Jump to content

F. mas

Membre Actif
  • Content Count

    11087
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    19

Everything posted by F. mas

  1. Je m'intéresse assez sérieusement au sujet depuis quelques mois (et j'en parlerai plus en détails) et je remarque une chose : il y a quelques années, bcp de voix en Occident (ama sous influence de la propagande de Pékin) célébrait le capitalisme autoritaire de Pékin comme un nouveau modèle émergent face à une démocratie libérale occidentale qui avait du plomb dans l'aile. Le discours tenu était en général le suivant : les réformes dans le sillage de Deng Xiaoping ont acté la propriété privée dans le cadre de ses réformes agraires+la bureaucratie s'est modernisée (elle accompagne la modernisation du pays et sa croissance économique de ouf) (cf les 4 modernisations). Aujourd'hui, on découvre petit à petit que ce modèle n'en est pas un, que c'est un état autoritaire/totalitaire qui fonde sa légitimité sur une croissance de rattrapage qui, en ralentissant, risque d'ébranler un peu la nomenklatura qui gouverne le pays, et que cette croissance/innovation est essentiellement due à l'ouverture du pays à la mondialisation liée à l'adhésion du pays à l'OMC en 2001. Xi est en train d'opérer une marche arrière toute vers le maoisme, parce qu'il voit ça, et qu'il ne veut pas que la Chine finisse comme l'URSS (la hantise du PCC). Du coup coup de booste en matière de grands travaux (routes de la soie) et politique impérialiste classique. La Chine, c'est la dystopie coco du 21e siècle, mais une certaine gauche comme certains secteurs business ne le voient pas encore, par intérêt et par manque de culture éco basique aussi.
  2. Ce qui menace l'environnement, c'est surtout le socialisme : https://mises.org/wire/socialism-greatest-threat-environment Un article sérieux sur le sujet, qui intéressera nos lecteurs ! Un volontaire ?
  3. Evidemment que ce n'est pas une définition, et evidemment je ne me contente pas de ça. Mais croire qu'on peut l'encapsuler en une doctrine fixe est voué à l'échec. Sur le sujet du contour du libéralisme, je n'ai pas varié depuis des années, je partage l'analyse d'Anthony de Jasay, construite en réponse au postlibéralisme de J Gray, à savoir qu'il existe un libéralisme au sens large dont la porosité avec les autres idéologies concurrentes est bien connue, et un libéralisme au sens strict qu'il est possible de reconnaître en repérant certaines de ses bases. C'est ce qu'il dit dans ce livre, https://iea.org.uk/publications/research/choice-contract-consent-a-restatement-of-liberalism et qu'il a rappelé (en réduisant même le nombre de principes à 3/4) dans ses deux derniers livres. Edit c'est deux règles https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_09_3_7_dejasay.pdf
  4. C'est Caroline 'les hommes sont tous des violeurs en puissance' de Haas.
  5. Oui, c'est propre au vocabulaire politique européen. Pour ceux que ça intéresse, Michael Oakeshott a écrit un texte très intéressant sur cette confusion épistémologique de base dans un texte intitulé 'Talking politics' (republié dans Rationalism in politics and other essays).
  6. Je pense aussi que son vocabulaire est un vocabulaire politique et historique hérité de circonstances particulières (l'histoire européenne), et que les usages qu'on en fait varie en fonction des auteurs et des époques. En d'autres termes, il y a un lexique libéral commun, pas nécessairement de grammaire commune. Tel auteur parle de "justice", de "liberté", d'"égalité", mais ne les définit pas et ne articule pas au sein d'une théorie général comme le fait un autre. Sur un fil on parlait de JS Mill : de loin, il parle le même langage que Mises, Hayek ou Rawls et Brian Barry. Ils disent pourtant tous des choses très différentes. Ce que je dis ne vise pas à brouiller les cartes, c'est juste que je me dis qu'il faut faire attention quand on cherche à systémiser, c'est parfois déroutant.
  7. Le problème avec le libéralisme, c'est qu'il s'agit d'une sensibilité aux contours flous, ce qui explique aussi ses crises régulières. D'ailleurs je me demande (et je ne suis pas le seul), si ce n'est pas aussi la raison de sa permanence et de sa résilience. Pour John Gray par exemple, il est illusoire de trouver la bonne définition du libéralisme qui clôt le débat comme il est illusoire de vouloir mettre un point final à la philosophie, les deux sont en discussion permanente sur son contenu. Enfin je pense quand même qu'on peut isoler des éléments communs aux différentes formes de libéralisme, à défaut d'avoir une définition claire qui puisse les englober tous.
  8. Oui, c'est ce que je pense. Il y a comme une volonté d'intégrer le droit à la théorie économique pour tout faire tenir d'un seul corps qui peut aboutir à sa stylisation excessive.
  9. Sinon, j'ai lu Une contre-histoire d'internet de Felix Treguer (l'un des fondateurs de la Quadrature du net) https://livre.fnac.com/a13526748/Felix-Treguer-L-utopie-dechue C'est foucaldien, ce n'est pas mal et la mise en perspective historique est intéressante. Gros bémol, la narration gauchiste et contre le méchant néolibéralisme a tendance à accorder trop d'importance aux altermondialeux en particulier français dans le "moment utopique" de l'internet libre, et surtout à passer sous silence/à déformer les positions des libertariens US.
  10. Merci @Restless Quelqu'un pour une trad dans la journée de cet article sur la procédure d'empeachment contre Trump ? c'est de l'actu brûlante et j'aimerai programmer ça pour demain. https://reason.com/2019/09/24/nancy-pelosi-announces-trump-impeachment-inquiry-over-ukraine-scandal/
  11. J'aurais tendance à dire que le problème vient essentiellement de la domination de l'économie (c'est dans ce champ que le libéralisme a reçu ses lettres de noblesse ces 60 dernières années) plus que du droit, parce que le droit souvent proposé par les libéraux 'à système', c'est du droit concassé et passé par la case 'analyse économique du droit', voire law et institutions machin : le traitement ainsi proposé donne une sorte de sabir juridique globalisant compatible avec la discipline économique, et pas nécessairement l'inverse. Typiquement, il y a parfois des simplifications excessives quand on parle de l'efficacité 'libérale' de la common law (mon oeil) par exemple, ou des rapprochements entre droit et coutume (des fictions bien pratiques pour être intégrées dans un raisonnement éco, mais assez loin de la réalité du droit).
  12. Repris par les nationalistes? Je sens le débat aérien qui vient
  13. Parce qu'on gagnerait à argumenter sur le fond, mais bon, mettons que je n'ai rien dit.
  14. Les amis, le propos est sans doute critiquable, mais on peut faire mieux que des attaques ad personam... 😕
  15. Quelqu'un pourrait-il avoir l'amabilité de me traduire ce texte d'actu sur les élections en Israël ? 🙏 Don’t Expect New Directions in Israel’s Foreign Policy By Ellen Laipson It will be weeks, most likely, before the coalition-bargaining in Israel produces a new government. Neither Likud’s bloc nor the new Blue and White coalition achieved a 61-seat majority, so any government will require a coalition with smaller parties. Many pundits in Israel and beyond consider the early results a repudiation of Benjamin Netanyahu’s long tenure as Israeli prime minister. It may be too early to rule him out, given how hard the government formation process will be, but most Israeli political observers believe Bibi will be either on the opposition benches, or in prison, when the dust settles. This election, called when Netanyahu failed to form a government in May, revealed deep fissures between him and his party, and a general disapproval in the public at large with his behavior and the corruption charges pending against him. Secular conservatives in Israel also believe he had given too much power to the Orthodox parties over the years, undermining even a prospect for preserving a multicultural society that would accommodate the Arab minority and support an eventual settlement with the Palestinians. Should Benny Gantz, leader of the Resilience party and head of the Blue and White coalition, succeed in forming a new government, it would likely include Avigdor Lieberman’s conservative nationalist Ysrael Beitenu party, not the Orthodox allies who pulled Netanyahu’s government further and further to the right. Gantz campaigned on a message of healing Israeli society from the cleavages that Netanyahu exploited. He focused on domestic issues, pledging to save Israeli democracy from extreme polarization and promising an end to Netanyahu’s imperial style that led to deep concerns among Israel’s international friends about the credibility and integrity of Israel’s democratic institutions. So Gantz promises to not abuse power, and to return the Israeli style of government to the more egalitarian political culture of the past. His personal modesty and even his occasional gaffes on the campaign trail have endeared him to many Israelis, who have tired of Netanyahu’s excesses and alleged corruption and abuse of power. So what does this mean for Israeli foreign policy? Overall, a Gantz premiership might not differ from the recent past in many respects. Gantz, who served as army chief of staff, represents the national security professionals. He would continue to be very tough on Iran. In recent months, Israel has expanded its low-intensity conflict with Iran by targeting Iranian supply depots and other military facilities in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, with virtually no adverse repercussions. Gantz may share the view that Israel has to act on its own to establish deterrence against Iran, setting red lines with Iran’s revolutionary forces in ways that play to the strengths and capabilities of Israel’s armed forces. Gantz has not hinted that he would depart from current policy on Iran. On the Palestinians, Gantz has sometimes appeared to agonize over this existential issue, to avoid alienating the cynical Israeli electorate who have low expectations of peace. He is presumed to favor compromise and territorial concessions and has courted Israeli Arabs to support his coalition. But Palestinian leaders don’t see much difference between the two finalists, calling it a choice between Pepsi and Coke. Palestinians are also despondent about any serious prospect for peace talks, and Gantz’s avoidance of the issue during the campaign does not augur for any dramatic shift. Should the Trump administration finally roll out its “deal of the century,” however, Gantz as prime minister would have to navigate the turbulent waters between pleasing the White House and demonstrating a fresh approach to Palestinian rights and expectations of a path to statehood. It’s in relations with Washington where a more interesting divergence could take place under Gantz. The depth of the bond between Donald Trump and Bibi cannot be overstated. On Wednesday, Trump declared that the US was “with” Israel and not any particular leader, already hedging on the election results. But he and Bibi reinforced and validated each other’s instincts in unusual ways. During the campaign, Netanyahu trashed his country’s media, judiciary and fellow politicians in ways that were remarkably close to Trump’s approach, and Trump made more concessions to the Israeli right than any other US president, with no commitments to peace talks in exchange. It will be in Gantz’s interest to have a cordial and productive relationship with Washington. The most striking change that could occur is a restoration of a more bipartisan relationship between diverse American constituencies and Tel Aviv. Netanyahu politicized the relationship by identifying with the Republican party to an extent that worried historic friends of Israel. A more balanced and normal US-Israel bilateral relationship could be the most noteworthy international effect of a new lineup in Tel Aviv. Ellen Laipson, a former vice chair of the US’s National Intelligence Council, is currently director of the international security program at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University in Virginia. She is a former president and CEO of the Stimson Center in Washington.
  16. J'ai à la maison une testeuse occasionnelle de la cuisine de là-bas, et ce qu'elle me raconte me plonge d'effroi à chaque fois qu'elle revient de voyage. Au XXIe siècle ! Des horreurs mon bon monsieur, des horreurs.
  17. Je connais cette théorie.
  18. J'ai bien entamé le dernier Piketty.
  19. Quelqu'un pourrait-il avoir la gentillesse de me traduire ça rapidement ? Merci d'avance! 👇 The Attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq Refinery and the Realpolitik of Oil By Robin Mills As the fires still burn at Saudi Arabia’s giant Abqaiq oil processing plant, attention has turned to the immediate impact on oil prices. The missile or drone attack, blamed by the US on Iranian allies in either Yemen or more likely Iraq, has temporarily knocked out half of the kingdom’s oil processing capacity. But more important than the near-term effect is what the attack reveals about the outlook for the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The strike is the latest in a series against Saudi and UAE petroleum assets. But the previous incidents were more in the way of calibrated warnings: slight damage to four ships at the UAE port of Fujairah, drone attacks on the Saudi east-west pipeline in May and explosions on two tankers in the Gulf of Oman in June. Missiles from Houthi forces in Yemen have struck other non-oil facilities, such as airports. But the size, sophistication and target of this attack represents a major escalation, and the first really to shock world oil markets. Abqaiq is the largest single oil-processing facility in the world, with capacity to handle up to 7 million barrels per day – from the Abqaiq field itself, from Ghawar, the world’s largest conventional field, from Shaybah and from Qatif. (Total Saudi capacity is 12.5 million bpd.) Abqaiq is the starting point for the Petroline pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea coast, an alternative to the Gulf as an export route. A significant amount of Saudi gas production has also been knocked out by the strikes, which will lead the country to burn more oil – perhaps an additional 300,000 bpd – to meet electricity demand for summer air-conditioning. Along with attacks on three of the 300,000 bpd processing trains at the Khurais field, 5.7 million bpd of production has been cut. Energy Intelligence reports that Aramco hopes to soon bring 2.3 million bpd back, and add 250,000 bpd of output from the offshore fields, of which the three largest, Safaniya, Zuluf and Manifa, have a combined capacity of 3.025 million bpd. Aramco can also supply customers for a while from its large inventories, held at home and in locations such as Egypt, Rotterdam and Okinawa. Speculation initially raged as to the impact on oil prices – some suggesting gains of a few dollars, some $10-15 per barrel, others that prices could rise into triple digits with a lengthy outage. But if this attack had to come at all, it comes at a relatively benign moment. The OPEC+ deal means that Saudi, other Gulf and Russian spare capacity is high. US shale growth has been slipping, but the promise of higher prices would revive it. The International Energy Agency may well coordinate a release from strategic stocks held by its members, while now would be a good time for China to bring onshore some of the Iranian crude held in bonded storage. Traders have been worried more about demand and a possible recession than about supply. This is a far cry from 2008, when markets were very tight and there was supposed to be a geopolitical “risk premium” of $10 or more in oil prices, even though the Middle East political situation was less threatening than it is today. The worry should be more over the medium term than the short term. As the key node in the kingdom’s oil industry, Abqaiq was heavily guarded with multiple rings of defences, and with redundancy of key units and stockpiling of spares. It easily repelled an Al Qaeda vehicle attack in 2006. But this protection has proved ineffective against aerial attack. And it questions the wisdom of concentrating so much processing capacity in one place, however fortified. Though Abqaiq is the most important, there are dozens of other critical industrial targets across the kingdom: gas-oil separation facilities, export terminals, oil tankage, refineries, petrochemical plants, power stations and desalination plants that provide half the country’s drinking water. Hundreds of offshore oil and gas platforms are even more vulnerable, exposed also to submarine drones, particularly in the case of an overt clash with Iran. The UAE, Riyadh’s partner in the war against the Houthis, has similar vulnerabilities, perhaps more so given its dependence on international business, tourism and trade. Large Saudi expenditure on armaments and internal security forces, and the beefing up of American forces in the Gulf, has proved ineffective to ward off such drone, missile and naval attacks. This dangerous attack has been roundly condemned. Fortunately, no one was killed. But morality is one thing, realpolitik another. From the Iranian point of view, it is retaliation for US sanctions, backed by the Saudis, that have eliminated most of Tehran’s oil exports – a more severe blow than that suffered by Saudi Arabia on Saturday. The Iranians underestimated how far the US could bully unwilling allies into compliance, and how little Russia and China could and would do to help them out. But it is hard to say they miscalculated, as post the American abandonment of the JCPOA nuclear deal, they have not been presented with an offer capable of acceptance. The US-Saudi axis, on the contrary, has clearly miscalculated, thinking they could take actions at a time and place of their choosing without the risk of response. Repeatedly, Iran has shown an ability to throw them off balance. Untethered from the global market, constraints on Tehran have been broken. Of course, the question of why now invites speculation. Following the sacking of the US national security advisor, John Bolton, is Iran escalating again to de-escalate, or have the hardliners chosen to slam the door on diplomacy? This does seem like a vulnerable moment in Riyadh. The new Saudi oil minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, was tasked with accelerating the share listing of Aramco, now thrown into renewed doubt. He had only last week cajoled Iraq and Nigeria into promising better compliance with OPEC production cuts. Now they, Russia and the OPEC allies of the UAE and Kuwait have an excuse to resume all-out pumping. Retaliation will expose further Saudi vulnerabilities, and risk spiking oil prices and economic downturn ahead of the US election campaign, in a crisis many would see as Trump’s fault. Further offers of negotiation or sanctions waivers would look weak. Even if there are no further attacks for a while, the memory will linger. Riyadh’s strongest weapon, its oil industry, has been shown also to be its Sword of Damocles. Robin Mills is CEO of Qamar Energy, and author of “The Myth of the Oil Crisis.”
×
×
  • Create New...