La Chine

[Taisei Yokusankai]

Au sujet des "pouilleux" sans intérêt économique, c'est justement un bon point pour l'Inde, qu'elle développe une moyenne et haute bourgeoisie très importante. Ce qui est du plus grand intérêt économique pour les investisseurs.

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L'un des handicaps de l'Inde par rapport à la Chine est justement son fort taux d'analphabétisation.

[ULYSSE]

En fait ces deux pays sont tellement peuplés, et comprennent de si grandes disparités internes, que l'analyse qu'on peut en faire dépend des groupes de population qu'on considère ; et de la prospective qu'on fait de l'évolution des différents groupes de population, au niveau économique, social, culturel, politique, sécuritaire.

Un pays d'un milliard d'habitants peut développer une bourgeoisie de 100, 200 ou 400 millions d'habitants, ce qui représenterait une puissance énorme ; et compter par ailleurs 400 millions d'analphabètes (ce qui représente aussi une grande puissance, car un pays trop éduqué ne trouve plus de travailleurs pour certains emplois).

[melodius]

Tu vas pouvoir me défendre auprès des gaullistes, pour qui je suis un salaud d'atlantiste.

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Disons que tu es un "gaulliste économique". :icon_mrgreen:

[Chitah]

un pays trop éduqué ne trouve plus de travailleurs pour certains emplois

Ce n'est pas parce que 80% d'une génération a le bac qu'il n'y a plus de plombiers, c'est parce que les gens veulent un boulot de fonctionnaire dans un bureau.

[Taisei Yokusankai]

Un article sur Hu Jintao, soulignant l'attention qu'il porte aux paysans afin, entre autre, de minimiser les risques de problèmes sociaux.

Hu Jintao bad for intellectuals, good for peasants

By Paul Mooney

BEIJING - In the run-up to the transition to the fourth generation of Chinese leaders in 2002, intellectuals in Beijing were cautiously optimistic that Hu Jintao would be a force for reform. But they conceded that the man who was slated to be the country's top leader was virtually unknown.

That Hu remained a political enigma, despite more than two decades in top of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) positions, came as no surprise. In the oblique world of Chinese politics, heirs apparent have traditionally had to be extremely cautious. Hu had been so careful, in fact, that liberal intellectuals had dubbed him sunzi, or "grandson", a synonym for "yes man".

Hu is now supreme leader - CCP chairman, national president and head of the party's powerful Central Military Commission. His predecessor, Jiang Zemin, stepped down from the commission last September, leaving Hu with the reins of power.

During the first few months of Hu at the helm there were indeed signs of a flowering of intellectual life, as emboldened Chinese media went on the offensive. Unfortunately, this Beijing spring - a reference to the flowering in the late 1970s - was short-lived. Since the spring of 2003, freedom of expression has been on the ropes in China. Newspapers have been shut down, editors, journalists and Internet dissidents have been imprisoned, lawyers have had their licenses temporarily revoked, and intellectuals have come under attack.

Chinese intellectuals now openly admit they misread China's new helmsman as Hu the reformer. In fact, they say the political situation is the worst in years. Some even yearn for the good old days under former honcho Jiang Zemin.

Xu Youyu, a political philosopher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), said intellectuals are "surprised and disgusted" with Hu's actions. "It's very strange," Xu told Asia Times Online. "When we were in the Jiang Zemin period, we thought we were in the worst situation and that any change would be better. But the policies of Hu Jintao are much worse than that of Jiang."

"In 2003, like other intellectuals, I had some high expectations for Hu," said Wang Yi, an outspoken law professor at Chengdu University in Sichuan province, southwestern China. "But I didn't understand him - none of us did." Wen said he is now "completely disappointed" in Hu, who he said "is ideologically more conservative than Jiang Zemin".

Some say that Hu hasn't changed, and that he has always been a committed Marxist. Like other top CCP leaders, he studied engineering at the prestigious Qinghua University, known in the past for maintaining its staunch political conservatism and turning out graduates who were youhong, youzhuan, or both red and expert. From 1982-85 he served as the head of the Communist Youth League, where he developed the core of his support.

"From the day Hu Jintao came up I said, 'Don't look for him to become China's Gorbachev,'" said Jiang Wenran, associate professor of political science at the University of Alberta in Canada. Jiang agrees that Hu has proved himself tough in shutting down dissent, but he argues that things were not any better under Jiang Zemin. "It was not all that free then," he told Asia Times Online, "and there were still limits on how much you could say."

More important, Jiang said Hu is moving forward in solving the problems that are posing the biggest threat to China. "The disparity between rich and poor is so wide and there is so much social unrest, they have to put this at the top of their agenda," he said. "It's about regime survival."

Jing Huang, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, said all new Chinese leaders have to prove their mettle, and that Hu's actions are a sign that he still does not feel secure at the top. "You have to learn from history," said Huang. "When Jiang Zemin came to power in 1989, he was also labeled a hardliner."

Huang said that the first step is for Hu to consolidate his own position. "He has to be a dictator first to get the power he needs to do things," said Huang. "This is what both Deng [Xiaoping] and Jiang [Zemin] did."

Hu has moved fast to secure his power and lay the foundation for the 17th Party Congress in 2007, when he'll finally have the personal authority to set the agenda for both the party and the nation. He carried out a major reshuffle of local and government officials in 2004, with many of the newly elevated leaders coming from the provincial and central ranks of Hu's power base - the Communist Party Youth League. In a paper on new provincial chiefs, Cheng Li, a professor at Hamilton College in New York state, pointed out that of 15 newly appointed provincial leaders, none were princelings or the offspring of high-ranking official families, but rather people who had worked their way up the CCP ladder from less developed inland provinces, and who share Hu's concern for social equality.

In January, Hu launched an 18-month campaign to "maintain the advanced nature of Chinese Communist Party members", which will allow him to put some of his own people into positions of power. The campaign has people in ministries, factories and schools across China sitting down for regular study and self-criticism sessions. In a report in the China Leadership Monitor, Boston University Professor Joseph Fewsmith said that while party members are cynical about such campaigns, they can nevertheless "give the party center new information about lower-level party cadres and provide a basis for reshuffling careers".

Jing Huang of the Brookings Institute said the campaign of reshuffling, study and self-criticism is aimed at cementing Hu's position at the top of the party. "This is really to show who the leader is," he said. "If you refuse to recognize the big boss, you're out. It's a loyalty campaign."

With the resignation of Jiang Zemin as chairman of the Central Military Commission (his last state post, less powerful than his former party position) at the National People's Congress (NPC) this week, Huang says that Jiang no longer wields much influence. The real challenge, he says, comes from the localities. "Hu has to convince second-tier leaders that he's the real boss," Huang told Asia Times Online. "The challenge to Hu does not come from Jiang Zemin, but from the people below him." He gives Hu six months to a year to secure his position at the top of the CCP, after which he predicts that the Chinese leader will be better able to promote his own set of reforms.

Ma Ling, the author of an unauthorized biography of Hu, accuses intellectuals of being naive and misunderstanding Hu. The former Ta Kung Po (considered the voice of the Beijing leadership in Hong Kong) reporter remains convinced that the Chinese leader is bent on reform. "He wants to change, but he has to do this in accordance with China's reality and conditions," Ma said. "Whenever you touch politics, you have to be extremely careful and not move too fast - the ramifications can be big." Ma expects Hu to reveal his real self at the 17th Party Congress.

At the annual session of the NPC, which opened last Saturday, a major theme has been Hu's call for the building of a "harmonious society", a campaign that focuses on the need to reduce social disparities and move away from the policies of the previous leadership that emphasized runaway growth in coastal areas at the expense of less developed inland areas. And this may be more than just a propaganda ploy. Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao have promised to reduce the gap in rural areas, where salaries are less than a third of urban incomes, by lowering hefty fees piled on farmers, scrapping rural taxes, boosting peasant incomes and offering assistance to grain-producing areas. The first three quarters of 2004 saw increases in rural incomes.

Scholars, however, are split on how things will turn out.

When asked whether Hu could be a reformer in a Leninist straightjacket, Xu, the political philosopher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, shook his head firmly and said, "No, no, not at all." He continued, "I'm very pessimistic. I'm convinced that the harsh policies are not temporary. Hu is following his real ideals."

"When Hu is more stable, he may relax the controls a bit," said Jiao Guobiao, an outspoken professor of journalism at Beijing University and critic of the government. "If China's economy improves, living standards will rise and society will become more stable, giving democracy more room to develop."

It's still not certain, however, that Hu will succeed. For one thing, the problems facing the CCP are huge. There is a huge gap between rich and poor, corruption is still massive, and protests are occurring at a rate of about 160 a day, despite party attempts to deal with social disparities and corruption.

More important, Hu does not see his mandate as bringing an end to the Chinese Communist Party dictatorship - his goal is to make it stronger. As a result, the move toward reform can only go so far.

Paul Mooney is a veteran foreign correspondent based in Beijing.

[Taisei Yokusankai]

Les USA ne veulent pas que l'UE lève son embargo vers les armes envers la Chine, mais ils n'hésitent pas à vendre leur technologie nucléaire à Pékin. Au risque de s'en mordre les doigts.

Une fois de plus, je reprends un article de l'excellent Asia Times Online. (Je lie plutôt que de le copier / coller, car c'est fort long:

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GC11Ad05.html

[Ronnie Hayek]

Les USA ne veulent pas que l'UE lève son embargo vers les armes envers les USA,

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GC11Ad05.html

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Envers la Chine, non ?

[Taisei Yokusankai]

Envers la Chine, non ?

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Nom d'une pipe, ça ne va pas pour le moment. Merci, j'ai rectifié.

[Taisei Yokusankai]

Tiens, pour la deuxième année de suite, l'Inde est le pays qui bénéficie des prêts Japonais les plus importants.

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/newse/20050313wo02.htm

India is still grappling with serious poverty despite the progress it has made in the information technology industry. Government sources said India was expected to remain Japan's largest yen loan recipient in the future because its economic development would contribute to the stability of Asia as a whole.

Indonesia is expected to follow India, receiving about 114.8 billion yen, and Turkey would rank third with 98.7 billion yen.

It was reported last month that China, which had been the top Japanese yen loan recipient from fiscal 1999 to fiscal 2002, would fall to fifth place after Vietnam.

[Chitah]

Un article très intéressant sur le capital risque en Chine (Venture Capital en anglais)

Voici des commentaires pour que les chiffres donnés ne soient pas trop abstraits:

- en gros, en France, 300 à 500 millions d'euros sont investis chaque année dans le VC, environ 200 à 400 entreprises sont ainsi financées.

- la France représente 15% du marché européen dans ce domaine, en gros la taille totale du marché européen doit être dans les 4 ou 5 milliards d'euros, là où nos amis américains en sont à 21 milliards environ.

- c'est bien gentil d'avoir des capital-risqueurs prêt à déverser de l'argent, mais c'est un jour pour sortir du capital (exit) et les deux méthodes pour cela sont simples, il n'en existe que 2 (je simplifie, hein): cotation en Bourse ou vente à un industriel de l'entreprise. Pour la premiere méthode, c'est trop compliqué de coter une boite à* Shangai, et pour ce qui concerne les industriels chinois, il n'y en a pas des masses.

Ce qui m'inquiete, ce sont donc les débouchés.

Conclusion:

- le marché chinois du VC est un petit peu plus gros que celui de la France, qui est le troisieme d'Europe, l'Europe représentant au grand max un quart du marché mondial.

- cela ressemble beaucoup à la France, pays communiste définanciarisé: lisez le texte vous verrez que plusieurs acteurs du VC en Chine sont des industriels type Lenovo, en France, ça a été pareil à un moment: Alcatel Ventures, Air Liquide Ventures, Europ@Web (groupe Suez avec B.Arnault) etc….

China’s VC growth

The year of the monkey was great for venture capital in China, but Shanghai is still a long way from Silicon Valley.

February 22, 2005

BEIJING – Venture capitalists stormed into China in 2004, investing $1.27 billion, almost 29 percent more than the previous year, according to Zero2IPO, a Beijing-based VC research firm.

Yet most of the capital is foreign, and most of the investments were driven by market opportunity, not new technology. Though China’s fabled 1.3 billion consumers may hold huge potential returns for both local and distant VCs, the IT venture market there still has some growing up to do.

Last year, venture capital firms funded 253 mainland or mainland-related enterprises, according to Zero2IPO, but most of that money—over $800 million of the $1.27 billion invested in the year—came from foreign-based VCs.

The most active VC in the country, Softbank Asia Infrastructure Fund, is based in Hong Kong, but San Jose, California-based Cisco Systems is the sole limited partner in the $404-million fund. Other major market players include Carlyle Asia Venture Partners, the local arm of the U.S. private equity behemoth, which opened an office last summer in Beijing and will open another this year in Shanghai, and IDG Technology Venture Investment, one of the first American firms to enter China, with more than $100 million invested since 1992.

Many inexperienced Chinese VCs, most of which are still on their first or second funds, have invested in dogs and watched their American counterparts hit it big.

“Domestic VCs are still below the waterline,” said Gavin Ni, president and CEO of Zero2IPO. “It’s a hard time for them. They made a lot of investments over the last five years, and for some, only 10 percent of their portfolio companies have seen an exit.”

Contrast that with Doll Capital Management in Menlo Park, California. Its Shanghai-based Internet job site, 51job, bettered its Nasdaq IPO offering price by 271 percent in barely two months by the end of 2004.

Several local VCs, including New Margin Venture Capital in Shanghai and Lenovo sister company Legend Capital, have made use of access to capital and dealflow, but domestic firms are more likely to invest in later-stage rounds. When it comes time to exit, most Chinese VCs are hampered by a tough local regulatory framework for IPOs and lack the resources to shepherd companies into U.S. public markets.

On the other hand, the U.S. VCs pouring money into Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen are often deficient in language skills and connections outside the big cities. Granite Global Ventures, headquartered in Menlo Park but with a Shanghai office, is one of a small number of foreign firms scouring the Chinese eastern seaboard for deals.

Because of the low cost of parts and labor in China, semiconductor companies were a hot IPO last year. But many of the most prominent startups and recent IPOs in China are consumer-focused companies—job sites like 51job or the Shanghai-based online gaming operator Shanda Interactive. VCs are funding media and wireless value-added services companies. They’re interested in “any sector that is consumer-driven with a high prospect of penetrating the mass market,” as Chester Hoang, associate director of private equity and VC at Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, put it.

This consumer focus elicits echoes of the U.S. dot-com boom: all eyeballs, no technology.

“The biggest problem is that VC in China is not governed by technological innovation,” said Mr. Ni. “In China, the market is the driving force. In the future, China needs to find companies with their own intellectual property. Shanda is not about technology. It’s about the consumer market.”

This lack of market breadth is one reason China’s total VC market pales to the U.S. figure of almost $21 billion in 2004, according to PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Thomson Venture Economics, and the National Venture Capital Association. Still, China had the largest IPO on the Nasdaq last year—Semiconductor Manufacturing International—and Nasdaq-bound startups like Focus Media, funded by Draper Fisher Jurvetson and 3i, are experiencing huge jumps in valuation between rounds.

What’s more, serial entrepreneurs, a sure sign of a mature market, are already starting to appear. Zhou Yunfan and Nick Yang created community web site ChinaRen, which merged into Sohu in 2000, then founded mobile entertainment company KongZhong, which IPO’d on the Nasdaq last year. The sooner another duo like Mr. Yunfan and Mr. Yang pops up, the faster the Chinese market will reach its potential.

[Chitah]

L'administration américaine avait examiné dans le détail cette vente, puisque les ordinateurs sont considérés comme une activité industrielle "stratégique".

Lenovo boucle le rachat de l'IBM PC et devient numéro un

Avec le rachat de la division PC d'IBM, le chinois Lenovo devient le premier fabricant mondial d'ordinateurs PC

L'acquisition de la division PC d'IBM est bouclée: pour 1,25 milliard de dollars, le groupe chinois Lenovo bouleverse le classement mondial du secteur.

Ayant obtenu l'aval de l'administration américaine, au prix de la séparation physique des activités des deux groupes aux Etats-Unis, Lenovo devient le premier fabricant mondial de PC.

Il devance désormais Dell, qui passe à la deuxième place, et HP à la troisième. Idem sur le marché asiatique (Asie-Pacifique, hors Japon), où HP n'aura occupé la première place que le temps de la publication du rapport trimestriel d'IDC.

On aurait pu craindre que le marché boursier ne boude la valeur de l'industriel chinois, car le marché des PC semble s'orienter vers la saturation. Mais il n'en est rien ! Depuis le début de l'année, le titre Lenovo a progressé à la Bourse de Hong Kong d'un peu plus de 18%.

On ne devient pas numéro un mondial pour rien !

[Evildeus]

Si mes souvenirs sont bons, Lenovo n'est pas non plus dans une forme financière splendide.

[Chitah]

Stratégie pétrolière de la Chine (ici, si ce n'est pas précisé, les chiffres sont exprimés en millions de barils par jour):

La consommation de pétrole chinoise est passée de 4.7 à 7.1 entre 2000 et 2005, sachant que la production intérieure est passée de 3.2 à 3.6.

La Chine a donc besoin de pétrole, d'autant que la demande sera à 12.8 en 2025, ce qui nécessitera l'importation de 9.4 .

Comment va faire l'Etat chinois:

- prendre pied sur de nouveaux territoires: CNPC a signé 20 contrats d'exploitation, et CPCC 21 nouvaux. Trois zones sont définies comme stratégiques: Asie centrale (Kazhakstan et Azerbaidjan) et la Russie, le Moyen Orient (Syrie, Iran), Afrique (Algérie Soudan mais aussi l'Angola qui relance sa production), l'Amérique LAtine (cVenezuela, Perou, Equator)

- économiser l'energie petroliere: pour crééer le même niveau de richesse, mettons un milliard d'euros, la Chine consomme 5 fois plus de pétrole que l'Europe, et 9 fois plus que le Japon: d'où des politiques puliques dans ce domaine

- stocker du pétrole, actuellement 90 jours de consommation sont stockés, le probleme étant que le prix actuel du baril ne les incite pas à augmenter leurs réserves!