Dernier point très controversé, il faudrait désormais avoir travaillé au moins 80 heures (au lieu de 70 aujourd'hui) par mois pendant six des douze derniers mois pour bénéficier de l'assurance-chômage. Faute de quoi, les gens toucheront les allocations sociales, l'équivalent du RMI.

"La plupart de nos adhérents sont des femmes peu payées qui travaillent souvent à temps partiel. Beaucoup d'entre elles risquent de ne pas pouvoir atteindre le niveau requis pour bénéficier de l'assurance-chômage", proteste Anders Bergström.

TCO, l'organisation parapluie des syndicats de cols blancs, menace même de porter l'affaire devant la cour européenne de justice. "Cette réforme discrimine les femmes, qui sont beaucoup plus nombreuses que les hommes à travailler à temps partiel", souligne Sture Nordh, président de TCO.

Le bras de fer est engagé et les syndicats ont fait de cette bataille leur priorité dans les semaines à venir.

Olivier Truc

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