Ash Posté 19 février 2008 Signaler Posté 19 février 2008 Il y a eu 3 présidents differents depuis le 1er janvier 1959 : Manuel Urrutia en 1959, Osvaldo Dorticós 1959-1976, et Fidel Castro 1976-2006, et même 4 en comptant le vice-president faisant fonction de président depuis 2006, Raul Castro.J'ai retrouvé le nom de mon poulain, il s'agit de Felipe Perez Roque, ministre des affaire étrangères, un peu plus de 40ans. Mais c'est qu'il croit ce qu'il dit en plus ! Hého ! Il s'agit d'une dictature.
José Posté 19 février 2008 Signaler Posté 19 février 2008 …il s'agit de Felipe Perez Roque, ministre des affaire étrangères… S'il arrive au pouvoir, ce ne sera qu'une marionnette. Le vrai pouvoir sera entre les mains des militaires qui contrôlent les secteurs clés de l'économie (enfin, ce qu'il en reste) et le trafic de drogue.
Emile Posté 19 février 2008 Signaler Posté 19 février 2008 Sans aucun parti pris, j'aime me renseigner sur les infos que je reçois. Ca me permet de ne pas débiter n'importe quoi ; de la même manière je me renseigne sur les libéraux, ça m'évitera de dire "renard libre dans poulailler libre" et tout ce que vous détestez tant. Je n'ai pas plus de raison de croire les médias français que de ne pas croire la constitution cubaine.
José Posté 19 février 2008 Signaler Posté 19 février 2008 …la constitution cubaine. Je n'ai pas plus de raison de croire les médias français que de ne pas croire la constitution cubaine. Bon, c'est pas tout ça, faut penser aux choses sérieuses :
john_ross Posté 19 février 2008 Signaler Posté 19 février 2008 J'ai beaucoup plus drôle Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen 26 Aout 1789 Art. 14.-Tous les Citoyens ont le droit de constater, par eux-mêmes ou par leurs représentants, la nécessité de la contribution publique, de la consentir librement, d'en suivre l'emploi, et d'en déterminer la quotité, l'assiette, le recouvrement et la durée.
Taranne Posté 19 février 2008 Auteur Signaler Posté 19 février 2008 Il y a eu 3 présidents differents depuis le 1er janvier 1959 : Manuel Urrutia en 1959, Osvaldo Dorticós 1959-1976, et Fidel Castro 1976-2006, et même 4 en comptant le vice-president faisant fonction de président depuis 2006, Raul Castro. Deng Xiao Pingh n'a jamais été président de la république populaire de Chine, il n'a donc jamais détenu le moindre pouvoir. CQFD.
Emile Posté 19 février 2008 Signaler Posté 19 février 2008 Deng Xiao Pingh n'a jamais été président de la république populaire de Chine, il n'a donc jamais détenu le moindre pouvoir. CQFD. Fidel Castro a été président de la république de Cuba, il a donc détenu tout le pouvoir. Fidel Castro n'a pas toujours été président de la république de Cuba, il n'a donc jamais détenu le moindre pouvoir lorsqu'il n'était pas président. CQFD (ça rentre hein !) Charles de Gaulle a été président de la république de France, il a donc détenu tout le pouvoir. Charles de Gaulle n'a pas toujours été président de la république de France, il n'a donc jamais détenu le moindre pouvoir lorsqu'il n'était pas président. CQFD Bien sûr que Castro avait du pouvoir même lorsqu'il n'était pas président. Il occupait la fonction de premier ministre ce me semble. Mais au fond, est-on si sûr que Castro prend sa retraite ? Non, il reste dans l'ombre pour mieux gouverner.
Sehb Posté 19 février 2008 Signaler Posté 19 février 2008 Fidel Castro a été président de la république de Cuba, il a donc détenu tout le pouvoir.Fidel Castro n'a pas toujours été président de la république de Cuba, il n'a donc jamais détenu le moindre pouvoir lorsqu'il n'était pas président. CQFD (ça rentre hein !) Charles de Gaulle a été président de la république de France, il a donc détenu tout le pouvoir. Charles de Gaulle n'a pas toujours été président de la république de France, il n'a donc jamais détenu le moindre pouvoir lorsqu'il n'était pas président. CQFD Bien sûr que Castro avait du pouvoir même lorsqu'il n'était pas président. Il occupait la fonction de premier ministre ce me semble. Mais au fond, est-on si sûr que Castro prend sa retraite ? Non, il reste dans l'ombre pour mieux gouverner. Où serait son interet de rester dans l'ombre ? Je vois vraiment pas.
Emile Posté 19 février 2008 Signaler Posté 19 février 2008 Où serait son interet de rester dans l'ombre ? Je vois vraiment pas. C'était de l'ironie
Dardanus Posté 20 février 2008 Signaler Posté 20 février 2008 Fidel Castro a été président de la république de Cuba, il a donc détenu tout le pouvoir.Fidel Castro n'a pas toujours été président de la république de Cuba, il n'a donc jamais détenu le moindre pouvoir lorsqu'il n'était pas président. CQFD (ça rentre hein !) Charles de Gaulle a été président de la république de France, il a donc détenu tout le pouvoir. Charles de Gaulle n'a pas toujours été président de la république de France, il n'a donc jamais détenu le moindre pouvoir lorsqu'il n'était pas président. CQFD Bien sûr que Castro avait du pouvoir même lorsqu'il n'était pas président. Il occupait la fonction de premier ministre ce me semble. Mais au fond, est-on si sûr que Castro prend sa retraite ? Non, il reste dans l'ombre pour mieux gouverner. Staline n'a jamais été président de l'URSS. Il n'a donc jamais détenu le moindre pouvoir en URSS ? Quand on ne connaît rien aux régimes communistes, on évite d'écrire n'importe quoi. Il est ridicule de comparer une démocratie libérale à un régime communiste. La constitution ne joue aucun rôle dans un régime communiste. Celui qui a le pouvoir est celui qui tient le Parti. Non le chef théorique de l'État.
José Posté 20 février 2008 Signaler Posté 20 février 2008 Tiens tu vas te poiler . Je l'imprime derechef, je manque justement de P.Q.
José Posté 20 février 2008 Signaler Posté 20 février 2008 Au fait, maintenant que tombe l'objection juridique principale (être chef d'État), quel est le procureur droit-de-l'hommiste-et-droit-d'ingérentiste qui inculpera le monstre de Birán ?
pankkake Posté 20 février 2008 Signaler Posté 20 février 2008 J’ai vu des projets d’entrepreneurs américains prêts à faire de cette ile un véritable paradis avec marina et complexe touristique à la pointe , architecture style Dubaï. Les nomenklaturistes au pouvoir ne résisteront pas longtemps au sens de l'histoire.A nous les ptites cubaines !
Harald Posté 20 février 2008 Signaler Posté 20 février 2008 Je l'imprime derechef, je manque justement de P.Q. Justement : NOUS, CITOYENS CUBAINS,héritiers et continuateurs du travail créateur et des traditions de combativité, d'héroïsme et de sacrifice de nos ancêtres; des aborigènes qui préfèrent l'extermination à la soumission; MDR. Que n'ont ils suivi cet exemple. Sans compter que des aborigènes à Cuba ça ne devait pas courir les rues.
Invité Arn0 Posté 21 février 2008 Signaler Posté 21 février 2008 http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/reaction…-1013523,0.html Faut vraiment lire les commentaires de cet article !
Samizdat Posté 21 février 2008 Signaler Posté 21 février 2008 http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/reaction…-1013523,0.htmlFaut vraiment lire les commentaire de cet articles ! Té, un lecteur du forum : 20.02.08 | 16h14]Les mythes libéraux s'éteindront aussi, quand ils auront eux aussi mangé leurs enfants.
Lexington Posté 21 février 2008 Signaler Posté 21 février 2008 Et rien ne va changer. Le discours officiel de Raul semble plutôt aller dans l'autre sens. Si la prudence doit prévaloir, les signaux sont plutôt positifs. Quelle rigolade que le formalisme des dictatures. Mais, bon, le chef a toujours été Castro. Sauf ces derniers mois, où il était à l'hosto. Même actuellement il garde un pouvoir important, ne serait ce que par l'influence que peuvent avoir ses tribunes dans Granma. Et il ne démissionne que de son poste de président du conseil d'Etat.
Taranne Posté 21 février 2008 Auteur Signaler Posté 21 février 2008 Un, deux, trois, vomi! Fidel's exit means continuity. For change, look to ObamaNo one can quite replace Castro, but Cuba's course is clear for now. Its future will depend on who takes the White House * Ignacio Ramonet * The Guardian, * Wednesday February 20 2008 The long and extraordinary political career of Fidel Castro is over - at least as far as the presidency is concerned. But his enormous influence will live on. His regular columns for Granma, the state newspaper - which he has continued to write throughout his illness - will continue. Only the strapline will be altered: instead of the reflections of the commandante en jefe, now it will be plain old camarade Fidel. For Cubans and international observers alike, they will still bear close reading. There can be no replacement for Fidel. Not simply because of his qualities as a leader, but because the historical circumstances will never be the same. Castro has lived through everything from the Cuban revolution to the fall of the USSR, and decades of confrontation with the US. The fact that he departs while alive will help to ensure a peaceful transition. The Cuban people now accept that the country can still be run the same way by a different team. For a year and a half they have been getting used to the idea, while Castro remained theoretically president but his brother, Raul, held the reins. It was Fidel the mentor, as ever. The most surprising thing that I found out about the man, in the hours we spent together compiling his memoirs, was how modest, human, discreet and respectful he was. He has a tremendous moral and ethical sense. He is a man of rigorous principles and sober existence. He is also, I discovered, passionate about the environment. He is neither the man the western media depict, nor the superman the Cuban media sometimes present. He is a normal man, albeit one who is incredibly hard working. He is also an exemplary strategist, one who has led a life of enduring resistance. He contains a curious mixture of idealism and pragmatism: he dreams of a perfect society but knows that material conditions are very difficult to transform. He leaves office confident that Cuba's political system is stable. His current preoccupation isn't so much socialism in his own country as the quality of life around the world, where too many children are illiterate, starving and suffering from diseases that could be cured. And so he thinks his country must have good relations with all nations, whatever the regime or political orientation. So now he is handing over to a team he has tested and trusts. This will not lead to spectacular changes. Most Cubans themselves - even those who criticise aspects of the regime - do not envisage or desire change: they don't want to lose the advantages it has brought them, the free education right through university, the free universal healthcare, or the very fact of a safe, peaceful existence in a country where life is calm. While Castro turns full-time columnist, the main task for his political heirs will be how to confront the one perpetual challenge of Cuban life: relations with the US. We must wait to see if changes occur. Raul Castro has twice publicly announced he is prepared to sit down for talks with Washington on the problems between the two countries. But it is in the US itself that a more appreciable political shift may come, with the Democratic frontrunner Barack Obama having signalled his willingness to engage with America's perceived enemies or adversaries, be it Iran, Venezuela or Cuba. An immediate and radical change may be unlikely, but there is reason to hope that November's election may at least alter the atmosphere after the Bush years - a presidency Castro regards as the most damaging to the whole planet of the 10 he has experienced. The departure of Bush is likely to lead the US to a reappraisal of foreign policy: learning the disastrous lessons of Iraq and the Middle East, and returning the focus to Latin America. The US will find a changed situation: for the first time, Cuba has genuine friends in government in Latin America, most prominently Venezuela, but also in Brazil, Argentina, Nicaragua and Bolivia, a host of governments who are not particularly pro-American. It is in the US's interests to redefine its relations with all of them: non-colonial, non-exploitative and based on respect. Cuba, meanwhile, has developed closer relations with partner countries, as part of the EU-like ALBA economic and political organisation, and in agreements with the Mercosur trade area. In the bigger international picture, Cuba is no longer such a unique case. It is on this international plane, developing ever stronger ties with Latin America, where the most visible changes in Cuban politics are likely to come. Its socialism will undoubtedly alter - but not in the manner of a China or Vietnam. Cuba will continue to go its own way. The new regime will initiate changes at the economic level, but there will be no Cuban perestroika - no opening up of politics, no multiparty elections. Its authorities are convinced that socialism is the right choice, but that it must be forever improved. And their preoccupation now, more than ever with the retirement of Castro, will be unity. But everything in Cuba is related to the US: that is the one overarching aspect of political life which outsiders need to understand. The retirement of Castro, long anticipated, means continuity. But in the evolution of this small nation's history, the election of Obama could be seismic. · Ignacio Ramonet is the co-author with Fidel Castro of Fidel Castro: My Life, and editor of Le Monde Diplomatique comment@guardian.co.uk Et c'est publié par Le Guardian. A comparer avec Joffrin dans Libé: ÉditorialŒillères laurent joffrin QUOTIDIEN : mercredi 20 février 2008 C’est une légende qui a fait naufrage. Les guérilleros sans peur des années 50 portaient l’espoir des réprouvés. Le renversement héroïque du corrompu Batista par une poignée de Robin des jungles avait ouvert une brèche dans le vieux monde. Las ! La réaction paranoïaque des Etats-Unis allait rejeter les barbudos - qui penchaient déjà de ce côté-là - dans les bras de l’URSS. Et comme toujours, les staliniens, seraient-ils fumeurs de cigares, allaient trahir la révolution. L’utopie guévariste d’une économie sans propriété privée allait échouer lamentablement, comme partout. Et comme partout l’écart entre le rêve communiste et la réalité serait comblée par la répression. Celle des «ennemis de la révolution» et bientôt celle de ses amis, coupables de garder en eux les valeurs humanistes des origines. Même animée par l’exubérance tropicale, l’île devint un camp. Bien sûr, le socialisme connut quelques succès. La santé et l’éducation dispensées largement et gratuitement donnent à Cuba un visage égalitaire qui tranche avec ces enfers de la misère et de l’injustice que sont les îles voisines, à commencer par Haïti. Mais l’étouffement bureaucratique, l’enfermement des dissidents et la police des esprits gâchent ces réalisations. La leçon est universelle : le socialisme sans la liberté est un passeport pour l’échec. Le patriarche immobile parti à la retraite après cinquante ans de solitude dogmatique, Cuba a désormais la possibilité de réformer son système et de sauver son âme et son économie. Encore faut-il que ses dirigeants quittent leurs œillères.
José Posté 21 février 2008 Signaler Posté 21 février 2008 A comparer avec Joffrin dans Libé: Aussi une belle daube : réaction paranoïaque, médecine et enseignement gratuits, bullshit. Quant à Haïti, il suffit de se rappeler la boutade : il s'agit du pays qui se trouve le plus près de l'enfer.
Taranne Posté 21 février 2008 Auteur Signaler Posté 21 février 2008 Aussi une belle daube : réaction paranoïaque, médecine et enseignement gratuits, bullshit. Quant à Haïti, il suffit de se rappeler la boutade : il s'agit du pays qui se trouve le plus près de l'enfer. Joffrin devrait regarder la video de Brad DeLong (encore un yankee parano) que j'ai postée un peu plus haut et qui rappelle que Cuba avant Castro n'avait rien d'un enfer - même si Battista, effectivement, c'était pas le top en matière de droits de l'homme.
Taranne Posté 21 février 2008 Auteur Signaler Posté 21 février 2008 Les trolls castristes ne sont pas une spécialité française: demandez à Brad DeLong: Los Gusanos--the Worms--Infest the Comment Section Tonight…Ah. The Fidel Castro fans are out in force, I see: Bloix: Let's do a thought experiment: Imagine that the year is 1960 and that you are a soul about to be inspirited into a foetus about to be born. God gives you a choice: you may become the son or daughter of a poor rural woman in either Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, or the Dominican Republic. What would you choose? Reply #1: That is the wrong comparison: Cuba in 1960 is like Costa Rica, northern Mexico, Puerto Rico, or Portugal. The fact that you today think of Cuba as to be plaed in the same basket as Guatemala, Haiti, or the Dominican Republic is Castro's doing, and is worth thinking about. The normal course of development should have given Cuba today the wealth, freedom, and health that Costa Rica, northern Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Portugal possess. It has only the health--and perhaps not even that. The only excuse for breaking eggs is if you manage to make a tasty omelette. prov: Too bad for an academic like you using such a language. you clearly depict the other side of the communist coin that of brutal capitalism, of dictatorships in Latin America etc.. Too bad taking an extreme position in an issue that must always be addressed in a more serious way. Too bad that you used Rosa's words to support you anti communist feelings Reply #2: So it's forbidden to use Rosa Luxemburg's words to support her anti-Leninist feelings? Ken Houghton: Model that one up and show me the results. Your major local trading partner when you were run by a Mob-backed dictator unilaterally refuses to buy your goods, or to import anything to you… Reply #3: You know, there is something very wrong with an argument that goes (a) Leninist centrally-planned communism is necessary because market exchange is inherently exploitative an destructive, and ( it's not Castro's fault Cuba's economy is in the toilet--America won't trade with it. That simply does not compute. dsquared: I'm not getting this Brad. At precisely which point after the Cuban revolution would it have made sense for Cuba to decide to switch allegiances, throw itself open to American capitalism and step onto the development path of Honduras, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean and Central American quasi-colonies? Or is the idea that Castro should have tried to start a revolution in a banana republic in the backyard of a superpower without any support from the other superpower? Or that all things considered, life under Batista wasn't so bad and the Cubans ought to have toughed it out for another forty years?… Reply #4: Stepping, at any point, onto a eurocommunist development path would have been fine. Stepping back onto the development path Cuba had been on--Costa Rica, Puerto Rico, etc.--would have been even better. Stepping onto the southern European Italian, Portuguese, or post-Franco Spanish development path would have really good. But any of those would have rapidly meant an end to the dictatorship of the Castro brothers. One Salient Oversight: Was Castro good or bad? He was both. Forget for a moment the brutality of his regime, especially in the early days. Instead focus upon what the nation has achieved since he took power. The United Nations Human Development Index has Cuba at a respectable 0.838 - a number higher than Mexico and can be defined as a nation with "High Human Development". If this increase in standards of living continues for another 10-20 years, Cuba will be considered a "First World Nation". I'm not going to defend Castro's sins. He did, however, prove to the world that Communism could improve the living standards of its citizens See Reply #1 Jessica: Cuba is certainly something there are intensely felt emotions about on all sides. I would not put Castro in a class with Stalin at all. Nor with Mother Theresa. Best comparisons would be Muhammed Ali of 19th century Egypt. Some elements of Menachim Begin/Ariel Sharon…. Castro's choice for the Soviet economic model turned out very poorly. But this was not at all obvious back when he was making that choice (and making it under severe pressure). Back then, North Korea was economically in far better shape than South Korea. (I know it's hard to believe, but that was the world in which Castro made his choices.) And once that die was cast, I don't see where Castro ever had a chance to switch directions without risking not only US invasion, but vindictive and brutal US invasion… Reply #5: Muhammed Ali of Egypt did not know that democracy was possible, and so cannot be blamed for not instituting it. Menachim Begin and Ariel Sharon held elections. History will judge Fidel Castro much more harshly than them, I think--most of all because he made the choice of political strategy, he did not let the people of Cuba make that choice. As to when Fidel could have switched to a eurocommunist or social-democratic model without immediately losing his head--well, 1968 with Dubcek, or 1975 with Sadat, or anytime in the Carter administration, certainly. Neal: Freedom and elections are fine sentiments for the comfortable--as long as you have enough to eat. No reponse seems possible James Killus: The last time I calculated the difference between infant mortality in Cuba vs the average in Latin America, it amounted to something like 3,000 per year infants that did not die in Cuba, but would have had they been born elsewhere in Latin America. Apparently the "stupidest man alive" contender thinks that this amounts to something. Apparently, smarter men do not believe it does. See Reply #1 http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2008/02/los-gusanos--th.html
José Posté 22 février 2008 Signaler Posté 22 février 2008 Castro's legacyFeb 21st 2008 From The Economist print edition Rue the damage he has done. But lift the embargo against a sad, dysfunctional island HE HAS been the great survivor of world politics. When Fidel Castro marched into Havana in January 1959 at the head of his troop of bearded revolutionaries, Dwight Eisenhower, Harold Macmillan and Nikita Khrushchev were all in power, and the Beatles were yet to come. Ensconced in his Communist-run island, Castro has weathered ten American presidents and their economic embargo against him. He has outlasted by almost two decades the cold war and his former sponsor, the Soviet Union—long enough to benefit from a new era of anti-Americanism in which Hugo Chávez in oil-rich Venezuela has come to his aid. And now, at last, he is stepping down as Cuba's president, for reasons of age and ill-health, but of his own volition and with what he clearly hopes will be an orderly succession that preserves his revolution. He will probably be replaced by his brother, Raúl, who has been running the government since Fidel underwent abdominal surgery in July 2006. Raúl Castro has given many signals that he intends to restart reforms that in the mid-1990s introduced some market mechanisms into the sclerotic, centrally planned economy. Yet reform will at first be slow—not least because while Fidel remains alive, he will have something of a veto over change. Look a bit further ahead, and two broad scenarios seem possible in Cuba. The first is one in which the Communist Party oversees the introduction of capitalism while retaining political control—in the mould of China, Vietnam or, closer to home, Mexico in the heyday of the Institutional Revolutionary Party. That seems to be the route favoured by senior figures in the regime, few of whom show any signs of being closet democrats. The other scenario is the one long dreamed of in Miami and in Washington, of the regime's sudden collapse and, it is assumed with a confidence many Iraqis may find worryingly familiar, a swift move to liberal democracy. The first prospect stems from the notion that Cuba is somehow different—its people won't want democracy. The second argues that the only exceptional thing is Mr Castro: remove his evil genius and the regime will crumble. In fact, the truth seems somewhere in between. To get a sense of what might—and should—happen, start by cutting through the fog of propaganda surrounding Fidel himself. The man and the myth Apart from its tropical ambience, Cuban Communism always differed from that of Eastern Europe in being the product of a national revolution, not of foreign conquest. Mr Castro was inspired first and foremost by his country's frustrated search for nationhood. As an island on the doorstep of the 20th century's superpower, Cuba's sad history was moulded by geography. Insularity meant that Spanish colonial rule survived far longer there; then came subjection to the United States as a neo-colony and misrule by a string of corrupt strongmen. Having won power, Mr Castro had no intention of giving it up. It was not the American trade embargo that pushed him into the arms of the Soviet Union; he went willingly. Yet the embargo, the CIA-organised invasion at the Bay of Pigs and the agency's repeated assassination attempts against him all gave him the perfect—if false—justification for dictatorship. Mr Castro's supporters point out that he used his power to give Cubans world-class health and education services, at least until the Soviet subsidies dried up. Those achievements were genuine, but often exaggerated. In 1959 Cuba was already one of the five leading countries in Latin America on a variety of socio-economic indicators. And along with the schools and clinics came the dreary economic failures of central planning, the absence of political freedom and a police state. Cuba is outranked today in the UN human-development index by democracies such as Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica, while Mexico is not far behind. So forget the cigars and the posters: Cubans have had a rotten deal from a miserable regime—and they know it. Scratch the surface of the regime's propaganda, and profound discontent wells up. But that does not mean they will automatically push out the Castros. Sadly, unlike much of South America, the island has no democratic tradition to speak of. Two-thirds of Cubans have known no ruler other than Fidel. They may yearn for change but they also fear it: although their lives are poor, they are also peaceful. If Fidel's successors fix the economy, Cubans may acquiesce in their rule. That, however, is a big if. Raúl lacks his brother's charisma and it is not clear how he will deliver the “structural and conceptual changes” he admits the economy needs. Without reform, wages and productivity will remain miserable; but reforms would bring more inequalities and resentments as well as benefits. That is why Raúl is proceeding with great caution. Raise the embargo and help change through The question now is a familiar one: whether to keep pressure on a dysfunctional dictatorship in the hope of dispatching the Castros quickly, or to try to lure Raúl forward by dropping America's trade embargo. The first option has its logic: why let a repressive, demeaning system modernise itself slowly? But there are more powerful reasons to drop the embargo now. To begin with, a policy that has failed to hurt the Castros for four decades is unlikely to work now. America risks leaving the field to Mr Chávez, who wants Venezuela to become more like Cuba rather than the other way around (he is already giving Cuba fast internet access because America won't). And what if pressure “worked”? The result at the moment could be chaos and violence. Cuba needs not just to dismantle Fidel's Communism but to construct the state institutions that might underpin capitalist democracy. The country can prosper only if the two Cubas—the entrepreneurial diaspora of 1.5m Cuban-Americans and the 11m on the island—work together, rather than against each other. But that, too, will take time. Real change in Cuba will start only after Fidel's death. But that is all the more reason for outsiders to make constructive use of his retirement. He has stubbed out Cuba's freedom once; it would be tragic if hatred of him led to more pain. http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayst…ory_id=10727865 The comandante's last moveFeb 21st 2008 | HAVANA From The Economist print edition Fidel Castro has stepped down as president. But the changes that Cubans yearn for will be slow and stealthy while he remains alive HALFWAY along Calle Obispo, a long street that links the restored colonial splendours of Old Havana to the crumbling tenements of the 19th-century city, a large red placard shouts its defiance in lime-green lettering in an arresting mixture of Spanish and English. “No hay tregua, compay! You understand: No Truce. Sr Bush: este pueblo no puede ser engañado ni comprado.” (“Mr Bush: this people cannot be deceived nor bought.”) The placard advertises the museum of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs), the neighbourhood groups set up by Fidel Castro in 1960 to be the grass roots of his revolution, to organise services but also to inform the newly installed Communist-run state of dissent or subversion. The museum contains glass cases of revolutionary memorabilia. On the walls are blown-up extracts from Mr Castro's speeches, and a chart showing the growth of membership in the CDRs, which in 2007 reached 8.4m of Cuba's 11m people. The highlight, on the first floor, is a scale model in plaster of a typical Cuban street, the houses fronted with the Greek-revival columns that past sugar wealth bequeathed, the façades painted in turn in shocking pink, lime green, toothpaste blue, peach and lemon. It is a remarkable exhibit of revolutionary kitsch. The museum is new, inaugurated on September 28th 2007. Yet on a recent Saturday afternoon it was empty; not one person among the throngs of Cubans and tourists strolling down Calle Obispo felt inspired to cross its threshold. With the mixture of friendly warmth and necessary opportunism that characterises Cubans nowadays, one of the bored women attendants was soon asking your correspondent's wife if she could spare a packet of antacids (“medicines are very scarce”). Mr Castro, ailing and aged 81, this week announced his retirement from the posts of Cuba's president and its “commander in chief”. But his revolution has long since become a shell, a work of theatre in which the old trouper rants on even as many in the bored audience desperately want to slip away—if only they could. As the curtain comes down on Mr Castro's 49 years of rule, change is inevitable. But of what kind and at what pace is far less clear. It was ill-health and impending mortality, not any sense of failure or repudiation, that obliged Mr Castro to issue his statement that he would not seek to retain his posts. In July 2006, facing abdominal surgery, he turned over his powers to his brother, Raúl Castro. Since then he has not appeared in public. Photographs suggest that while he has been convalescing he remains extremely frail. In November he allowed his name to go forward as a candidate for the National Assembly. But this week he said: “it would be a betrayal of my conscience to accept a responsibility requiring more mobility and dedication than I am physically able to offer.” On February 24th the new assembly is due to meet to unveil the Council of State, and thus Cuba's president and its other top officials. The council's members will be picked by the Castro brothers and a handful of senior advisers. Most Cuba-watchers expect Raúl Castro to be confirmed as the new president. Since Raúl is himself aged 76, a bolder move would be to hand the top job to Carlos Lage, a 56-year-old doctor who is the number three in the hierarchy. Cuban officials see it as a triumph of their revolution—and a defeat for the United States—that power is being transferred peacefully and in an orderly manner within the regime. Once again, they have confounded those outside Cuba who have so often predicted the revolution's demise. Yet the country that Fidel Castro is bequeathing to his successors is discontented and all but bankrupt. The undoubted costs imposed by the American economic embargo pale beside self-inflicted problems. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Cuba lost the patron, protector and paymaster that had allowed Mr Castro's Communist regime to survive the United States' embargo and its persistent efforts to kill or topple him. Cuba's economy shrank by around 35% between 1989 and 1993. Many outsiders expected Mr Castro swiftly to go the way of the Berlin Wall. He responded by declaring a “Special Period” involving a mixture of drastic austerity and pragmatic economic reform. His government encouraged mass tourism and foreign investment, mainly in hotels, nickel mines, telecoms and oil exploration. It allowed farmers markets, to supplement the meagre official rations, and, for the first time since the 1960s, licensed family businesses such as restaurants (known as paladares) or plumbers and electricians. It also legalised the use of the dollar, tapping a new source of hard currency in the form of remittances from the million or more Cuban-Americans. State companies were given more freedom to run themselves. Chávez replaces the Soviet Union These measures, implemented by Mr Lage and a group of reformist economists, stabilised the economy and saw a modest return to growth. But they brought rising inequality to Cuban society, and undermined party control. In 1996 Mr Castro halted the reforms. Finally, in 2004 he declared the Special Period over and rolled back some of the changes. The dollar was replaced by the “convertible peso” commonly known as a CUC and now valued at $1.08. The welcome for foreign investment became more selective; many small businesses had their licences withdrawn. Along with counter-reform came a political crackdown. The few dissidents on the island, supported by the United States but infiltrated by the Cuban security services, pose no threat to Mr Castro. Not so the Varela Project, a push for constitutional change led by Oswaldo Payá, a Christian democrat. The project gathered 11,000 signatures for a petition handed in to the National Assembly urging changes to the 1976 constitution to allow free elections and civil and political rights. Unlike the dissidents, Mr Payá opposes the American economic embargo and refuses help from American diplomats. Mr Castro reached for his sledgehammer. He organised a referendum to approve a constitutional change declaring socialism “irrevocable”. And in March 2003, while the world was distracted by the American invasion of Iraq, the government arrested 75 opponents, most associated with the Varela Project, and in summary trials sentenced them to long prison terms. When coincidentally three Cubans hijacked a ferry in a desperate attempt to get to Florida, they were executed. Cuba's shuffle towards the market was far more timid than the bold steps taken by China or Vietnam. Mr Castro felt able to retreat from it because new allies appeared. Venezuela's Hugo Chávez has gone some way towards replacing Cuba's lost Soviet sponsor. Under a web of barter deals, up to 20,000 Cuban doctors, sports trainers and security specialists work in Venezuela; in return Mr Chávez has provided the island with 92,000 barrels per day of oil, and with other aid worth some $800m in 2006 and $1.5 billion in 2007, according to a recent book by Germán Sánchez, Cuba's ambassador in Caracas. With Naomi Campbell, a British fashion model, in tow Mr Chávez turned up in November to inaugurate a mothballed Soviet-era oil refinery near the southern city of Cienfuegos, completed with Venezuelan money. He also paid for 100 three-room houses for the refinery workers, and has offered aid to restart defunct industrial plants, such as a rusting fertiliser factory near the refinery. Venezuelan aid has boosted economic growth (see chart 1). It has also allowed the government to overhaul the electricity system (as well as replacing 52m incandescent light bulbs with energy-saving ones). A few years ago, power cuts were frequent and lengthy; now they are rare. Along with Venezuelan aid has come Chinese credit. Cuba is gradually augmenting its fleet of thirsty Soviet buses and trucks with new, more fuel-efficient Chinese models. Mr Chávez may still believe in Mr Castro's revolution, but talk to ordinary Cubans and grievances well up. Top of the list comes low wages and high prices. Salaries typically range from 400 (non-convertible) Cuban pesos a month for a factory worker to some 700 for a doctor. But that amounts to only 16-28 CUCs ($17-30) at the unofficial (but legal) exchange rate. Pesos are good mainly for buying the subsidised official rations, handed out through the CDRs. Each month these comprise 5lbs (2¼ kilos) of rice per person, half a litre of cooking oil and, when available, beans, sugar, sardines, pork, chicken, soap and toothpaste. This lasts only a week or so. Other things can be bought nowadays in Cuba—but at a price. At the bustling Cuatro Caminos market hall near Havana's main railway station, onions cost 5 ordinary Cuban pesos each, a pound of beans costs 10 pesos and a similar quantity of chicken and bacon go for 23 pesos. To make ends meet, Cubans are forced to rely on a vast informal economy. It is greased by remittances from abroad, which are estimated at between $500m and $1 billion a year. “Everyone has their business on the side,” says a transport inspector in Aguada de Pasajeros, a dusty farming town of small one-storey houses that would not look out of place in the poorer countries of Central America. These sidelines range from market gardens to shoemending, or to running a taxi service using the horses and carts that are ubiquitous in places like Aguada. Rodrigo, an engineer in a small town in central Cuba surrounded by cane fields, says there is no point in practising his profession for a pittance. Instead, he deals in second-hand clothes, and raises chickens and pigs. He dives into the bedroom in his two-bedroom house and shows off an attaché case full of euros and CUCs. In any other country, he would be a successful businessman. He and his partner, a psychologist, are desperate to leave Cuba. Since the informal economy is officially illegal, it is wrapped around by harassment, bribes and bureaucracy—what Cubans call the “internal embargo”. It also breeds absenteeism, cynicism and ingenuity. These are eroding the little that remains of revolutionary morale. In Cienfuegos, when your correspondent went to the official exchange house, he was ushered into a shop next door by a muscular young man in dark glasses who offered to swap euros for CUCs. “It's illegal, but there's no problem,” he said. This transaction took place right opposite the local headquarters of the Communist Party. Rodrigo says his dissident sympathies are well known in his town, but he is not denounced by the president of his local CDR because he sells clothes to the man's wife. Use of the internet is restricted, but government workers rent out night-time access. The informal economy is one way in which Cuba is becoming more like the rest of Latin America. Another is growing inequality. Jobs in tourism or at foreign companies are coveted, as giving access to tips or bonuses. But only around two-thirds of Cubans have access to hard currency from one source or another. There is no malnutrition but poverty is palpable: at night, at a tourist restaurant in Cienfuegos, a chef hands a basket of food through a window to hungry relatives waiting outside. Other grievances include the shortages of public transport and housing. On the outskirts of every town, would-be passengers wait for an hour or more for a ride. Alberto, a driver, tells of his frustration that after 30 years of work he must still lodge in the house of his sister. Many Cubans still praise their free health and education services. But they add that these are of deteriorating quality. Schools have been hit by the loss of teachers to tourism jobs (and by a decision to halve class sizes to 15). Their replacements are ill-trained student teachers. Hospital buildings are dilapidated, while medicine and equipment are often in short supply. Next to the shabby maternity hospital in Havana stands a trim, freshly painted eye hospital—used mainly for Latin American patients flown in by Venezuela for cataract operations. This is a propaganda success for Mr Castro and Mr Chávez, but breeds resentment among Cubans. Raúl and the renewal of reform Since taking over the reins, Raúl Castro has given signs that he understands many of these frustrations. But Raúl is no liberal democrat. He is a lifelong Communist: he was in the Communist Youth when Fidel was still just a leftist nationalist. Immediately after the revolution, his brother charged him with forging a new army, which he has run ever since. It is the country's most efficient institution. Raúl differs in temperament from Fidel. He keeps regular hours, is a tidy administrator and is more at home in small gatherings than giving long public speeches. Where Fidel is an obsessive micro-manager, Raúl is a delegator. He is also more pragmatic. Last July he launched an open debate on the shortcomings of Cuba's economy, saying that it needed “structural and conceptual changes”. So far more has been said than done. But the government has quietly turned more state land over to family farming and paid off a debt to dairy farmers. It is also spending more money on transport—buying more Chinese buses—and on doing up hospitals. Provincial officials have been given more autonomy. The police inflict less harassment on the private taxi drivers who take tourists around in 1950s American cars. The government has decreed that workers in foreign companies must pay tax on their unofficial bonuses—a way of accepting that companies should be free to vary pay according to performance. With Raúl (or Mr Lage) installed in the presidency, change may accelerate—but only a bit. An economist involved in the reforms of the mid-1990s expects their resumption, but at a slower pace. “I think there will be a move towards greater decentralisation and the use of market mechanisms,” he says. Foreign investment and small business will be encouraged again. It is hard to discern clear factions within the regime. But there are powerful groups that benefit from the status quo. And some officials are seen as orthodox Marxists. Not all of these are elderly: they include Felipe Pérez Roque, the foreign minister, a protégé of Fidel. Even reformers worry that change will intensify inequality and create instability. Under Fidel Castro political logic has always trumped economic logic: three times since the 1960s he has reversed more pragmatic, decentralising policies and reimposed central control, as Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Pérez-López, two Cuban-American economists have pointed out. Although he is retiring as president, Fidel Castro remains first secretary of the Communist Party. If a long-overdue party congress is held this year, that may be another harbinger of reform. But Fidel is still likely to exercise a veto power behind the scenes. He plans to continue writing regular newspaper columns. “I am not saying goodbye to you. I want only to fight on as a soldier of ideas,” his statement said. Raúl is not going to do anything that might embarrass his brother, says a foreign academic in Havana. Nevertheless, two things are now acting as motors of change. One is a realisation that Venezuelan aid may not last forever—especially following the defeat last December of a constitutional referendum that would have allowed Mr Chávez to stay in office indefinitely. Without his payments for Cuban doctors (classed as a service export), the balance of payments would be under unbearable strain (see chart 2). The island spent $1.6 billion on food imports last year, and imports much of its fuel. Having repeatedly defaulted on its foreign debt, its credit is restricted. The second motor of change, recognises the economist, is “popular discontent”. Whatever else Cubans might think of Fidel Castro, many respect and fear him as the man who led the revolution and successfully defied the United States. A successor regime cannot count on those advantages. Already there have been small signs of defiance. Officials explaining the decree taxing bonuses were greeted with jeers and complaints. The revolution has lost the loyalty of young people. One youngster publicly questioned Ricardo Alarcón, the president of the National Assembly, as to why the recent election did not include candidates with different views. Parents of teenagers, having struggled through the Special Period, find it hard to offer their children any hope that things will improve. Since Raúl Castro took charge, there have been several, small signs of political relaxation. Writers and artists seem to have carved out a small niche of autonomy. When former officials associated with the Stalinist cultural crackdown of the 1970s surfaced in a television programme, Raúl Castro publicly apologised for the excesses of that period. “The Lives of Others”, a film about the Stasi secret police in Communist East Germany, received several packed screenings at the Havana Film Festival last year. (Havana wags quickly adapted its Spanish title La Vida de Los Otros to La Vida de Nosotros or “Our Lives”.) One or two Cuban bloggers have survived without being molested. The government announced in December that it would sign the United Nations covenants on human rights. And it has begun a formal dialogue about human rights with Spain, its main European trading partner. On February 15th, it freed four of the prisoners arrested in the 2003 crackdown. But human-rights groups say there are still more than 200 political prisoners in Cuban jails. Grumbling about the economy, about corruption and bureaucracy is tolerated. Grumbling about politics is not. As Rodrigo says, his mother who lives in the United States can stand on a street corner and denounce Mr Bush but “if here we talk ill of Fidel we go to jail.” Cuba remains a police state. Asked for their political opinions, most Cubans will respond by rolling their eyes. It may be true, as officials assert, that Cubans care about everyday issues and not about democracy. But nobody can be sure of that. http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayst…ory_id=10727899
José Posté 22 février 2008 Signaler Posté 22 février 2008 Les consignes de CNN pour traiter Castro avec du velours : From: Flexner, Allison Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2008 7:46 AM To: *CNN Superdesk (TBS) Cc: Neill, Morgan; Darlington, Shasta Subject: Castro guidance Some points on Castro – for adding to our anchor reads/reporting: * Please say in our reporting that Castro stepped down in a letter he wrote to Granma (the communist party daily), as opposed to in a letter attributed to Fidel Castro. We have no reason to doubt he wrote his resignation letter, he has penned numerous articles over the past year and a half. * Please note Fidel did bring social reforms to Cuba – namely free education and universal health care, and racial integration. in addition to being criticized for oppressing human rights and freedom of speech. * Also the Cuban government blames a lot of Cuba’s economic problems on the US embargo, and while that has caused some difficulties, (far less so than the collapse of the Soviet Union) the bulk of Cuba’s economic problems are due to Cuba’s failed economic polices. Some analysts would say the US embargo was a benefit to Castro politically – something to blame problems on, by what the Cubans call “the imperialist,” meddling in their affairs. * While despised by some, he is seen as a revolutionary hero, especially with leftist in Latin America, for standing up to the United States. Any questions, please call the international desk. Allison http://www.babalublog.com/archives/007467.html
h16 Posté 22 février 2008 Signaler Posté 22 février 2008 From: Flexner, Allison * While despised by some, he is seen as a revolutionary hero, especially with leftist in Latin America, for standing up to the United States. La France est donc un pays d'Amérique Latine. Surprenant, mais finalement, ça explique plein de choses.
john_ross Posté 22 février 2008 Signaler Posté 22 février 2008 La France est donc un pays d'Amérique Latine. Surprenant, mais finalement, ça explique plein de choses. Notamment les résultats de l'équipe nationale de football depuis 1998
0100011 Posté 23 février 2008 Signaler Posté 23 février 2008 L'épidémie de Castro se termine aussi en France selon le réseau Sentinelle de l'INSERM.
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