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Armageddon économique ?


vincponcet

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Comparaison des pertes d'emploi des dernières récessions aux USA : http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/02/job-l…ing-recessions/

Trois récessions, c'est peu comme point de comparaison. Et puis il faudrait ajuster selon la population du moment, bref, mettre ça en pourcentage (de la population totale, ou active, ou dans le privé, quelque chose comme ça).

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Certes, mais les deux récessions prises (1990 et 2001) impliquent une population peu différente (ce n'est pas celle de 1930, p. ex). La comparaison en pourcentage laisserait probablement apparaître que les deux précédentes sont naines en comparaison de celle qui advient actuellement.

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http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206…&refer=home

The stimulus package the U.S. Congress is completing would raise the government’s commitment to solving the financial crisis to $9.7 trillion, enough to pay off more than 90 percent of the nation’s home mortgages.
The pledges, amounting to almost two-thirds of the value of everything produced in the U.S. last year, are intended to rescue the financial system after the credit markets seized up about 18 months ago. The promises are composed of about $1 trillion in stimulus packages, around $3 trillion in lending and spending and $5.7 trillion in agreements to provide aid.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206…&refer=home

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has voiced the opposite concern, noting that Japan in the 1990s and the U.S. in the 1930s snuffed out incipient recoveries by prematurely tightening credit. He has vowed not to repeat that mistake.

Tous les boss US sont d'accord pour imprimer… ils vont l'avoir leur hyper-inflation.

A ce niveau là, on devrait faire du lobbying pour que la BCE vende ses dollars.

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[…]

Tous les boss US sont d'accord pour imprimer… ils vont l'avoir leur hyper-inflation.

A ce niveau là, on devrait faire du lobbying pour que la BCE vende ses dollars.

Après avoir été vilipendées pendant si longtemps par les économistes anti-inflation, les méthodes de Gideon Bono, le Directeur de la Banque Centrale du Zimbabwé, vont faire école. Elles sont d'une simplicité biblique: il suffit d'ajouter chaque semaine un zéro à chaque dénomination de billet de banque. Lorsqu'il n'y a plus de place (faisons l'hypothèse que ce soit au bout de 25 zéros), on supprime tous les zéros et on échange tous les billets en circulation contre les nouveaux billets au taux de 10^25 pour 1. Simple, efficace, cette méthode a permis à Mugabe de rester au pouvoir pendant presque 40 ans. Merci qui? Merci Gideon Bono!

http://www.dailyreckoning.com/here-come-the-zeros/

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http://www.boursorama.com/infos/actualites…ca9207a1514dfe1

Les ventes de voitures neuves en Europe s'écroulent de 27% en janvier

Les ventes de voitures neuves en Europe se sont effondrées de 27% en janvier sur un an, avec environ 355.000 unités vendues en moins, selon des chiffres provisoires publiés vendredi par l'Association des constructeurs automobiles européens (ACEA).

Les nouvelles immatriculations ont ainsi reculé pour le neuvième mois consécutif. Le mois de janvier, avec ses 958.517 unités vendues au total, affiche sa plus mauvaise performance en deux décennies.

Ces statistiques portent sur 28 pays: 25 Etats membres de l'Union européenne, Chypre et Malte n'étant pas inclus, plus les trois pays de l'AELE (Islande, Norvège et Suisse).

Et évidemment :

Tous les grands marchés automobiles, à l'exception de la France, affichent des chutes à deux chiffres en janvier par rapport au même mois de 2008.

Ben tiens…

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Ca pue de plus en plus fort :

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbys…overnments.html

European banks' toxic debts risk overwhelming EU governments

The toxic debts of European banks risk overwhelming a number of EU governments and may pose a “systemic” danger to the broader EU banking system, according a confidential memo prepared by the European Commission.

“Estimates of total expected asset write-downs suggest that the budgetary costs of asset relief could be very large both in absolute terms and relative to GDP in member states,” said the document, prepared for a closed-door meeting of EU finance ministers.

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A prendre avec des pincettes :

http://lacrisepourlesnuls.blogspot.com/200…-en-danger.html

http://www.blacklistednews.com/?news_id=3285

It is not surprising that European Union finance ministers looked ashen faced in Brussels on Tuesday.

The breakfast meeting discussed how EU governments should deal with, in other words pay for, the "toxic" banking assets that triggered the economic crisis.

The figures, contained in a secret European Commission paper, are startling. The dodgy financial packages are estimated to total £16.3 trillion in banks across the EU.

The "impaired assets" may amount to an astonishing 44 per cent of EU bank balance sheets. It is a deep ditch the bankers, regulators and their friends in government have dug us into.

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Ca fait combien de temps que le CAC est dans le range 2800-3200? Ce n'est jamais bon, les siutations d'équilibre n'existent pas. Tous le monde est aux aguets et attend de sentir une tendance. Tout ce que j'en pense c'est qu'on se préprare des mouvement violents. A la hausse ou à la baisse? Là est la question.

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A la hausse, bien sûr : toutes les nouvelles sont super-bonnes, le moral est d'enfer, les analystes haussiers, les ventes décollent, les CA sont obèses et les profits obscènes.

Tsk tsk tsk :icon_up: ; quand ça va tomber, ça va faire boum -10% et ce sera terrible.

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Le Guardian vient de publier la lettre ouverte de Keynes envoyée à Roosevelt en 1933. Le journal l'a intitulée, très à propos, "Mr President: spend, spend, spend".

Dear Mr President,

You have made yourself the trustee for those in every country who seek to mend the evils of our condition by reasoned experiment within the framework of the existing social system. If you fail, rational change will be gravely prejudiced throughout the world, leaving orthodoxy and revolution to fight it out. But if you succeed, new and bolder methods will be tried everywhere, and we may date the first chapter of a new economic era from your accession to office. This is a sufficient reason why I should venture to lay my reflections before you, though under the disadvantages of distance and partial knowledge.

At the moment your sympathisers in England are nervous and sometimes despondent. We wonder whether the order of different urgencies is rightly understood, whether there is a confusion of aim, and whether some of the advice you get is not crack-brained and queer. If we are disconcerted when we defend you, this may be partly due to the influence of our environment in London. For almost everyone here has a wildly distorted view of what is happening in the United States. The average City man believes that you are engaged on a hare-brained expedition in face of competent advice, that the best hope lies in your ridding yourself of your present advisers to return to the old ways, and that otherwise the United States is heading for some ghastly breakdown. That is what they say they smell. There is a recrudescence of wise head-waging by those who believe that the nose is a nobler organ than the brain. London is convinced that we only have to sit back and wait, in order to see what we shall see. May I crave your attention, whilst I put my own view?

You are engaged on a double task, recovery and reform - recovery from the slump and the passage of those business and social reforms which are long overdue. For the first, speed and quick results are essential. The second may be urgent too; but haste will be injurious, and wisdom of long-range purpose is more necessary than immediate achievement. It will be through raising high the prestige of your administration by success in short-range recovery, that you will have the driving force to accomplish long-range reform. On the other hand, even wise and necessary reform may, in some respects, impede and complicate recovery. For it will upset the confidence of the business world and weaken their existing motives to action, before you have had time to put other motives in their place. It may over-task your bureaucratic machine, which the traditional individualism of the United States and the old "spoils system" have left none too strong. And it will confuse the thought and aim of yourself and your administration by giving you too much to think about all at once.

My second reflection relates to the technique of recovery itself. The object of recovery is to increase the national output and put more men to work. In the economic system of the modern world, output is primarily produced for sale; and the volume of output depends on the amount of purchasing power, compared with the prime cost of production, which is expected to come on the market. Broadly speaking, therefore, and increase of output depends on the amount of purchasing power, compared with the prime cost of production, which is expected to come on the market. Broadly speaking, therefore, an increase of output cannot occur unless by the operation of one or other of three factors. Individuals must be induced to spend more out of their existing incomes; or the business world must be induced, either by increased confidence in the prospects or by a lower rate of interest, to create additional current incomes in the hands of their employees, which is what happens when either the working or the fixed capital of the country is being increased; or public authority must be called in aid to create additional current incomes through the expenditure of borrowed or printed money. In bad times the first factor cannot be expected to work on a sufficient scale. The second factor will come in as the second wave of attack on the slump after the tide has been turned by the expenditures of public authority. It is, therefore, only from the third factor that we can expect the initial major impulse.

Now there are indications that two technical fallacies may have affected the policy of your administration. The first relates to the part played in recovery by rising prices. Rising prices are to be welcomed because they are usually a symptom of rising output and employment. When more purchasing power is spent, one expects rising output at rising prices. Since there cannot be rising output without rising prices, it is essential to ensure that the recovery shall not be held back by the insufficiency of the supply of money to support the increased monetary turn-over. But there is much less to be said in favour of rising prices, if they are brought about at the expense of rising output. Some debtors may be helped, but the national recovery as a whole will be retarded. Thus rising prices caused by deliberately increasing prime costs or by restricting output have a vastly inferior value to rising prices which are the natural result of an increase in the nation's purchasing power.

The set-back which American recovery experienced this autumn was the predictable consequence of the failure of your administration to organise any material increase in new loan expenditure during your first six months of office. The position six months hence will entirely depend on whether you have been laying the foundations for larger expenditures in the near future.

I am not surprised that so little has been spent up-to-date. Our own experience has shown how difficult it is to improvise useful loan-expenditures at short notice. There are many obstacle to be patiently overcome, if waste, inefficiency and corruption are to be avoided. There are many factors, which I need not stop to enumerate, which render especially difficult in the United States the rapid improvisation of a vast programme of public works. But the risks of less speed must be weighed against those of more haste.

The other set of fallacies, of which I fear the influence, arises out of a crude economic doctrine commonly known as the quantity theory of money. Rising output and rising incomes will suffer a set-back sooner or later if the quantity of money is rigidly fixed. Some people seem to infer from this that output and income can be raised by increasing the quantity of money. But this is like trying to get fat by buying a larger belt. In the United States to-day your belt is plenty big enough for your belly. It is a most misleading thing to stress the quantity of money, which is only a limiting factor, rather than the volume of expenditure, which is the operative factor.

It is an even more foolish application of the same ideas to believe that there is a mathematical relation between the price of gold and the prices of other things. It is true that the value of the dollar in terms of foreign currencies will affect the prices of those goods which enter into international trade. In so far as an over-valuation of the dollar was impeding the freedom of domestic price-raising policies or disturbing the balance of payments with foreign countries, it was advisable to depreciate it. But exchange depreciation should follow the success of your domestic price-raising policy as its natural consequence, and should not be allowed to disturb the whole world by preceding its justification at an entirely arbitrary pace. This is another example of trying to put on flesh by letting out the belt.

These criticisms do not mean that I have weakened in my advocacy of a managed currency or in preferring stable prices to stable exchanges. The currency and exchange policy of a country should be entirely subservient to the aim of raising output and employment to the right level. But the recent gyrations of the dollar have looked to me more like a gold standard on the booze than the ideal managed currency of my dreams.

You may be feeling by now, Mr President, that my criticism is more obvious than my sympathy. Yet truly that is not so. You remain for me the ruler whose general outlook and attitude to the tasks of government are the most sympathetic in the world. You are the only one who sees the necessity of a profound change of methods and is attempting it without intolerance, tyranny or destruction. You are feeling your way by trial and error, and are felt to be, as you should be, entirely uncommitted in your own person to the details of a particular technique. In my country, as in your own, your position remains singularly untouched by criticism of this or the other detail. Our hope and our faith are based on broader considerations.

If you were to ask me what I would suggest in concrete terms for the immediate future, I would reply thus.

In the field of domestic policy, I put in the forefront, for the reasons given above, a large volume of loan-expenditures under government auspices. It is beyond my province to choose particular objects of expenditure. But preference should be given to those which can be made to mature quickly on a large scale, as for example the rehabilitation of the physical condition of the railroads. The object is to start the ball rolling. The United States is ready to roll towards prosperity, if a good hard shove can be given in the next six months.

I put in the second place the maintenance of cheap and abundant credit and in particular the reduction of the long-term rates of interest. The turn of the tide in great Britain is largely attributable to the reduction in the long-term rate of interest which ensued on the success of the conversion of the War Loan. This was deliberately engineered by means of the open-market policy of the Bank of England. I see no reason why you should not reduce the rate of interest on your long-term government bonds to 2.5% or less with favourable repercussions on the whole bond market, if only the Federal Reserve System would replace its present holdings of short-dated Treasury issues by purchasing long-dated issues in exchange. Such a policy might become effective in the course of a few months, and I attach great importance to it.

With these adaptations or enlargements of your existing policies, I should expect a successful outcome with great confidence. How much that would mean, not only to the material prosperity of the United States and the whole World, but in comfort to men's minds through a restoration of their faith in the wisdom and the power of government!

With great respect,

Your obedient servant

JM Keynes

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/ci…ynes-us-advice#

Bref, cette lettre illustre le caractère erronée des politiques keynésiennes que veulent appliquer aujourd'hui les États, mais sans l'excuse de l'ignorance.

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http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/2009/02/…an_10-year.html

German 10-Year Bond Auction Fails for Second Time

A German sovereign bond auction failed yesterday amid growing danger signs for governments as they attempt to raise record amounts of debt to pay for fiscal stimulus packages and bank bail-outs, writes David Oakley .

It was the second successive failure this year of a 10-year Bund auction - usually one of the most sought-after - as demand fell 20 per cent short of the €6bn (£5.4bn)the German government wanted.

Les commentaires sont intéressants (noter les yields sur les émissions grecques).

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Toujours au chapitre "Informations Diverses, Armageddon & Petits Fours", on trouve le graphique suivant :

cdsratingfev2009ma1.th.jpg

Noter la position de l'Islande : 1000, et celle des autres pays, Irlande, Grèce & Italie, juste en dessous. Weepee.

Et enfin, Michelin. Evidemment, avec l'effondrement des ventes de voitures et camions, il fallait s'attendre à quelques toussotements :

http://www.lemonde.fr/la-crise-financiere/…47_1101386.html

Michelin fait face à un effondrement inédit du marché du pneumatique

Début 2008, l'un des grands fabricants mondiaux d'engins de chantiers commandait encore à Michelin 6000 pneus par mois. Aujourd'hui, il n'en achète plus que 50. Cet exemple illustre la chute brutale de l'activité du numéro un mondial du pneumatique. "Cet automne, la baisse de l'activité a dépassé tout ce que nous avions imaginé", raconte Michel Rollier, cogérant de Michelin. Le groupe a annoncé, vendredi 13 février, une baisse spectaculaire de 53,8 % de son bénéfice net à 357 millions d'euros, la marge opérationnelle tombant à 5,6 % du chiffre d'affaires, contre 9,8 % en 2007.

Les ventes, elles, ont reculé de 2,7 % en valeur, à 16,4 milliards d'euros, et de 2,9 % en volume. Un chiffre en trompe-l'œil, car la bonne tenue de l'activité en début d'année cache un véritable affaissement des affaires au quatrième trimestre. Les ventes de pneus poids lourds se sont effondrées de 20 %, tandis que le marché des voitures de tourisme reculait de 15 %. "Du jamais-vu", avoue M. Rollier.

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Ont-ils précisé comment ils le financent? Augmentations d'impôts (hu hu)? Réduction des dépenses de l'Etat (rêve Nick)? Déficit et endettement, c'est à dire impôt sur le futur?

Well done liberals!

Avec un bon commentaire du leader liberals, comme quoi ce type de package allait a l'encontre des principes de logique economique et qu'il allait faire plonger le deficit public australien. Un sursaut d'intelligence dans ce monde de socialiste.

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http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/2009/02/…an_10-year.html

Les commentaires sont intéressants (noter les yields sur les émissions grecques).

et pourtant les taux baissent..ce qui voudrait dire que les états n'ont pas besoin de promettre un bon rendement pour attirer les investisseurs, non ?

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dec76790-fa00-11…0077b07658.html

Government bonds benefited from the shift away from equities. The yield on the 10-year US Treasury bond briefly climbed above 3 per cent at the start of the week as concerns about new supply continued to dominate sentiment. Late Friday, the yield was at 2.89 per cent, 9bp lower on the week.

Gains for UK and European bonds were even more dramatic. The yield on the 10-year Gilt ended the week 19bp lower at 3.55 per cent, after sliding 25bp on Wednesday – the biggest single-day drop for at least 10 years. The 10-year Bund yield fell by 28bp to 3.10 per cent.

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et pourtant les taux baissent..ce qui voudrait dire que les états n'ont pas besoin de promettre un bon rendement pour attirer les investisseurs, non ?

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dec76790-fa00-11…0077b07658.html

Moui et non : ils ne baissent pas tous, ceux qui le font ne le font pas de façon uniforme. En zone euro, cela commence d'ailleurs à poser des problèmes (notamment à cause du spread d'un pays euro à l'autre).

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