Le Mot De La Fin?

Antoninov · 7 avril 2005

US relied on 'drunken liar' to justify war

It now appears there were problems with Curveball from the start, but the intelligence community was willing to believe him 'because the tales he told were consistent with what they already believed.'

In May 2000 doubts about his credibility surfaced when he was examined for signs that he had been exposed to biological agents. While the results were inconclusive, a US official was surprised to find Curveball had a hangover and said he 'might be an alcoholic.' By early 2001, the Germans were having doubts of their own, telling the CIA their spy was 'out of control'.

But warnings were dismissed. Intelligence analysts who voiced concern were 'forced to leave' the unit mainly responsible for analysing his claims, the commission found. At every turn analysts were blocked by spy chiefs and their warning never passed on to policy-makers.

Chitah · 26 avril 2005

RDD= Radiological Dirty Device

R.P. Eddy: "Look for Nuclear Weapons in the RDD Haystack"
Contributing Expert R.P. Eddy, former senior U.N. and N.S.C. counterterrorism official, asked me to post this for him:

From a story by Bill Gertz in yesterday's Washington Times: Recurrent intelligence reports say al Qaeda terrorist Abu Musab Zarqawi has obtained a nuclear device or is preparing a radiological explosive -- or dirty bomb -- for an attack.. The classified reports say Zarqawi, al Qaeda's leader in Iraq, has stored the nuclear device or dirty bomb in Afghanistan.

While reports of terrorists possessing either an RDD or a nuclear weapon are bad news, credible intelligence of terrorists overseas possessing the latter would be cause for defensive measures approaching a lock-down of our borders and a massive increase in federal and policing activity.

On the other hand, credible intelligence of terrorists with an RDD overseas should cause nothing near the same level of response. It is quite likely a terrorist can assemble an RDD in nearly any industrialized city - here or abroad. Radioactive waste is a by-product of mining, medicine, even dentistry. For this reason, to learn that they have created an RDD overseas would make me think the intended target is overseas as well - why go to the trouble to transport it to the US when they can make one here? (An exception would be if they came upon stores of some of the most highly toxic radioactive materials that are better protected in the US.)

So in a resource constrained environment, how to prioritize and act on information that mentions radioactive material? Is the threat nearly a show-stopper or is it simply newsworthy?

1 - En effet, il me semble que des isotopes radioactifs du Cobalt notamment sont utilisés dans des machines médicales, je ne sais plus lesquelles.

2 - Mais si ce Zarqawi a caché cet arme en Afghanistan, qui est censé être un pays sous contrôle US (au moins en théorie) que doit-on en conclure sur l'intérêt d'envahir ce pays, et d'y rester?

Voici l'article du Washington Times.

http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20…02106-5456r.htm

Reports reveal Zarqawi nuclear threat
By Bill Gertz

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Recurrent intelligence reports say al Qaeda terrorist Abu Musab Zarqawi has obtained a nuclear device or is preparing a radiological explosive -- or dirty bomb -- for an attack, according to U.S. officials, who also say analysts are unable to gauge the reliability of the information's sources.

The classified reports have been distributed to U.S. intelligence agencies for several consecutive months and say Zarqawi, al Qaeda's leader in Iraq, has stored the nuclear device or dirty bomb in Afghanistan, said officials familiar with the intelligence.

One official said the intelligence is being questioned because analysts think al Qaeda would not hesitate to use a nuclear device if it had one.

However, the fact that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has reported the nuclear threat in several classified reports distributed since December indicates concern about it.

A DIA spokesman had no comment.

The Jordanian-born Zarqawi, who last year formally linked up with Osama bin Laden's terror network, is thought to be operating inside Iraq and has specialized in suicide bombings and large-scale vehicle bombings. He had several close encounters in recent weeks with Iraqi and U.S. forces.

Senior U.S. intelligence and security officials said in congressional testimony in February that a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, chemical or biological arms -- is likely. CIA Director Porter J. Goss said such a terrorist strike "may be only a matter of time."

Dirty bombs are made by mixing radioactive material with conventional explosives.

A report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction faulted U.S. intelligence agencies for not understanding al Qaeda's unconventional weapons programs in Afghanistan prior to 2001, when U.S. forces helped oust the Islamist Taliban government.

"There are critical intelligence gaps with regard to each al Qaeda unconventional weapons capability -- chemical, biological and nuclear," said the report, made public March 30.

The commission said bin Laden told a Pakistani newspaper reporter in November 2001 that al Qaeda has both nuclear and chemical weapons. The CIA then "speculated" in a report that the terrorist group "probably had access to nuclear expertise and facilities and that there was a real possibility of the group developing a crude nuclear device," the commission report said.

The commission also said U.S. intelligence agencies think development of a radiological bomb is "well within al Qaeda's capabilities."

The reported threat of nuclear terrorism comes amid other intelligence indicating that Zarqawi is planning an attack on the United States. Still other intelligence says Zarqawi was planning a chemical weapons attack in Europe, officials said.

In February, U.S. intelligence and security officials said information showed bin Laden had asked Zarqawi to focus future attacks on targets inside the United States. The threat was contained in a classified bulletin to state and local security officials.

Chitah · 6 mai 2005

http://www.juancole.com/2005/05/secret-bri…shows-bush.html

Apparemment, un memorandum interne du gouvernement britannique exprimait le fait que l'auteur ne se faisait aucune illusion sur les motivations du Président Bush, et ce en juillet 2002:

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft

Date: 23 July 2002

S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

( Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

[En gros, proposer à SH que les inspecteurs reviennent, en s'attendant à ce qu'il réponde non, provoquant ainsi le casus belli]

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

( The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

© CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)